Some Problems in Logic: Applications of Kripke's Notion of Fulfilment by Quinsey, J. E.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
10
54
0v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  2
3 A
pr
 20
19
Some Problems in Logic:
APPLICATIONS OF KRIPKE’S NOTION OF FULFILMENT
Joseph Emerson Quinsey
Submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
St Catherine’s College
Oxford
April 1980
Edited April 2019: The original thesis was type-written with hand-drawn symbols. This is a
transcription of into LaTeX. No changes have been made, except for the correction of some typos,
and the replacing of the Peano-Russell dot notation in formulas by parentheses.
Version date: April 25, 2019
ii
SOME PROBLEMS IN LOGIC
Joseph Emerson Quinsey
St Catherine’s College
Oxford
Hilary Term, 1980
This work is a study of S. Kripke’s notion of fulfilment. Motivated by the result of [5], Kripke was
looking for a proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem which was model-theoretic, natural (that is,
without self-reference), and easy. The resulting notion of fulfilment is very simple and it provides a
versatile tool for deriving a large number of results, both new and old (indeed, the oldest), and in both
Proof Theory and Model Theory.
In Chapter I, we give short and elegant proofs to a number of classical results; most of these are due to
Kripke. There are two new results. One, due to Kripke, is that there exists an easily definable subring
R of the ring of primitive recursive functions such that for any non-principal ultrafilter D on ω, R/D is
a recursively saturated model of Peano arithmetic. The other is that for any r.e. theory T extending PRA
and for any given r.e. set, we can feasibly find a Σ01 formula which semi-represents in T the given set;
and if T is not Σ01-sound, we can choose the formula to be ∆
0
1 (T).
Chapter II contains two distinct results. One answers a problem of [3] by showing that
{ pφq ∈ Π0k : φ is Σ0k-conservative over PA } (∗)
is a complete Π02 set. The second, when combined with the results of III, gives a version of Herbrand’s
Theorem and the relationship between the notions of proof and fulfilment.
III gives an exposition and extension of the Hilbert-Ackermann method of proving the consistency of
PA; our account is largely based on that of [6].
IV is an exposition and extension of the method in [1] for obtaining conservation results of the form:
Σ
1
2-AC is Π
1
3-conservative over (Π11-CA)<ε0↾. We give a general version of this and from it derive
a number of results for arithmetic, analysis, and set theory. Using III, we may also obtain uniform
versions: e.g.
∀α < ε0 (Π11-CA)α↾ ⊢ RFNΠ13 (Σ12-AC)
In V and VI we give some model-theoretic applications of fulfilment. V deals with non-ω-models and
is based on [4]. We also prove an extension of the theorem of D. Scott and [2] involving Weak König’s
Lemma, and we describe the order types of some sets of elementary initial segments of recursively
saturated models of certain theories. VI is an extension of [2]’s theorem on minimal models of analysis.
We develop the notion of indicator for countable fragments of L∞ω, and obtain a close parallel between
this and the first-order case. The chapter concludes with some representability results in ω-logic and
the analogue of (∗).
VII gives an exposition of the Paris-Harrington statement, deriving the sharp negative results established
by others, and we also give a strengthened version of a key combinatorial lemma of [5].
[1] H. Friedman, Iterated inductive definitions and Σ12-AC. Buffalo Conf. 1970
[2] —————, Countable models of set theories, Cambridge Summer School 1973
[3] D. Guaspari, Partially conservative extensions of arithmetic, TAMS 1979
[4] L. Kirby & J. Paris, Initial segments of models of PA, LNM 619 1977
[5] J. Paris & L. Harrington, A mathematical incompleteness in PA, Handbook 1977
[6] T. M. Scanlon, The consistency of number theory via Herbrand’s Thm, JSL 1973
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Introduction
The notion of fulfilment1 is due to S. Kripke2. Motivated by the Paris-Harrington result, he
was looking for a proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem which was model-theoretic, natural
(that is, without self-reference) and easy. The notion of fulfilment is very simple, and it is
implicit in much of mathematical logic. (Indeed, it is more or less stated in some of the early
works of Skolem, Herbrand and Gödel.) In making it explicit, we obtain a unifying notion with
applications in both Proof Theory and Model Theory.
Let us first consider model-theoretic proofs of proof-theoretic results. Fulfilment enables
us to give enlightening proofs of some classical results—proofs which do not use the fixed-
point theorem. Included here are: 1.4 Peano’s arithmetic, PA, is not finitely axiomatizable;
1.5 PA is not complete; and 1.10 the theory of N is not arithmetical. To dispense with the
fixed-point theorem, however, we must occasionally pay the price by considering only theories
which include enough Induction. This is well illustrated by 2.7 where we give two proofs of the
Essential Unboundedness Theorem of G. Kreisel and A. Levy [68]. Let us consider our proof 1.5
of the Incompleteness Theorem. When we apply it to theories not in the language of arithmetic,
say in the language of set theory or analysis, the independent sentences we first obtain are quite
complex as measured in terms of the number and types of quantifiers, e.g. Π2. But by weakening
the notion of fulfilment, we may obtain independent Π02 sentences. By weakening the notion still
further and using the fixed-point theorem, we may obtain independent Π01 sentences.
Next let us consider some results of a more recursion-theoretic flavour. Given any sufficiently
strong r.e. theory T and any Σ01 formula θx,3 we show in 1.12 how to feasibly (without the fixed-
point theorem) semi-represent the r.e. set { n ∈ω : θn } in T by a Σ01 formula ψx; indeed, if T is not
Σ
0
1-sound, we may choose ψ to be ∆
0
1 (T). In 2.8 we solve an open problem of D. Guaspari [79]
and R. Solovay by showing
{ θ ∈ Π0k : θ is Σ0k-conservative over PA }
to be a completeΠ02 set for each k ≥ 2; we also give a complete (in terms of quantifier complexity)
classification of the analogous sets for theories other than PA.
Thirdly, consider some proof-theoretic applications of fulfilment. In Chapter III we give an
exposition and slight generalization of the Hilbert-Ackermann method of proving the consistency
of theories such as PA; our account is largely based on that of T. Scanlon [73]. From our result
we may easily derive Herbrand’s Theorem 2.3, 2.5 and the Reflexiveness Theorem 2.4:
S + Induction ⊢ ∀n (Pr
PC
(pϕ nq) ⊃ ϕ n) ,
where S is any weak theory which is sufficient to perform the required coding, ϕ n is any formula
in the language of S with a single free variable of integer type, and the schema of Induction
ranges over all formulae in the language of S. Also from our proof we may obtain the sharp
1 The term “fulfillability” for “the notion of fulfilment” has the advantage of being one word as opposed to four. But
I will not use it, and instead shall usually abbreviate “the notion of fulfilment” by “fulfilment”.
2 I am greatly indebted to Professor Kripke for informing me of some of his results. In Chapter I, results 1.3, 1.4, 1.5,
1.7, 1.8, and 1.13 are due to him, as is the equivalence RFN(T) ≡ FUL(T) given in Chapter II. Professor Kripke also
informed me of the possibility of the exposition of the Herbrand-Ackermann-Scanlon method given in Chapter III.
3 Footnote added 2019: The notation here means that θ is a formula in the language of T which can be interpreted as
being Σ01 in the language of arithmetic. Also recall semi-represents here means that for all n ∈ ω, N  θn iff T ⊢ ψn.
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bounds of G. Minc [71] concerning subsystems of arithmetic, and the “No-Counter-Example
Interpretation” of G. Kriesel. Our result also gives, for example, the following. In KP + Infinity
we may define by a ∆0 predicate an ordering which is intuitively a well-ordering of order-type
εOn+1, the least ε-number greater than the class of ordinals. Then KP plus V =L plus the schema
of Foundation on this ordering implies the schema of Uniform Reflection for KP. We conclude
Chapter III with some conservation results for the schema of Induction over various theories of
analysis and set theory, and for the language of arithmetic augmented with an extra constant c,
conservation results for the schema of Induction up to c over various theories of arithmetic.
In Chapter IV we give an exposition and extension of H. Friedman’s [70] method of obtaining
conservation results of the form, e.g. Σ12-AC↾ is Π
1
3-conservative over Π
1
1-CA
↾, and Σ12-AC is Π
1
3-
conservative over (Π11-CA)<ε0↾, that is, axioms asserting that the relativized hyperjump may be
iterated α times for all α < ε0 but without the schema of Induction. The new results here are
uniform versions of the above: for example
∀n (Π11-CA)n↾ ⊢ RFNΠ13 (Σ12-AC↾ )
∀α < ε0 (Π11-CA)α↾ ⊢ RFNΠ13 (Σ12-AC)
where e.g. ∀n (Π11-CA)n↾ is an axiom asserting that the relativized hyperjump may be iterated n
times for each integer n. We give a large number of applications of our general theorems to set
theory, analysis and arithmetic; these results are for the most part known.
Next let us consider some model-theoretic applications. Theorem 1.13, due to S. Kripke, is
interesting and very simple: there exists an easily definable subring F of the ring of rudimentary
(or primitive recursive, or recursive, etc.) functions such that for any non-principle ultrafilter D
onω,F/D is a recursively saturated model of PA. Chapter V is concerned with non-ω-models of
first-order theories. (This is a rapidly expanding field, especially with regard to countable models
of arithmetic, and undoubtably many of the results contained herein are known to other workers
in the field. I have tried to give complete references, and, for my own results, acknowledge any
work independent of my own. But let me say that most of the results of V were inspired by, or are
due to, J. Paris and L. Kirby.) We first note that many results concerning nonstandard models of
arithmetic have nothing whatsoever to do with arithmetic, so we for the most part give our results
in more generality; that is, they apply to any model with sufficient coding abilities and satisfying
the appropriate Collection axioms. Theorem 5.3 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of certain initial segments which are models of coded theories, and indicators for the
same. We use this to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of initial segments
which are models of a given complete theory. In 5.11 we give a description of the order-types
of certain sets of elementary initial segments of a recursively saturated model of PA. In 5.9 we
give an extension of a result of L. Kirby, K. McAloon and R. Murawski concerning indicators in
models of arithmetic for models of analysis; the lemma 5.9 required is a common generalization
of a theorem of D. Scott and H. Friedman and the generalization of the MacDowell-Specker
Theorem (for countable models) by R.G. Phillips and H. Gaifman. It concerns finding extensions
of a countable model M of arithmetic which code a given countable class X of subsets of M; the
main requirement is that 〈M,X 〉 satisfy WKL: every infinite binary tree has an infinite branch.
In Chapter VI we consider analogues for the results of V for ω-models, or more generally,
models of theories contained in countable fragments of the infinitary language L∞ω. We start
by considering an extension of a result of H. Friedman [73]: there are no minimal models of
analysis, where analysis is assumed to contain the full schema of AC. We present a proof of this,
one which is essentially that of Friedman [73], but simpler and more general. The main idea is
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that in a non-β-model we can construct trees which are well-founded inside the model but not in
the real world; the desired substructure is then obtained from any infinite branch of such a tree.
Then we shall modify this construction using the notion of fulfilment to obtain the following
improvement: there are no minimal models of Σ11-BI. Indeed, in 6.8 we show that a sufficient
condition for a model A of a given Π11 theory T not to be a minimal model of T is that the notion
of a well-founded linear order is not Σ11/A, and this is also a necessary condition for A to be
non-minimal in a certain strong sense.
We develop the ideas contained in the above proof into a theory of indicators in, for example,
non-β-models of Σ11-AC and non-well-founded models of KP for theories contained in countable
fragments ofL∞ω . We obtain a striking parallel between the ω- and non-ω-model cases. Typical
instances of our main theorem 6.6 for, say, the language of set theory are as follows. If T is an r.e.
theory extending ZF−, then any non-β-model of T has, for each k ∈ ω, a k-elementary transitive
substructure which is a model of T. If T is an r.e. theory extending KP↾ + Π1-Foundation, then
any countable (or, more generally, locally countable) nonstandard model of T has a transitive
substructure which is a model of T, and moreover, we can choose the substructure to have
certain saturation properties. Theorem 6.6 also provides model-theoretic proofs of results in
Feferman [68].
Chapter VI is concluded with an analogue of 2.8. We show, for example, that if T is an r.e.
theory in the language of analysis extending Σ1
k
-AC with k ≥ 1, then
{ θ ∈ Σ1k+1 : θ is Π1k+1-conservative over T with the ω-rule }
and, if k ≥ 2,
{ θ ∈ Π1k : θ is Σ1k-conservative over T with the ω-rule }
are both Π01 in Kleene’s O, and are complete for this class of sets. We also prove a lemma
concerning the semi-representation of Π11 sets in r.e. theories T with the ω-rule: for example, if
T is not Π11-sound, then any Π
1
1 set may be semi-represented in T with the ω-rule by a formula in
∆
1
1 (T).
The final chapter is an exposition of the Paris-Harrington result. This chapter is presented
as an introduction for the general reader, and we give proofs of the truth and independence of
the Paris-Harrington statement, and we also show, by fairly simple model-theoretic means, the
sharp negative results established by the work of J. Ketonen, L. Kirby, G. Mills, J. Paris, and
R. Solovay. We also prove an optimal result, namely that for c = 2,
PA 0 ∀e ∃n
((e, n)−→∗ (e + 1)ec )
(this has also been proved independently by others) and we give the equivalence of the Paris-
Harrington statement with the Σ1-Uniform Reflection Principle of PA.
* * *
We shall use the following notation and abuses of notation; areas of logic where our abuses
would lead to trouble are, while important, not of interest to us here. We shall often not distinguish
between formulae, etc., and their codes, and it will often be implicitly assumed that some object
x codes a finite sequence 〈(x)0, (x)1, . . . , (x) |x |–〉.4 −⇀x ∈ y means that (x)i ∈ y for all i ≤ |x |–;
−⇀x < y, −⇀x ⊆ y are defined similarly.
4 Footnote added 2019: See page 7 for the notation |x |–. In the 1980 thesis, this was denoted λx.
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We shall often let the same metavariable represent both formal variables and parameter
variables; for example, we might say “if ∃xθx holds, choose a witness x”. When we say, for
example, that Collection is the schema
∀x ∈ a ∃y θ ⊃ ∃b∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ bθ ,
we mean that Collection is the set of universal closure of sentences of this form, where θ ranges
over all formulae of the language under consideration, and where suitable precautions are taken
to avoid collision of variables. A theory is a set of sentences.
When there is no risk of confusion, the same symbol “∈” will have three different uses: as a
symbol of our formal language, as a binary relation of some model under consideration, and with
its usual informal meaning. Likewise, we shall usually not need to distinguish between constant
or function symbols and their interpretation in some model. When we write f −⇀x we implicitly
assume that the length of −⇀x is equal to the arity of f . If f is of arity n, let f ′′A = f [An].
We shall be interested in models A = 〈A, ∈, . . . 〉 of a weak set theory. wf(A) is the well-
founded part ofA; we shall often implicitly suppose that wf(A) is equal to its transitive collapse.
A is nonstandard if it contains linear orderings which are internally well-founded but are not so
in the real world, and A is an ω-model if it does not contain non-standard integers. We shall
usually try to distinguish between “contains” and “includes”. A subset B of wf(A) is coded
in A if there exists b ∈ A such that B = { a ∈ wf(A) : A  a ∈ b }. If there is no risk of
confusion, the structure in which sentences, especially quantifier-free ones, are to be interpreted
will only be implicitly mentioned; for example, we should usually write the previous equation as
B = { a ∈ wf(A) : a ∈ b }.
A is a model of overspill (Σk-overspill) if for each (Σk) formula θx, possibly with parameters
from A, if θa holds in A for each standard ordinal a of A, then θa holds of some nonstandard
ordinal ofA, where here ordinal refers to any element of any internally well-founded linear order-
ing. A similar notion which is useful when dealing with weaker theories is this: A is recursively
saturated (Σ(k)-recursively saturated) if for any recursive set of (Σ(k)) formulae, with only a finite
number of free variables and perhaps a finite number of parameters fromA, if each finite subset is
realized inA, then the whole set is realized inA. (Σ(k) is the closure of Πk−1 under conjunction,
disjunction, and existential and bounded universal quantification; in the presence of Σk-Collection
and the pairing axiom, each Σ(k) formula is equivalent to a Σk formula.) A substructure B of
A is an initial segment (and A is an end-extension of B) if x ∈ A and y ∈ B with x ∈ y implies
x ∈ B; and a sub-structure B of A is cofinal in A if for all x ∈ A there exist n and x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,
y ∈B such that x ∈ x1 ∈ . . . ∈ xn ∈ y. A is locally countable if { y ∈ A : y ∈ x } is countable for all x ∈ A.
* * *
I should like first of all to thank my supervisor, Professor Dana Scott, and his substitute for
the academic year 1978-9, Dr Robin Gandy;5 and I am grateful to the Association of Common-
wealth Universities for enabling me to study in Britain for three years under the Commonwealth
Scholarship scheme. I should also like to thank Professor Saul Kripke for informing me of some
of his results and for several conversations. I am most grateful to Craig Smoryński and Alan
Adamson6 for many conversations and much correspondence, and for trying to teach me a little
logic. Alex Wilkie and Dan Isaacson kindly lent me a great many preprints and were always
5 Robin Gandy, 1919-1995.
6 Alan Adamson, 1949-2012.
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ready to lend an ear and offer suggestions; and I should like also to thank my fellow students at the
Mathematical Institute for patiently putting up with my often foolish questions and comments.
David Guaspari and Lawrence Kirby, among others, generously sent me preprints of their work.
I should also like to thank all those who have kindly set aside an hour or so to talk to me. I have
left my greatest debt till last: because of the constant, cheerful and uncomplaining support of my
dearest wife Katherine, I have dedicated this thesis to her.
St Catherine’s College, Oxford
1 April 1980
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I The Main Definition
In this first chapter we define the notion of fulfilment, along with several of its variants. After
a lemma giving some simple properties of this notion, we discuss its relationship to some of
the early work in Mathematical Logic by Skolem, Herbrand, and Gödel. Then, using fulfilment,
we give results on the completeness and finite axiomatizability of theories such as Peano’s
arithmetic—results whose proofs require only very simple model-theoretic arguments. Our
independent statements, however, suffer from the defect of being at best Π02 whereas Gödel’s
independent sentences are Π01. However, by making use of the fixed-point theorem, we shall
generate interesting independent Π01 (but self-referential) statements of a model-theoretic nature.
We shall close the chapter with three miscellaneous results. The first is a model-theoretic proof
(without self-reference) of Tarski’s Theorem: the theory of N is not arithmetical. The second
shows how we may give a feasible (without the use of the fixed-point theorem or the use of
such notions as pairs of recursively inseparable sets) semi-representation of any r.e. set in an
r.e. theory which is not necessarily Σ01-sound. Finally, we give a method of constructing models
of various theories in the language of arithmetic as quotients of certain “constructively given”
function rings.
Let L be any finite first-order language. Let (I, ≺) be any linearly ordered set with a minimal
element, which will be denoted by 0, and is such that each element i of I (except the maximal
element, if one exists) has an immediate successor, which will be denoted by i + 1.7 Let
σ = 〈Ai〉i∈I be a family of new unary predicate symbols, let |σ |– denote I less (if it exists) the
maximal element of I, and let |σ | = I. For each formula ϕ of L and for each i in |σ |– define the
(not necessarily first-order) formula ϕσ
i
inductively as follows. (Here i and j are understood to
range over |σ |–. When the context is clear, the superscript σ will be omitted.)
i. If θ is atomic, let θi = θ and (¬θ)i = ¬θ .
ii. (∃xθ)i = ∃x ∈ Ai+1θi .
iii. (∀xθ)i = ∀ j ≥ i ∀x ∈ Aj θ j , where j is a new variable.
iv. (¬∀xθ)i = (∃x ¬θ)i ;
(¬∃xθ)i = (∀x ¬θ)i .
v. Otherwise, θi is obtained from θ by replacing each positive instance of a Boolean atom ψ
of θ by ψi and each negative instance by ¬(¬ψ)i .
For example, if θ is quantifier-free, then (∀x ∃y ∀u ∃vθ)σ0 is just
∀i ≥ 0∀x ∈ Ai ∃y ∈ Ai+i ∀ j ≥ i ∀u ∈ Aj ∃v ∈ Aj+1θ ;
and (ϕ ⊃ ψ)σ
i
is ¬(¬ϕ)σ
i
⊃ ψσ
i
. σ is increasing if for all i in |σ |–, Ai ⊆ Ai+1, and σ is closed
if for each i in |σ |– and for each function f of L, f ′′Ai ⊆ Ai+1, and if each constant of L is
contained in A0. Let A = 〈A, . . . 〉 be a structure for L and for each i in I, let Ai be interpreted
as a non-empty subset of A. Let ϕ be any formula of L and let −⇀a be a valuation in A of the free
variables of ϕ. Say σ fulfils ϕ−⇀a , and write A  (ϕ−⇀a )σ , if:
A  (ϕ−⇀a )σ0 and σ is increasing and closed.
7 Footnote added 2019: Here 0 and + are overloaded notations, and we should perhaps write 0I and +I : for example,
if I is the set of positive odd integers, then 0I and +I are interpreted as stated, and the first element of σ would be
σ0|σ | . We will also abuse the von Neumann ordinal notation: when we write |σ |–= 3, we mean |σ |– = {0, 1, 2} (as
an ordered set), and so |σ | must be {0, 1, 2, 2+1}.
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(The last two requirements ensure that σ fulfils ∀x ∃y (x = y) and ∀−⇀x ∃y ( f −⇀x = y) for every
function symbol f .) We shall occasionally use the phrase |σ |–-fulfil when we wish to indicate
|σ |–. It will be convenient to allow a closed sequence of length one 〈A0〉 to vacuously fulfil any
statement.
The motivation behind this definition should be clear. For example, suppose ϕ is a sentence
which is true in a structure A. Then there exist many sequences of subsets of A which fulfil ϕ:
for example, the trivial sequence 〈A, A, A, . . . 〉. A more useful construction—one which is due
to Skolem—is as follows. Choose (using the axiom of choice) a set F of satisfaction functions
for ϕ: for example, if
ϕ = ∀x ∃y ∀u ∃vθxyuv
where θ is quantifier-free, choose f and g such that
A  ∀x ∀u θ(x, f x, u, gxu)
and set F = { f , g }. Let A0 , ∅ contain the (interpretations of the) constants of L and let
Ai+1 = ∪ f ∈L∪F f ′′Ai
for each i in ω. Then 〈Ai〉i<ω fulfils ϕ, as does every finite subsequence.
In Chapter III it will be convenient to use a slight variant of the above definition: let i and j
range over |σ | rather than |σ |–, and change clause (ii) above to read
(∃xθ)i =
{
∃x ∈ Ai+1θi+1 , if i ∈ |σ |–
true, otherwise.
The motivation behind this definition is also simple. In the above example, choose F to be a set
of so-called Skolem functions for the existential quantifiers of ϕ; that is, if ϕ is as before, choose
f and g such that
A  ∀x ∀u ∃vθ (x, f x, u, v)
and A  ∀x ∀y ∀u
(
∃vθxyuv ⊃ θ (x, y, u, gxyu)) .
Now if we define A0, A1, A2, . . . , as before, but using these Skolem functions rather than the
satisfaction functions, we obtain a sequence which fulfils ϕ according to this second notion of
fulfilment.
It is clear that if σ fulfils a sentence ϕ according to the first definition, then it also fulfils ϕ
according to the second. Furthermore, a moment’s thought shows that if σ = 〈σi〉i≤ |σ |– fulfils ϕ
according to the second definition, where |σ |– ≤ω, and if ϕ has k existential quantifiers, then the
sequence
〈σik〉ik≤ |σ |–
fulfils ϕ according to the first. Thus for our purposes the two notions are equivalent, and we shall
always use the first except in Chapters III and VII.
There are threemore variants of the notion of fulfilment which naturally occur. The definitions
are listed here below for ease of reference, even though it would perhaps be less daunting to the
reader, and clearer, if they were deferred until they were actually needed.
For the first variant, we do not start with a given fixed structure, but rather we consider
pairs (σ,A) where 〈σi〉i∈ |σ | is an increasing sequence of sets of new constant symbols, and A
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is a structure for L with domain ∪i∈ |σ | σi, and where σ is closed under the functions of L as
interpreted inA. (We do not need the function symbols ofL to be interpreted as total functions; it
suffices that they be defined wherever needed.) In our notation we shall not mention the structure
A explicitly. Say σ ∗fulfils a sentence of L, and write ϕ∗σ, if
A  ϕσ .
The raison d’être of the notion of ∗fulfilment is this. If ϕ is a sentence of any finite language L,
then the sentence
for all n ∈ ω, there exists σ with |σ |–= n which ∗fulfils ϕ
may, by the usual coding techniques, be expressed by a Π01 sentence of arithmetic (for we can
easily estimate an upper bound on the cardinality of σn, that is, of the structure A; the bound is
in fact an E3 function of n and the number of quantifiers in ϕ); whereas the sentence
for all n ∈ ω, there exists σ with |σ |–= n which fulfils ϕ
may not be expressed in arithmetic at all except when ϕ itself is in the language of arithmetic,
and even then it must in general be expressed by a Π02 sentence.
For our next definition we consider a languageLwhich contains (or, at least, some definitional
extension of it contains) a type (or a unary predicate symbol) ω, constant symbols 0 and 1, and
function symbols + and × whose domain is ω. A sequence σ (or more precisely, an ordered pair
(σ,A) half-∗fulfils a sentence ϕ, and we write ϕ 12 ∗σ, if: σ = 〈σi〉i∈ |σ | is an increasing sequence of
L sets which contain both constant symbols and integers; A is a structure with domain∪i∈ |σ | σi
in which the interpretation ofω consists of integers, and in which the interpretation of the symbols
0, 1, +, and × is the standard one; and
A  ϕσ .
Thus if ϕ is a sentence in the language of, say, set theory or analysis, we may express
for all n ∈ ω, there exists σ with |σ |–= n which 12∗fulfils ϕ
by a Π02 sentence of arithmetic. Note that we may also allow ϕ to have free variables of integer
type.
In our final variation of the notion of fulfilment, we consider structures A = 〈A, . . . 〉 for the
language of either set theory or arithmetic. The notion of i-fulfilment (for initial) is like that of
fulfilment, except we require of our sequences σ = 〈σi〉i∈ |σ |, in the case of arithmetic, that each
σi be an initial segment of A (i.e. x < y ∈ σi implies x ∈ σi), and in the case of set theory, that
for all i in |σ |–, x ∈ y ∈ σi implies x ∈ σi+1. In the case of arithmetic, (the internalized version
of) i-fulfilment gives a particularly elegant formulation of fulfilment, for rather than considering
sequences of sets of integers we can just consider sequences of integers, and say that σ = 〈σi〉i≤n
i-fulfils e.g. ∀x ∃yθ iff
∀i < n∀x < σi ∃y < σi+1θ .
We shall use this observation to simplify the statements or proofs of two or three results. One
could combine the notions of i-fulfilment and 12∗fulfilment, but we shall have little need for this.
Next we shall consider a few simple properties of the notion of fulfilment. The first two parts
of the following lemma are due to Kripke.
1.1 Lemma Let A = 〈A, . . . 〉 be any structure for L, let ϕ be any formula of L (which may
contain parameters from A) and let σ = 〈Ai〉i∈ |σ | be a sequence of subsets of A.
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i. If |σ |– is unbounded and if σ fulfils ϕ, then ϕ is true in
B = A ↾∪i∈ |σ |– Ai
ii. Let J ⊆ |σ | have aminimal element and be such that each element of J (except the maximal
element, if one exists) has an immediate successor in J, and let σ↾J = 〈Ai〉i∈J . If σ fulfils
ϕ, then σ↾J fulfils ϕ.
iii. If |σ | =ω, if 〈Ai〉i≤n fulfils ϕ for each n ∈ω, and if each Ai is finite, then 〈Ai〉i<ω fulfils ϕ.
Furthermore, i, ii, and iii also hold for ∗, 12∗, and i-fulfilment.
Proof: (i) Let ψ be obtained from ϕ by first eliminating all occurrences of “⊃ ” by use of “¬”
and “∨”, and then “pushing” all negations inside. From the definition of fulfilment, ψσ iff ϕσ.
Suppose ϕσ and so ψσ . Then χ holds in B, where χ is obtained from ψσ by removing the
bounds on the existential quantifiers. Working from the innermost quantifiers of χ outwards,
replace each quantifier pair of the form “∀ j ≥ i ∀x ∈ Aj” by “∀x”: each successive alteration
maintains the truth in B. Hence ψ, and ϕ, hold in B.
(ii) Again we may suppose that ϕ is in negation normal form. The result is now obvious.
(iii) The proof is by induction on the length of ϕ, which we can assume is in negation normal
form. There is nothing to prove if ϕ is quantifier-free, and the conjunction and disjunction steps
are trivial. Let σ↾ (n + 1) = 〈Ai〉i≤n. For the induction to work, we need to show a bit more: for
all k ≥ 0 and all θ with any evaluation of its free variables, θσ
k
iff ∀n > k θσ↾(n+1)
k
.
For the universal quantifier we have
∀n > k (∀x ϕ)σ↾(n+1)k
iff ∀n > k ∀i ≥ k ∀x ∈ Ai ϕσ↾(n+1)i , by definition, with i new, i < n
iff ∀i ≥ k ∀x ∈ Ai ∀n > i ϕσ↾(n+1)i
iff ∀i ≥ k ∀x ∈ Ai ϕσi , by our induction hypothesis
iff (∀x ϕ)σk , by definition.
For the existential quantifier,
∀n > k (∃x ϕ)σ↾(n+1)k
iff ∀n > k ∃x ∈ Ak+1 ϕσ↾(n+1)k , by definition
and because Ak+1 is finite,8 9 by the pigeon-hole principle this holds
iff ∃x ∈ Ak+1 such that for infinitely many n > k, ϕσ↾(n+1)k
iff ∃x ∈ Ak+1 ∀n > k ϕσ↾(n+1)k , by (ii)
iff ∃x ∈ Ak+1 ϕσk , by the induction hypothesis
iff (∃x ϕ)σk , by definition. 
Now that the above machinery has been set up, we can give a succinct account of some of
the earliest work in Mathematical Logic. As already mentioned, Skolem in [20], in his proof of
8 Footnote added 2019: The finiteness is generally needed. For example, consider the sentence “the odd numbers are
bounded” in the language L = {even, <} given by ∃x ∀y
(
x < y ⊃ even(y)) . Let A0 be the even natural numbers. Add
the first odd number to A1, the second to A2, etc. Each finite subsequence fulfils the sentence, but the whole does not.
9 Footnote added 2019: But for many applications the finiteness restriction can be bypassed. If L has coding abilities,
and A is recursively saturated or is a model of Σ1-overspill, and if ϕ is n-fulfillable for all n, then ϕ is ω-fulfillable.
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Löwenheim’s Theorem, observed that if a sentence θ is true in a structure A, then by the axiom
of choice we can find a sequence 〈σi〉i∈ω of finite subsets of A which fulfils θ; A ↾∪i σi will
then be a countable substructure of A which is a model of θ.
In [22], [28], and [29], Skolem saw that this shows
if θ is satisfiable, then ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θ∗σ) , (1)
and, moreover, the converse is also true, by a simple argument using König’s Infinity Lemma.
Skolem pointed out (in [28]) that this gives a proof procedure which, as we see, is cut-free and
has the subformula property. (Aside: Kripke has pointed out an elegant, nonstandard argument
for the converse of (1). Suppose ∀n∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧θ∗σ). Then in any proper elementary extension
of N we can find (the code of) a sequence σ of nonstandard length which ∗fulfils θ. Then by
1.1.i and ii, θ is true in the structure determined by σ with domain∪ n standard σn.)
In [30], Herbrand gave an (incomplete) proof of
⊢ ¬θ implies ¬∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θ∗σ) (2)
and its converse; moreover, his proof is effective in that we may obtain primitive recursively a
witness n from any proof of ¬θ, and conversely, a (bound on the) proof from any witness n.
From the converses of (1) and (2) wemay immediately obtain, as many people have remarked,
theCompleteness Theorem ofGödel [30]. Gödel’s proofwas, very roughly, as follows. He proved
the converse of (1) as Skolem did, so let us consider the converse of (2). First note that for each
formula θ of L and each integer n, we may express the notion
∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θσ) (3)
in the language of L by writing out the elements of the terms in explicitly. For example,
if θ = ∀x ∃yψxy, with ψ quantifier-free, and if the language L has no function symbols or
constants, we may write (3) as
∃x0, x1, . . . , xn
∧
i<n ψ xi xi+1,
With this understanding, we can show that, in any axiomatization of the predicate calculus which
we may wish to consider, for each n ∈ ω,
⊢ θ ⊃ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θσ). (4)
So now to show the converse of (2), suppose for some n, ¬∃σ ( |σ |– = n ∧ θ∗σ). Then
 ¬∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θσ). But this is essentially a propositional formula, and as the proposi-
tional calculus is complete, we have ⊢ ¬∃σ ( |σ |–= n∧ θσ). Hence by (4), ⊢ ¬θ. Note that this
proof is also effective.
This completes our discussion of early logic. We shall next consider various incompleteness
results.
To obtain these results, we shall need to be able to formalize the notion of fulfilment. Wewish
our results to be applicable to many different areas—arithmetic, analysis, and set theory—and so
to state them in the necessary generality, we shall usually consider some fixed but arbitrary r.e.
theory S of L in which a notion of membership ∈ may be defined so that S proves
Pair : ∀x, y ∃z
(
x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ x ∧ ∀u ∈ z (u = x ∨ u = y)) , and
Union : ∀x ∃y (∀z ∈ x ∀u ∈ z u ∈ y ∧ ∀u ∈ y ∃z ∈ x u ∈ z) .
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(For example, in arithmetic, say x ∈ y if
∃s, t (t < 2x ∧ y = s2x+1 + 2x + t) ,
and in analysis, extend the usual notion of membership ∈ ⊂ ω × Pω by the class
{ (X,Y ) : ∃n∀m (m ∈ X ≡ 〈n,m〉 ∈ Y ) }
where λnm.〈m,n〉 is a standard pairing function on the integers.) Furthermore, we shall assume
that some notion of natural number may be defined in S, and that S proves ∆1(S)-Induction,
where as usual we have
∆0 = Π0 = Σ0 = closure of atomic formulae under ∧, ∨,¬, ∀x ∈ y, ∃x ∈ y
Σk+1 = closure of Πk under ∃x and equivalences in the PC
Πk+1 = dual of Σk+1
∆k+1(T) = formulae provably equivalent in T to a Σk+1 and a Πk+1 formula .
Let 0 denote the first natural number as represented in S, 1 the second, etc. Finally, we shall
suppose that S proves that some Σ1 formula is a satisfaction predicate for ∆0 formulae. This latter
assumption may often be omitted, but it makes our exposition somewhat easier. In particular, it
enables us to treat various restricted schemata as single sentences, which saves us the trouble of
picking the appropriate instances. Also, for certain proof-theoretic results we shall need that S
proves the fourth Grzegorczyk function E4 is total.
Among the schemata which we will find useful to consider are:
Induction : θ0 ∧ ∀n (θn ⊃ θ(n + 1)) ⊃ ∀nθn ,
Foundation : ∃xθx ⊃ ∃x (θx ∧ ∀y ∈ x ¬θy) ,
Separation : ∃b∀x ∈ a (x ∈ b ≡ θ) ,
Collection : ∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y θ ⊃ ∃b∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y ∈ b θ , and
Bounding : ∃b∀x ∈ a (∃yθ ⊃ ∃y ∈ b θ)
where b does not occur free in θ. Λ-Induction, etc., is the schema of Induction with θ restricted
to Λ. Infinity is the axiom asserting that the integers form a set. The variables n and m in will
always be restricted to the integers.
One base theory we shall occasionally consider is PA−ex, that is, arithmetic with axioms
for addition, multiplication, exponentiation and membership, and with induction limited to ∆0
formulae.
The relation
(ϕ−⇀a )σi
may be expressed as a∆1 (S) predicate ofσ, i, (the code of the sequence) −⇀a , and (theGödel number
of) ϕ, and henceforth this notation will implicitly refer to some such suitable representation. If
σ satisfies the extra requirement for i-fulfilment, we write i(σ). For a formula T(x) (which, as
the notation suggests, is to be considered as representing a class of sentences) let (T)σ denote
∀ pθq ∈ |σ |– (T(pθq) ⊃ θσ ) .
For a formula θ−⇀x , let (Tr θ−⇀x )σ denote
∀i ∈ |σ |– ∀−⇀x ∈ σi
(
θ
−⇀x ⊃ (θ−⇀x )σi
)
,
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and let (Tr Σk)σ denote
∀i, pθq ∈ |σ |– ∀x ∈ σi
(
SatΣk (pθq, x) ⊃ (θ x)σi
)
where SatΣk (e, x) is a standard satisfaction predicate for formulae with one free variable. Paren-
theses will usually be omitted when there is no risk of ambiguity.10
By formalizing Skolem’s argument above, we obtain:
1.2 Lemma For each formula ϕ−⇀x and each integer k,
∀
−⇀x
(
ϕ
−⇀x ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ ϕ−⇀x σ ∧ TrΣkσ)
)
is provable in S + Induction. 
We omit the proof and just remark that although ϕ may not have definable satisfaction functions,
using Induction we can still define some suitable finite approximations which will suffice to carry
out the construction. If the schema of Collection is also assumed, we may require that iσ hold.
In the presence of a strong theory such as ZF, we also have a simple proof Lemma 1.2 via the
set-theoretical reflection principle—although the usual proofs of this principle (see, for example,
Krivine [71]) make implicit use of the notion of fulfilment. Thus for the study of theories as
strong as ZF, the notion of fulfilment is unnecessary; indeed, much of the value of fulfilment
stems from the fact that by using it, we can mimic arguments of ZF in much weaker theories. If
the negation of Infinity is assumed, the schema of Collection is implied in S by that of Induction
(see remarks in Chapter 4 on page 41); and so in particular we have
PA ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ iσ ∧ ϕσ ∧ Tr Σkσ) .
The proof of the next theorem is the template for many later results. Let fulϕ(n, σ) be either
|σ |–= n ∧ n ∈ σ0 ∧ iσ ∧ ϕσ
or |σ |–= n ∧ n ∈ σ0 ∧ Tr∆0σ ∧ ϕσ .
1.3 Theorem (Kripke) If ϕ is a sentence consistent with S + ∆0-Foundation,
ϕ ⊃ ∀n ∃σ fulϕ(n, σ) (5)
is not a theorem of the predicate calculus.
Proof: Let A = 〈A, . . . 〉 be any non-ω-model of S + ∆0-Foundation, ϕ, and (5). Pick any
nonstandard n in A and by ∆0-Foundation choose τ in A so that fulϕ(n, τ) holds but for no σ ∈ τn,
does fulϕ(n, σ) hold. By Lemma 1.1, B = A ↾∪i∈ω τi is a model for ϕ, and as the formula fulϕ
is absolute between A and B, for no element σ of B does fulϕ(n, σ) hold. 
1.4 Corollary (Ryll-Nardzewski, Mostowski; this proof due to Kripke) No consistent extension
of S + ∆0-Foundation + Induction is finitely axiomatizable.
Proof: Suppose ϕ is an axiom for such a theory. By Lemma 1.2
ϕ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ∀n ∃σ fulϕ
and so ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ∀n ∃σ fulϕ .
10 Footnote added 2019: To clarify, for a formula T(x) in the language of S, we denote T = {x : T(x)}, and let
Tσ := ∀θ ∈ T ∩ |σ |– θσ
TrTσ := ∀i ∈ |σ |– ∀θ ∈ T ∩ σi (θ ∈ T)σi .
The notation “Tr ” in the second phrase is perhaps unfortunate: it has little to do with truth, and merely ensures that
the notion of being an axiom of T persists in the submodels we create.
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This contradicts the theorem. 
1.5 Corollary (Kripke) Let T be any consistent theory extending S + ∆0-Foundation which is
semi-representable in T. Then
∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ n ∈ σ0 ∧ Tr∆0σ ∧ TrTσ ∧ Tσ)
is not provable in T, where “T” in this sentence is understood to be any formula which semi-
represents T in T. In particular, there is a true Π02 sentence not provable in PA, and a true Σ1
sentence not provable in ZFC (assuming ZFC has a standard model). 
This corollary may either be proved by the same method or, if “T” is Π1, be derived from 1.3; we
omit the proof. (See, however, 1.10 below.)
Corollary 1.5 is of course weaker the Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem [31] which gives
(true) Π01 sentences which are not provable in PA and ZF; furthermore, 1.5 does not apply to
theories without the schema of ∆0-Foundation. But we can improve our results as follows. By
use of the notion of 12∗fulfilment, the proofs of 1.3 and 1.5 yield Π02 sentences which independent
of, say A2 and ZF, respectively, as stated in 1.6 below, and we also have that A2 is not finitely
axiomatizable. By making use of the fixed-point theorem, however, we may obtain independent
Π
0
1 sentences as in 1.8 below.
1.6 Theorem If ϕ is a sentence consistent with S then
ϕ ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ n ∈ σ0 ∧ Tr∆00σ ∧ ϕ
1
2 ∗σ)
is not a theorem of the predicate calculus, and so no consistent extension of S + Induction is
finitely axiomatizable. (Here it is immaterial whether we write Tr∆00
σ or Tr∆00
1
2 ∗σ.) And if T is
a consistent theory extending S which is semi-representable in (some consistent extension of) T,
then
∀n∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ n ∈ σ0 ∧ Tr∆00σ ∧ TrT
1
2 ∗σ ∧ T 12 ∗σ
is not provable in T, where “T” in this sentence is understood to be the representation of T. 
The proof of 1.6 is almost word-for-word the same as those of 1.3 and 1.4 and is left to the reader.
We have exhibited sentences which are not provable in various theories T, but without some
extra assumptions on T their negations may very well be provable. Let us consider, for example,
an r.e. theory T in the language of arithmetic. If T is Σ01-sound, the sentence of 1.5 is a true Π
0
2 not
provable in T, and so if T is also Σ02-sound, its negation is not provable. By use of the fixed-point
theorem, however, we may obtain independent sentences without this soundness hypothesis.
1.7 Theorem (Rosser; this proof, Kripke) Suppose T extends S and that T is binumerated in
(some consistent extension of) T. Then T is not complete.
Proof: Choose θ so that T proves:
θ ≡ ∀n (∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ θσ) ⊃ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ (¬θ)σ)) ,
where “T” in this sentence is to be understood as above. We claim that θ is neither provable nor
refutable in T. Let A be any model of T (plus the theory { T(pθq) : θ ∈ T }).
Suppose θ holds inA. We can assume that overspill holds inA, for otherwise we just consider
some recursively saturated elementary extension ofA. For each n in ω, ∃σ ( |σ |–= n∧ Tσ ∧ θσ)
holds in A and so it must hold for some nonstandard n in A. Then ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ (¬θ)σ)
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also holds for this n. Let σ be any witness to this and let B = A ↾∪i∈ω σi. Then B is a model
of T and ¬θ.
Suppose ¬θ holds in A. Let n be any witness to ¬θ; n is necessarily nonstandard. Then
∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ θσ). Let σ be any witness to this and let B = A ↾∪i∈ω σi. Then B is a
model of T and θ. 
If T is r.e., the above independent sentence is (equivalent to one which is) Π2. By using
1
2∗fulfilment instead of fulfilment, we may obtain an independent Π02 sentence. However, with
∗fulfilment we can obtain an independent Π01 sentence, namely:
1.8 Corollary (Kripke)11 If T is a consistent r.e. theory extending S and if
T ⊢ θ ≡ ∀n (∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T∗σ ∧ θ ∗σ) ⊃ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T∗σ ∧ (¬θ)∗σ))
where “T” here is understood to be any ∆00 formula which gives an axiomatization of T, then θ is
(equivalent to) a Π01 sentence which is independent of T. If θ is such that
T ⊢ θ ≡ ∀n∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T∗σ ∧ (¬θ)∗σ )
then θ is (equivalent in T to) a true Π01 sentence not provable in T. 
The proof is identical to that of 1.7, and is omitted. We remark that these θ’s are not, however,
very novel independent sentences: by corollary 2.5 below, they are provably equivalent in S to a
Rosser sentence and to Con(T), respectively.
1.9 Corollary If T is, say, an r.e. extension of S and if k ≥ 1, there is a Πk+1 sentence ψ which is
Σk+1-conservative over T, and whose negation is Πk+1-conservative over T; namely, choose any
θ for which T proves
θ ≡ ∀n (∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧Tσ∧Tr Σkσ∧θσ) ⊃ ∀x ∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧ x ∈σ0∧Tσ∧Tr Σk−1σ∧(¬θ)σ)) ,
and let ψ be the right-hand-side of this equivalence. 
For the definitions of the concepts involved here, and for an indication of the proof, see Chapter II,
pages 25ff.
For the remainder of the chapter we shall eschew the use of the fixed-point theorem. The
next theorem may also be obtained as a corollary of 1.5.
1.10 Theorem (Tarski)12 The theory of N is not arithmetical.
Proof: Suppose an arithmetical formula T(x) represents the theory of N in N, and let θ(n, σ) be
|σ |–= n∧ n ∈ σ0 ∧ Tσ ∧ (Tr T)σ ∧ Tr∆0σ .
Then N  ∀n ∃σ θ(n, σ) . (6)
Let A be a proper elementary extension of N. Choose a nonstandard n in A and let σ ′ in A be
the least witness to ∃σ θ(n, σ). Then B = A ↾∪i∈ω σ ′i is also a model of the theory of N which
contains n. The formula T is absolute between A and B, and hence so is θ. But by our choice of
σ ′, there is no witness in B for ∃σ θ(n, σ), which contradicts (6). 
11 This corollary, along with the notion of ∗fulfilment, was also discovered independently by the author.
12 Kripke has also obtained a similar proof.
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By using the notion of 12∗fulfilment, the above proof immediately yields:
1.11 Corollary If A is any ω-model of S, the theory of A is not definable over A by any
parameter-free formula of L. 
D. Scott [62] was probably the first to use nonstandard models to prove Tarski’s Theorem.
His proof, which is related to arguments of Feferman and Tennenbaum, is as follows. By
Henkin’s proof of the Completeness Theorem, if Th(N) is arithmetical there exists a non-standard
arithmetical model A = 〈ω, 0, 1, ⊕, ⊗〉 of Th(N). Let
δ(n) = 1 ⊕ 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ 1 (n times);
this is primitive recursive in the function ⊕. Choose a formula ψ such that ψ(n) holds in N iff
A  δ(n) < n. Because A and N are elementarily equivalent, N  ψ(n) iff A  ψ(n). Let m be
a (nonstandard) element of A coding the set { n : A  ψ(n) }. Then
A  n ∈ m iff A  ψ(n) iff N  ψ(n) iff A  n < n .
The substitution of m for n gives a contradiction. This proof may also be generalized to give 1.11
above.
1.12 Theorem Let T ⊇ S be any consistent r.e. theory and let { n : N  ∃mχmn } be any r.e.
set, where χ is ∆00. Then we can feasibly semi-represent this set in T by the Σ
0
1 formula
ψ = ∃m ∃σ
( |σ |–= m ∧ T 12 ∗σ ∧ Tr∆00 12 ∗σ ∧ χmn) ,
where “T” here is understood to be ∆00 formula which gives an axiomatization of T. 
The proof contains no new ideas, and is left to the reader. I am not sure of the correct notion of
feasible; we have that
the length of ψ = the length of χ + a constant independent of χ ;
whereas a result of Parikh [71] seems to suggest that any semi-representation obtained in the
usual manner via the fixed-point theorem would not have this property. An extension of 1.12,
giving a ψ in ∆01 (T) for non-Σ01-sound T is contained in the proof of 2.8 in the next chapter.
Our next result complements the discussion in Scott [61].
1.13 Theorem (Kripke, Kochen, Friedman) Let G be any collection of functions from ω to ω
containing an unbounded non-decreasing function and which is closed under composition and
bounded recursion. Let T be any Σ01-sound set of sentences extending PA whose characteristic
function is in G. There exists a function g(n, x) in G such that if F is any collection of functions
including G and which is closed under composition and bounded recursion and if D is any
non-principal ultrafilter on ω, then
B = { f ∈ F : f unary and ∃n ∀x ( f x < gnx) } /D
is a (recursively saturated) model of T.
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Sketch of proof: Let h(x) be an unbounded, non-decreasing function in G. Define:
m(x) =
{
max { m < hx : ∃σ < hx ( |σ |–= m ∧ iσ ∧ Tσ) }, if this exists,
0, otherwise;
σ(x) =
{
min { σ < hx : |σ |–= mx ∧ iσ ∧ Tσ }, if mx , 0,
0, otherwise;
g(n, x) =
{
(σx)n, if n ≤ mx,
0, otherwise,
where for this definition we are using the notion of i-fulfilment as described on page 9. For any
non-principal ultrafilter D, consider the structure A = { f ∈ F : f unary }/D. Then σ/D is (the
code of) a sequence in A of nonstandard length m/D which i-fulfils each standard sentence of
T. Hence
⋃
n∈ω{ x ∈A : x < (σ/D)n } is a (recursively saturated) model of T. But this is exactly
the structure B in question. 
The above result is essentially due to Kripke. From the embedding technique of Fried-
man [73], one may obtain:
Theorem If A is a model of ∆00-overspill and T is a Σ
0
1-sound set of sentences extending PA
coded in A, then there exists a recursively saturated initial segment B of A which is a model of
T. 
However, in a unpublished typescript (of which Kripke was not aware), Friedman [7x] shows a
result which to mymind is much more interesting: one can canonically define the initial segment.
This, together with the observation that we may take A to be F/D, will yield Theorem 1.13.
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II Herbrand’s Theorem and Reflection Principles
In this second chapter we begin a more detailed study of the notion of fulfilment. Using a
combinatorial result from the next chapter, we use fulfilment to derive a version of Herbrand’s
Theorem. As a corollary, we can show that the notion of fulfilment is fairly stable: for example,
if
⊢ θ ≡ ϕ
then in any structure A, for all n there exists a sequence of subsets of A which n-fulfils θ if
and only if for all n there exists such a sequence which n-fulfils ϕ; and moreover, there exists a
primitive recursive function g(n) such that there is a constructive method of obtaining a sequence
n-fulfilling θ from one g(n)-fulfilling ϕ. As another corollary, we obtain the Reflexiveness
Theorem for theories such as PA. We go on to compare a number of minor variants of schemata
involving fulfilment with various proof-theoretic reflection principles, and then we give two
proofs of the main theorem of Kreisel and Levy [68]. We conclude the chapter by solving a
problem of Guaspari and Solovay concerning the complexity of
{ θ ∈ Λ1 : θ is Λ2-conservative over T }.
In this chapter Γ will always denote an finite set of formulae and we shall say that a sequence σ
fulfils Γ ∨ ¬Γ, and write (Γ ∨ ¬Γ)σ, if σ fulfils ∀−−⇀xθ (θ ∨ ¬θ) for each θ in Γ, where −−⇀xθ is a list
of the free variables of θ. Let S be as on page 11; the language of T here can be unrelated to that
of S.
The following is the main lemma of this chapter.
2.1 Lemma If a sentence ϕ is provable in a universal theory T, then there exists n and a finite
set of formulae Γ, depending on the proof, such that in any model of T there exists no sequence
which n-fulfils ¬ϕ and Γ ∨ ¬Γ.
If we ignore the reference to Γ (as we shall be able to do using 3.6 below) this is just a version of
Herbrand’s Theorem.
First we need a simple lemma. Define the rank of a formula as follows. θ is of rank 0 if it is
quantifier-free, θ is of rank k if it is a Boolean combination of formulae of rank at most k, and
Qxθ is of rank k + 1 if θ is of rank k.
2.2 Lemma If θ is of rank k, then θ∧¬θ is not k + 1-fulfillable in any structure and for any
valuation of its free variables.
The proof of 2.2 is an easy induction on the complexity of θ, but because such a proof obscures the
reason why 2.2 is true, we shall consider instead a simple example and leave the complete proof
to the reader. Let θ = ∀x ∃y ∀u ∃vψ, where ψ is quantifier-free, and let σ = 〈A0, A1, . . . , A5〉.
Then θσ implies
∀x ∈ A1 ∃y ∈ A2 ∀u ∈ A3 ∃v ∈ A4 ψ
while (¬θ)σ implies the negation. Hence not (θ ∧ ¬θ)σ. 
Proof of 2.1: We use induction on the length of proof, and we shall specify what n and Γ should
be as we carry out our induction. First we need to select some formal first-order system: for
example, consider the following Hilbert-style system.
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Axiom schemata:
1. All tautologies.
2. All equality axioms.
3. All formulae of either the forms
(∀xθx) ⊃ θt, θt ⊃ (∃xθx)
where t is any term free for x in θx.
Rules of Inference:
1. Modus Ponens:
θ θ ⊃ ψ
ψ
2. Generalization:
θ ⊃ ψx
θ ⊃ ∀xψx
ψx ⊃ θ
∃xψx ⊃ θ where x is not free in θ.
This system has the advantage that the only difficult step (i.e. the only step involving Γ) in our
induction corresponds to Modus Ponens. (This is not to say that using, for example, a cut-free
sequent calculus would be any easier; in that case it would be the ∃-introduction rule which
would be difficult.)
Let T be any set of universal sentences. By induction on the length of proof, we shall show
that for any formula θ there exists n and Γ such that Γ ∨ ¬Γ plus the negation of the universal
closure of θ is not n-fulfillable in any structure for T.
If θ is an axiom of T, then ¬(¬θ)σ for any σ because θ is universal; likewise for the equality
axioms.
Let θ be a tautology. As fulfilment is preserved under truth preserving Boolean transforma-
tions, we may consider the normal form of ¬θ consisting of a disjunction of conjuncts. Then
each of these conjuncts must contain both ψ and ¬ψ for some formula ψ. Let n be greater than
the ranks of all such ψ. By 2.2, the existential closure of θ is not n-fulfillable.
Next consider the axiom θt ⊃ ∃xθ. Let the height of a constant or variable be 0, and for each
function symbol f , let the height of f −⇀u be 1 plus the maximum of the heights of its arguments.
Let −⇀v be a list of the free variables of θt ⊃ ∃xθ and let σ = 〈A0, . . . , An〉. Unravelling the
definition, ¬ (¬∀−⇀v (θt ⊃ ∃xθ))σ iff ∀−⇀v ∈ A1 ((θt)0 ⊃ ∃i < n ∃x ∈ Ai ¬(¬θx)i ) . Fix −⇀v ∈ A1, and
suppose (θt)0. By Lemma 1.1.ii, (θt)k for all k < n. In particular, (θt)h for h the height of t. If n
is greater than h plus the rank of θ, then ¬(¬θt)h by Lemma 2.2. Thus ∃i < n∃x ∈ Ai ¬(¬θx)i ,
and we are done. Since fulfilment is preserved by “moving negations in or out”, the dual form
follows.
For Generalization, let σ = 〈A0, . . . , An〉 and note that
¬(¬ ∀−⇀v , x (θ ⊃ ψx))σ iff ∀−⇀v , x ∈ A1 (θ0 ⊃ ¬(¬ψx)0)
iff ∀−⇀v ∈ A1 (θ0 ⊃ ¬(¬∀xψx)0)
iff ¬(¬ ∀−⇀v (θ ⊃ ∀xψx))σ .
For Modus Ponens, let −⇀u , −⇀v , and −⇀w be listings of the free variables of ψ, θ, and θ ⊃ ψ,
respectively. Suppose that θ is in Γ and that we have a sequence τ which n + 1-fulfils ¬∀−⇀u ψ−⇀u
and Γ ∨ ¬Γ. If n is large enough then by 2.2, τ fulfils ∀−⇀v θ. If we let σ be τ less its first term,
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say σ = 〈A0, . . . , An〉, then ∃−⇀u ∈ A0 (¬ψ)σ0 and ∀−⇀v ∈ A0θσ0 . Hence ∃−⇀w ∈ A1 (θσ0 ∧ (¬ψ)σ0 ), that
is, σ n-fulfils ¬∀−⇀w (θ ⊃ ψ) and Γ ∨ ¬Γ, contradicting our induction hypothesis.
This concludes the proof of 2.1. 
Next we shall quote a result, paraphrased, from the next chapter page 33, which allows us to
eliminate the mention of Γ in Lemma 2.1.
3.6 Theorem For any structure A for L and any sentence θ of L, for all n there
exists a sequence of subsets of A which n-fulfils θ if and only if for all n and for
all finite sets Γ of formulae of L there exists such a sequence which n-fulfils θ and
Γ ∨ ¬Γ. Moreover, the proof of this is effective in the following sense. Given n, Γ,
and θ, we may obtain an m primitive recursively (in fact, by a function in E4) from
n and the number of quantifiers in θ and Γ such that if in some structure we have a
sequence σ which m-fulfils θ, we may constructively obtain a sequence σ ′ from σ
which n-fulfils θ and Γ ∨ ¬Γ. Thus we also have the formal versions:
PRA ⊢ ∀θ ( ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θ∗σ) ≡ ∀n, Γ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θ∗σ ∧ (Γ ∨ ¬Γ)∗σ ) )
where θ (Γ) ranges over (the codes of) sentences (finite sets of formulae, respectively)
of L, and assuming that S proves the functions in E4 are total,
S ⊢ ∀θ ( ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θσ) ≡ ∀n, Γ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ θσ ∧ (Γ ∨ ¬Γ)σ ) )
where θ and Γ are as before but with L the language of S. 
From 2.1 and 3.6 we may immediately obtain Herbrand’s Theorem. A formalized version of this
is:
2.3 Corollary (Herbrand)
S ⊢ ∀θ (Pr
PC
(θ) ⊃ ¬∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ (¬θ)σ)
)
where Pr
PC
is any natural proof predicate for the Predicate Calculus and θ ranges over (the codes
of) sentences in the language of S. 
Results 1.2 and 2.3 immediately give:
2.4 The Reflexiveness Theorem For each formula ϕx in the language of S
S + Induction ⊢ ∀n (Pr
PC
(ϕ Ûn) ⊃ ϕn
)
.
where ϕ Ûn is (the code of) the sentence obtained by substituting the term n for x in ϕx. 
For any formula T(x) let Pr
T
(θ) = ∃ finite X ⊆ T Pr
PC
(∧ X ⊃ θ). An alternative formaliza-
tion of Herbrand’s Theorem is:
2.5 Corollary If T is a formula in the language of S,
S ⊢ ∀θ (Pr
T
(θ) ⊃ ¬∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ (¬θ)σ ) ) ,
and if T is a formula in the language of arithmetic,
PRA ⊢ ∀θ (Pr
T
(θ) ≡ ¬∀n∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T∗σ ∧ (¬θ)∗σ ) ) ,
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where θ has the appropriate ranges.
Proof: That the converse direction also holds for ∗fulfilment is given by Gödel’s proof of the
Completeness Theorem as discussed on page 11. 
We may restate 2.5 perhaps more elegantly by using the fact that S proves:
∀θ
(
¬∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧Tσ∧(¬θ)σ ) ≡ ∀ϕ (∀n∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧Tσ∧ϕσ) ⊃ ∀n∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧Tσ∧ϕσ∧θσ)) )
and PRA proves the ∗fulfilment version. The left to right direction is immediate from 3.6 by
taking Γ = {¬θ}, and the converse is obtained from (the formalized version of) 2.2 by taking
ϕ = ¬θ.
If we wished to avoid the use of 3.6 we could, for example, restate 2.5 as
S ⊢ ∀θ (Pr
T
(θ) ≡ ¬∀n, Γ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ (¬θ)σ ∧ (Γ ∨ ¬Γ)σ ) )
and similarly for ∗fulfilment. Likewise, in the next theorem we could avoid the use of 3.6 by
making analogous changes to all the following schemata which involve fulfilment. Of course, if
S proves that the theory T contains all sentences of the form ∀−⇀x (θ ∨¬θ), then this alteration has
no effect, and it also has no effect for (a natural axiomatization of) a theory such as PA, where
the induction schema contains sentences which are essentially just ∀−⇀x (θ ⊃ θ).
Next we shall use 2.5 to explore minor variants of different sentences and schemata and to
compare these with various reflection principles. To concentrate on the case which is of most
interest to us, let us suppose that all formulae below are in the language of S, that S has a ∆00
axiomatization, and that S proves that T is an extension of S. First consider the schemata:
Ful(T) : ϕ ⊃ ∀n∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ ϕσ)
FUL1(T) : ∀m
(
ϕm ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ (ϕ Ûm)σ ) )
FUL2(T) : ∀x
(
ϕx ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ (ϕx)σ ) )
and the sentences
FUL3
Σk
(T) : ∀n∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr Σkσ)
FUL4
Σk
(T) : ∀n, x ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr Σkσ ∧ x ∈ σ0)
and similar sentences for Πk . Let i-Ful, i-FUL
1, . . . , i-FUL4
Σk
be the analogous notions for i-
fulfilment, and we can also consider the schemata ∗Ful and ∗FUL1 for ∗fulfilment. Let ful,
ful1, . . . , ful4
Σk
be the schemata
ful(T) : ϕ ⊃ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ ϕσ) , n ∈ ω,
ful1(T) : ∀m
(
ϕm ⊃ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ (ϕm)σ ) ) , n ∈ ω, etc.
Finally consider
RFN(T) : ∀m (Pr
T
(ϕ Ûm) ⊃ ϕm)
Rfn(T) : Pr
T
(ϕ) ⊃ ϕ , and
rfn(T) : Proof
T
(p, ϕ) ⊃ ϕ , p ∈ ω .
The main feature of the following result, that FUL(T) is equivalent to RFN(T), is due to
Kripke. Suppose, for simplicity, that T is ∆00.
2.6 Corollary (a) In S, for all k in ω, with “(T)” omitted for brevity:
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i. FUL3
Σk
≡ FUL3
Πk+1
≡ FUL1
Πk+1
≡ ∗FUL1
Πk+1
≡ RFNΣk+1
ii. FUL4
Σk
≡ FUL4
Πk+1
≡ FUL2
Πk+1
≡ FUL2
Σk+2
≡ FUL1
Σk+2
≡ ∗FUL1
Σk+2
≡ RFNΠk+2
iii. FUL2
∆0
≡ FUL2
Σ1
⊃ FUL1
Σ1
⊃ ∗FUL1
Σ1
≡ RFNΠ1
iv. ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ) ⊃ ∀n∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T∗σ) ≡ Con(T)
v. FulΠk ⊃ ∗FulΠk ≡ RfnΣk
vi. FulΣk ⊃ ∗FulΣk ≡ RfnΠk
vii. ful3
Σk
≡ ful3
Πk+1
≡ ful1
Πk+1
≡ fulΠk+1 ≡ rfnΣk+1 ≡ ∗fulΠk+1 ≡ ∗ful1Πk+1
viii. ful4
Σk
≡ ful4
Πk+1
≡ ful2
Πk+1
≡ ful2
Σk+2
≡ ful1
Σk+2
≡ fulΣk+2 ≡ rfnΠk+2 ≡ ∗fulΣk+2 ≡ ∗ful1Σk+2
ix. ful2
∆0
≡ ful2
Σ1
⊃ ful1
Σ1
⊃ fulΣ1 ⊃ rfnΠ1 ≡ ∗fulΣ1 ≡ ∗ful1Σ1
x. { ∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧Tσ) : n∈ω } ⊃ { ∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧T∗σ) : n∈ω } ≡ { ¬Proof
T
(p, p0=1q)) : p∈ω }
(b) In S + “Collection ⊆ T” (i.e. an axiom asserting that T includes the Collection schema), the
relations (i) to (x) with i-fulfilment replacing fulfilment also hold. In fact, we may improve parts
of (iii) and (ix) by the equivalences:
i-FUL2
Σ1
(T) ≡ ∀n ∀x ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ x ∈ σ0 ∧ iσ ∧ Tσ)
and i-ful2
Σ1
(T) ≡ { ∀x ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ x ∈ σ0 ∧ iσ ∧ Tσ) : n ∈ ω } .
Thus in the presence of S + “Collection ⊆ T”, fulfilment and i-fulfilment are essentially the same
notions, except in the Σ1 schemata.
(c) The interest in (vii), (viii) and (ix) lies in the fact that rfnΠk+1(T) and rfnΣk+1(T) axiomatize
the Πk+1 and Σk+1 consequences of T, respectively. The following are, in the presence of S +
“Induction ⊆ T”, further examples of such axiomatizations. First, for the Πk+1 consequences, we
have:
xi. {RfnΠk+1(T ∩ m) : m ∈ ω } ≡ { ∗FulΣk+1(T ∩ m) : m ∈ ω } , for all k
≡ { FulΣk+1(T ∩ m) : m ∈ ω } , if k ≥ 1
≡ { FUL4
Σk+1
(T ∩ m) : m ∈ ω } , if k ≥ 1.
For the Σk+1 consequences, we have:
xii. {RfnΣk+1(T ∩ m) : m ∈ ω } ≡ { ∗FulΠk+1(T ∩ m) : m ∈ ω } , if k ≥ 1
≡ { FulΠk+1(T ∩ m) : m ∈ ω } , if k ≥ 2,
and in the presence of “Infinity ∈ T” and “Σk+1-Collection ⊆ T”, we also have the Σk+1 form of
{ FUL3
Σk+1
(T ∩ m) : m ∈ ω } .
(d) There are similar results for 12∗fulfilment. In particular,
1
2 ∗ful3Σ0
k
(T) : ∃σ
(
|σ |–= n ∧ T 12 ∗σ ∧ (Tr Σ0k)
1
2 ∗σ
)
, n ∈ ω,
axiomatizes the Σ0
k+1 consequences of T, and
1
2 ∗ful4Σ0
k
(T) : ∀m ∃σ
(
|σ |–= n ∧ T 12 ∗σ ∧ (Tr Σ0
k
) 12 ∗σ ∧ x ∈ σ0
)
, n ∈ ω,
24 II Herbrand’s Theorem and Reflection Principles
axiomatizes theΠ0
k+2 consequences ofT. Also, if Induction is included inT, then { ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧
T ∩ m ∗σ) : m ∈ ω } axiomatizes the Π01 consequences of T.
Proof: We shall only consider typical examples of nontrivial cases. First let us consider
FUL2
Σ1
(T) ⊃ FUL1
Σ1
(T). Suppose ∃zϕz is true in some structure, with ϕ Π1. Choose any
witness a and let b = {a}. Then any sequence which fulfils the true Π1 formula
∃x ∈ b (x = a ∧ ϕa)
will fulfil ∃zϕz.
That ∗FUL(T) implies RFN(T) (and conversely) is an immediate consequence of 2.5.
Finally, suppose RFNΠk+1(T) and that we wish to show FUL4Σk−1(T), say. For each n in ω we
have
T ⊢ ∀x ∃σ ( |σ |– = n ∧ x ∈ σ0 ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr Σk−1σ) .
Moreover, this fact can be formalized, and so we have
S ⊢ ∀n Pr
T
(
∀x ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ x ∈ σ0 ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr Σk−1σ)
)
.
Hence by RFNΠk+1(T) we obtain FUL4Σk−1(T). 
We cannot in general improve (iv), (v) or (vi). A result of Feferman [60] is that
S + RFN
Σ
0
1
(T) ⊢ RFN
Σ
0
1
(T + Rfn(T)).
(Aside: this can be easily generalized from Σ01 to arbitrary Λ ⊇ Σ01. A simple proof is given in
Smoryński [77]; or by an equally simple proof, using 2.5 we can show
S + FUL3
Λ
(T) ⊢ FUL3
Λ
(T + Rfn(T)) . )
Now by Matijacevic’s Theorem and 2.5 we have that for any arithmetical theory T in the language
of arithmetic,
S + “Σ1-Induction ⊆ T” ⊢ (∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ)) ≡ FUL3
Π
0
1
(T)
and so if T is ∆00, then by either Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem or 1.5,
S + Rfn(T) 0 ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ) .
Our next result is a version of the main lemma of Kreisel and Levy [68].
2.7 Corollary LetU extend S and let T be a subset ofUwhich is representable in (some consistent
extension of) U. Suppose that U implies RFN(T), where “T” in this schema is understood to be
some representation of T. Then no consistent extension of U (plus { T(pθq) : θ ∈ T }) may be
obtained by adding a set of Σk sentences to T for any k.
Proof: We shall sketch two proofs, the second uses the fixed-point theorem while the first does
not, but the first proof requires the further assumption that U extends Foundation. Fix k in ω.
By 2.6 we have that U implies
∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ n ∈ σ0 ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr Σkσ) . (1)
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We can suppose that T(x) is Πk . Then by fixing a nonstandard n and choosing a minimal witness
σ as in 1.3, we see by our usual method that any nonstandard model of U + { T(pθq) : θ ∈ T } has
a k-elementary substructure which is a model of T and in which (1) is false.
For our second proof, let U0 be a finite subset of U which suffices to prove that some formula
Tr Σk (x) is a Σk truth predicate. By 2.6, for all sentences χ
U ⊢ χ ⊃ ∀ϕ (Tr Σk (ϕ) ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ (Tr Σk (ϕ))σ ∧ Tσ ∧ U0σ ∧ χσ)) . (2)
Choose χ such that
U ⊢ χ ≡ ∀ϕ (Tr Σk (ϕ) ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ (Tr Σk (ϕ))σ ∧ Tσ ∧ U0σ ∧ (¬ χ)σ)) .
Then U ⊢ χ, for by (2), U ⊢ ¬ χ ⊃ χ. But for any Σk sentence ϕ consistent with U + { T(pθq) :
θ ∈ T }, we may find a model of Tr Σk (ϕ), T, U0, and ¬ χ. Hence T + ϕ 0 χ. 
We conclude the chapter by considering a problem posed by D. Guaspari [79]. Given a class
of sentences Λ and a set of sentences T, say that a sentence ϕ is Λ-conservative over T if for all
θ in Λ, if T + ϕ ⊢ θ then T ⊢ θ already. For a theory T let
(Λ1,Λ2) = { pϕq ∈ Λ1 : ϕ is Λ2-conservative over T } .
R. Solovay and P. Hájek have shown that if T is a consistent r.e. reflexive theory then (Σk,Πk) is
a complete Π02 set for all k ≥ 1. We shall prove this without the hypothesis of reflexivity and we
shall also consider the dual case. (In retrospect, I see that simple modifications of Hájek’s [78]
proof will give most of the results in (b) below: just use the equivalence of the notions of reflection
and fulfilment as given in 2.6.) Part (a) below is due to Guaspari [79] who uses a construction
due to Scott [62] and Friedman [73]. He requires, however, that T contain the power-set axiom.
2.8 Corollary (a) Let T be a consistent extension of S. A sentence ϕ is Σk+1-conservative (Πk+2-
conservative) over T iff all models of T + Σk+1-overspill which code T have (for any element x) a
k-elementary substructure (containing x) which is a model of T + ϕ.
(b) Let T be an r.e. extension of S. Then:
i. For all k ≥ 1, (Σk,Πk) is a complete Π02 set.
ii. For all k ≥ 2, (Πk, Σk) is a complete Π02 set, as are (Π2, Σ1) and (Σ2, Σ1), and if T proves
Infinity so is (Π1, Σ1).
iii. (∆02(T), Σ01) is a complete Π02 set if T is not Σ02-sound, and is ∆02 otherwise.
iv. (Π01, Σ01) and (Π01,∆01(T)) are complete Π02 sets if T is not Σ01-sound, and are complete Π01
sets otherwise.
Proof: Part (a) is immediate from 2.6, so let us consider (b). It is clear by their definition that
these sets are Π02 . It is also easy to check that if T is Σ
0
1-sound, a sentence is ∆
0
1(T)-conservative
over T iff it is consistent with T, a Π01 sentence is Σ
0
1-conservative iff it is true, and if T is also
Σ
0
2-sound, a Π
0
2 sentence is Σ
0
1-conservative over T iff it is true. This establishes the negative
parts of (iii) and (iv).
We shall next show that (Π2, Σ1) and (Πk+1, Σk+1) are complete Π02 sets for k ≥ 1. We shall
in fact give two proofs: the first avoids the use of the fixed-point theorem but requires the further
assumption that T extends Foundation. Let k ≥ 1, let ψn be Σ01, and let Φ be the Πk+1 sentence
Φ = ∀n
(
∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr Σkσ) ⊃ ψn
)
.
Consider the following statements:
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(a) for all n ∈ ω, T ⊢ ψn;
(b) Φ is Σk+1-conservative over T;
(c) Φ is Πk-conservative over T;
(d) Φ is Σ01-conservative over T;
(e) Φ is ∆01(T)-conservative over T.
We claim that (a), (b) and (c) are equivalent. The result follows from this claim, for it is easy to
show by the reader’s favourite method (e.g. 1.12) that
{ pψxq ∈ Σ01 : ∀n ∈ ω, T ⊢ ψn }
is a complete Π02 set.
To prove the claim, note that (b)⊃ (c) is trivial , and that (c)⊃ (a) is easy. So consider (a)⊃ (b).
Suppose (a). Let A be any non-ω-model of T (+Foundation). It suffices to show there exists a
k-elementary substructure B of A which is a model of T and Φ. If Φ holds in A, we are done.
If not, choose the least witness m of ¬Φ; m is necessarily nonstandard by (a). Now choose a
minimal witness σ as in 1.3, and let B = ∪i∈ωσi. Then B≺kA, and B  T. It remains to show
that Φ holds in B. Consider n ∈ B. If n < m, then ψn holds in A by the choice of m, and so ψn
holds in B. If n ≥ m, then by the choice of σ the antecedent in Φ must be false at n in B. Hence
Φ holds in B.
To prove that (Πmax(k+1,2), Σk+1) is a complete Π02 set if T does not necessarily extend
Foundation, choose Φ such that T proves:
Φ ≡ ∀n
(
∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr Σkσ ∧ Φσ) ⊃ ψn
)
. (3)
Then, as before, (a), (b) and (c) are equivalent. Since the choice of Φ can be made recursive
in pψq, we are done. Likewise, if T proves Infinity, (Π1, Σ1) is a complete Π02 set. (Note that
the analogous fixed-point and argument using the notion of ∗fulfilment does not give as sharp
a result: we obtain that (“∀n ∃m < nΠk+1”, Σk+1) is a complete Π02 set, where this first class is
Πk+1 prefixed by a universal and a bounded existential numerical quantifier.)
To show that (Σ2, Σ1) is a complete Π02 set, let ψm = ∃l ψ0ml be Σ01 and consider the fixed
point in T:
Φ ≡ ¬∀n
(
∃l ∀m < nψ0mlm ⊃ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr∆00σ ∧Φσ)
)
.
Φ is (equivalent to) a Σ2 sentence, and as above, (a), (b) (with k = 0) and (c) are equivalent.
Next suppose T is not Σ02-sound, and choose some true Π
0
2 sentence ∀m ∃l θml which T
refutes. Let ψm = ∃l ψ0ml be Σ01, and let χn = ∃l ∀m < nψ0mlm ∧∃l ∀m ≤ n θmlm, and suppose
T proves:
Φ ≡ ∀n
(
∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T 12 ∗σ ∧ Tr∆00
1
2 ∗σ ∧ Φ 12 ∗σ) ⊃ χn
)
.
Then (a) and (d) are equivalent. Since T proves ¬∀n χn, T proves:
Φ ≡ ∃n
(
¬∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T 12 ∗σ ∧ Tr∆00 12 ∗σ ∧Φ 12 ∗σ ) ∧ χ(n − 1) ) .
Thus Φ is ∆02(T), and so (∆02(T), Σ01) is a complete Π02 set.
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Suppose now that T is not Σ01-sound. D. Jensen and A. Ehrenfeuch [76] and D. Guaspari [79]
have shown by the fixed-point theorem that an r.e. theory T is Σ01-sound iff it decides every ∆
0
1(T)
sentence. Using a similar calculation, we can show that if an r.e. theory T is not Σ01-sound, then
any r.e. set may be semi-represented in T by a formula which is ∆01 in T. We can, however, do
better by giving a feasible representation as in 1.12. Let ∃k χk be a false Σ01 sentence provable
in T, with χ ∆00, let θmn be any ∆
0
0 formula, and let
ψn = ∃m, σ ( |σ |–= m ∧ T 12 ∗σ ∧ Tr∆00
1
2 ∗σ ∧ θmn ∧ ∀k < pσq¬ χk) .
Then, since S is assumed to include ∆01(S)-Induction, it is easy to show that for all n ∈ ω, T ⊢ ψn
iff ∃m θmn is true. Moreover, because T proves ∃k χk, T also proves
∀n
(
¬ψn ≡ ∃k (χk ∧ ¬∃m, σ ≤ k ( |σ |–= m ∧ T 12 ∗σ ∧ Tr∆00 12 ∗σ ∧ θmn)) ) .
and so ψ is ∆01(T). Now if T contains ∆01(T)-Induction, consider
Φ = ∀n
(
∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T 12 ∗σ ∧ Tr∆00
1
2 ∗σ) ⊃ ψn
)
;
and if not, consider a fixed point similar to (3). Then we have that (a), (d) and (e) are equivalent,
and so (Π01, Σ01) and (Π01,∆01(T)) are complete Π02 sets.
Finally, for the sets (Σk+1,Πk+1) consider either the fixed points:
Φ ≡ ¬∀n
(
∀m < nψm ⊃ ∀x ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ x ∈ σ0 ∧ Tσ ∧ TrΣk−1σ ∧ Φσ)
)
;
(which work for all k ≥ 1); or the fixed points:
Φ ≡ ¬∀n
(
∀m < nψm ⊃ ∀θ (Tr Σk+1(pθq) ⊃ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ T∗σ ∧ θ∗σ ∧ Φ∗σ)) ) ,
(which work for all k). The details are left to the reader. 
Theorem 6.12 on page 69 gives an analogue of this last result for the ω-rule.
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Hilbert posed the following problem: can one prove the consistency of Peano arithmetic in a
constructive manner? Hewas interested in this question because a positive answer implies that the
(nonconstructive) PA is a conservative extension of the constructive techniques used with respect
to real (that is, Π01) sentences. (See the introduction of Smoryński [77] for a further discussion.)
As is well-known, solutions to this problem were given by Gentzen, in [36] and [38], who used as
his main tool (in the second paper at least) cut-elimination, and by Ackermann in [40], who used
the Hilbert substitution method. As Dreben and Denton [70] point out, the Gentzen approach,
with its purely syntactical transformations of formal proofs, has little use for the interpretations of
formulae; the Ackermann approach, on the other hand, “‘finitistically’exploits the oldest and most
naïve idea in proof theory: a set of axioms is consistent if it has a model”. An elegant extension
of Ackermann’s proof was given in Tait [65a], [65b] using functionals: Tait’s proof applies to
systems of arithmetic with the schema of foundation on some arbitrary primitive recursive linear
ordering. Scanlon [73] building on the work of Dreben and Denton [70] obtains the same results
for linear orderings without the use of functionals; unfortunately, Scanlon’s paper is very long
and intricate, and contains, as Kripke has pointed out, some unnecessary detours. This chapter
is essentially an exposition of the above-mentioned work of Ackermann, Dreben, Denton and
Scanlon.
The notion of fulfilment is of course not necessary in our treatment (indeed one could regard
it as superfluous since all the work is still done with finite versions of Skolem functions) but I
believe that it is very helpful conceptually—especially as it provides a clear separation between
the logical and combinatorial parts of our argument.
We shall assume that S on page 11 is finite. Let be 4 any formula of L, the language of S,
with two free variables; this should be thought of as representing a pre-well-founded relation,
i.e., the non-linear analogue of a pre-well-ordering. Let 4strict denote x 4 y ∧ y $ x; this will
also be denoted by ≺. Let Foundation(4) be the schema
Foundation(4) : ∃xθx ⊃ ∃x
(
θx ∧ ∀y (θy ⊃ y ⊀ x)
)
.
Consider the consistency of the theory S + Foundation(4). By 2.6, it suffices to show that each
finite subset of this theory plus any true sentence is n-fulfillable for all n; and we would like to do
this in as constructive a manner as possible. Of course, by the Second Incompleteness Theorem
or by 1.5, we must assume a quite strong notion of constructiveness: our proof may be formalized
in an extension Foundation(4ε) defined below. If the axioms of S are Σ3 and the relation 4 is
Σ2, we need only the schema Foundation(4ε) restricted to Σ1 formulae, and if the axioms of S
have the form
∃
−⇀
x ∀
−⇀
y ∃!−⇀z θ
with θ ∆0, and if 4 has the form ∀
−⇀
y ∃!−⇀z θ, with θ ∆0, then we need only the schema
Foundation(4ε) restricted to ∆1(S) predicates.
We need some general definitions. Given a binary relation 4, let ≺=4strict be as above.
Define a binary relation 4lex on nonempty finite sequences by 〈a0, . . . , am〉 4lex 〈b0, . . . , bn〉 iff
either there exists k ≤ min(m, n) such that al = bl for all l < k and ak ≺ bk , or m < n and al = bl
for all l ≤ m. Let 4ω be the disjoint union over n of 4lex restricted to sequences of length n:
that is, x 4ω y iff |x | = |y | and x 4lex y. A finite sequence x is 4-descending if xi+1 ≺ xi for
all i < |x |–; let 24 denote 4lex restricted to 4-descending sequences. If ≺ is well-founded and
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nontrivial, 4lex is not well-founded, but the usual proofs (see, for example Feferman [77]) show
that Foundation(4) implies Foundation(4ω) and Foundation(24).
Let us go back to our given 4. Fix any element and denote it by ∞. Define the relations:
x 4+ y if y = ∞ or both x , ∞ and x 4 y ,
x 40 y if x (4+)ω y ,
x 4n+1 y if x (24n ) y ,
and let 4ε be a disjoint union over n of 4n: e.g. say
(n, x) 4ε (m, y) if n = m and x 4n y.
We shall suppose that this relation may be represented in the language of S in some natural way.
We note that if 4 is ∆k(S) then 4ε is ∆k(S + Σk+1-Induction).
Recall one of the twenty-odd schemata given on page 22, there labelled FUL2 :
FUL(T) : ∀x
(
ϕx ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ Tσ ∧ (ϕx)σ ) ) .
3.1 Theorem S + Foundation(4ε) ⊢ FUL (S + Foundation(4)) .
We shall give an informal proof, which will be divided into four lemmas.
With each formula θ with n free variables associate an n-ary function symbol fθ . Define the
Skolemization S(θ) of θ by induction on length:
i. if θ is an atom, let S(θ) = θ;
ii. let S(θ ⊃ ψ) = S(θ) ⊃ S(ψ), and similarly for the other Boolean connectives; and
iii. let S(Qxθ) = S(θ)(x/ fQxθ−⇀v ) where −⇀v is a listing of the free variables of Qxθ.
For the remainder of the proof fix an integer n and a finite set H of formulae of the form ∃xθ.
We shall first consider the problem of finding a sequence which n-fulfils the universal closure of
Foundation(4)
∃xθx ⊃ ∃x
(
θx ∧ ∀y (θy ⊃ y ⊀ x)
)
(1)
for each ∃xθ in H.
Let sub(H) be the collection of subformulae of formulae of H. If Qxθ in sub(H) \ H is of
rank r (as defined in Chapter II page 19), let the rank of fQxθ be r. Let q − 1 be the maximum
of the ranks of formulae in sub(H) \ H, and for all ∃xθ in H let the rank of f∃xθ be q. Let the
functions of L have rank 1. Let F = { fQxθ : Qxθ ∈ sub(H) }.
3.2 Lemma Suppose we are given an interpretation of the functions of F and a set A0 which
contains (the interpretations of) the constants of L. Define by σ = 〈Ai〉i≤n by
Ai+1 = Ai ∪∪ f ∈L∪F f ′′Ai.
Suppose:
i. for each ∃θ in H with free variables −⇀u ,
∀
−⇀u , x (S(θ) ⊃ x ⊀ f∃xθ −⇀u )
where here, as in (ii) and (iii) below, the quantifiers ∀−⇀u , ∃x, and ∀x are restricted to An−1;
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ii. for each ∃xθ in sub(H) with free variables −⇀u ,
∀
−⇀u
(
∃x S(θ) ⊃ S(∃xθ)
)
;
iii. for each ∀xθ in sub(H) with free variables −⇀u ,
∀
−⇀u
(
S(∀xθ) ⊃ ∀x S(θ)
)
; and
iv. for all i < n, all x, y in Ai, if x ⊀ y then 〈Ai, . . . , An〉 fulfils x ⊀ y (in the sense of the
second definition of fulfilment motivated by Skolem functions, as given on page 8).
Then for each ∃xθx in H with free variables −⇀u , σ fulfils (in the sense of this second definition)
(1) above.
Proof: We shall first show by induction on length that if θ in sub(H) has free variables −⇀u , then
for all i < n, all −⇀u in Ai,
¬(¬θ)i ⊃ S(θ) and S(θ) ⊃ θi . (2)
If θ is quantifier-free this is trivial, and the inductive step is easy for the Boolean connectives.
So consider ∃xθ in sub(H), and suppose the claim is true for θ. Fix i and the free variables −⇀u of
∃xθ in Ai.
Suppose ¬(¬∃xθ)i . By definition, there exists a j with i ≤ j < n and an x ∈ Aj such that
¬(¬θ)j . By the inductive hypothesis, S(θ). Then ∃x ∈ An−1 S(θ), and so by (ii), S(∃xθ).
Now suppose S(∃xθ), that is, S(θ)(x/ f∃xθ −⇀u ). Since f∃xθ −⇀u ∈ Ai+1 if i + 1 < n the inductive
hypothesis gives θi+1(x/ f∃xθ −⇀u ), and so (∃xθ)i . If i + 1 = n we have (∃xθ)i anyway.
The proof for formulae of the form ∀xθ is dual to the above, and is left to the reader. This
establishes the claim.
Let ∃xθ in H have free variables −⇀u . We wish to show
∀i < n∀
−⇀
u ∈ Ai
(
¬(¬∃xθ)i ⊃ ∃x ∈ Ai+1
(
(θx)i+1 ∧ ∀ j . i < j < n
(¬(¬θy)j ⊃ (y ⊀ x)j ) )) .
Fix i < n and −⇀u in Ai and suppose ¬(¬∃xθ)i . By (2), S(∃xθ). Let x = f∃xθ(−⇀u ). Then S(θ)(x),
and by (2) or by i + 1 = n, (θx)i+1. Fix j with i < j < n and y ∈ Aj , and suppose ¬(¬θy)j . By
(2), S(θ)(x/y), and so by (i), y ⊀ x. By virtue of (iv), we are done. 
If −⇀x is a k-tuple and f is an m-ary function, let fˆ ′′ −⇀x denote (for this paragraph only) the
km-tuple 〈 f −⇀y i〉i<km , where 〈−⇀y i〉i<km is some standard listing of the m-tuples from −⇀x . Given an
interpretation of F and a finite sequence
−⇀
A 0, define a sequence of sequences
−⇀
σ = 〈−⇀A 0, . . . , −⇀A n〉
inductively by −⇀
A i+1 =
−⇀
A i ⌣ fˆ
′′ −⇀A i ⌣ gˆ′′
−⇀
A i ⌣ . . .
where f , g, . . . is some fixed listing of the functions of L ∪ F , and where “⌣” is sequence
concatenation.
A loop is a finite sequence a0, . . . , am+1 such that for all i ≤ m, ai ≺ ai+1 and am+1 ≺ a0;
Foundation(4) proves that no loops exist.
3.3 Lemma There exists a constructive interpretation of F which satisfies the premises of
Lemma 3.2.
Proof: We shall first consider only the premises (i), (ii) and (iii). A simple modification of our
algorithm will then take care of (iv); this is discussed following Lemma 3.5.
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We shall define a sequence 〈F i〉i<Ω (where Ω ≤ ω) of interpretations of F , where F i =
{ f i : f ∈ F }. Each f i will have constant value ∞ except at a finite number of arguments. For
each F i , define σi and −⇀σ i as above, with A0 any finite set containing the constants and ∞ and−−⇀
A0 a listing of A0. Let i, j range over Ω.
For each f in F , let f 0 be the constant function of appropriate arity with value ∞. Suppose
we have defined F i. If F i satisfies the premises (i) to (iii), stop. Otherwise, choose some Qxθ
in sub(H) whose corresponding condition is false, and choose −⇀u , x in Ai
n−1 as witnesses. Define
F i+1 by:
i. if f ∈ F , f , fQxθ and rank( f ) ≤ r, let f i+1 = f i;
ii. if f ∈ F and rank( f ) > r, let f i+1 = f 0; and
iii. let f i+1
Qxθ
equal f i
Qxθ
everywhere except at −⇀u , where we let f i+1
Qxθ
(−⇀u ) = x.
We shall call ( fQxθ, −⇀u ) the (i + 1)st-critical pair. We shall suppose that the choice of the
(i + 1)st-critical pair depends only on −⇀σ i. The rank of σi+1 will be r; let σ0 have rank 0.
We must show that our algorithm halts.
First note that if ( f , −⇀u ) is the i + 1st-critical pair, then f i+1 −⇀u ≺+ f i −⇀u . If f i −⇀u = ∞ this is
trivial, so suppose f i −⇀u , ∞. Then there exists a greatest j ≤ i such that ( f , −⇀u ) is the j th critical
pair. Let f = fQxθ , and let ±θ be θ or ¬θ according to whether Q is ∃ or ∀. Then S i(±θ)( f j −⇀u , −⇀u )
is true, and for all k with j ≤ k ≤ i, Sk(±θ)( f k −⇀u , −⇀u ) remains true since nothing has altered.
Thus, for ( f , −⇀u ) to be the i + 1st critical pair, the rank of f must be q and f i+1 −⇀u ≺ f i −⇀u . Finally,
f i+1 −⇀u , ∞, for otherwise there would exist a loop.
Next note that if i < j, if the rank of σ j is not less than that of σi, and if the rank of σk is
greater than that of σ j for all k between i and j, then for all f in F , and all −⇀u , f j −⇀u = f i −⇀u except
when ( f , −⇀u ) is the j th critical pair, in which case f j −⇀u ≺+ f i −⇀u .
Finally note that if for all f in F and all −⇀u , f j −⇀u ≺+ f i −⇀u or f j −⇀u = f i −⇀u , then −⇀σ j = −⇀σ i or
−⇀
σ
j
n ≪ −⇀σ in, where ≪ is the ordering (≺+)ω .
Let 〈i, ν〉 denote 〈−⇀σ j〉i≤ j<ν , where ν ≤ Ω. 〈i, ν〉 is an r-subroutine if the rank of σi is ≤ r,
the rank of σ j is greater than r for all j between i and ν, and if ν < Ω, the rank of σν is ≤ r.13
3.4 Lemma Let 〈i, i + s〉, 〈 j, j + s〉 be two consecutive (i.e. i + s= j) r-subroutines and suppose
that the rank of σ j is not less than that of σi. Then there exists p < min(s, t) such that for all
l < p, −⇀σ i+l = −⇀σ j+l , and −⇀σ j+pn ≪ −⇀σ i+pn .
Proof: By the above remarks, −⇀σ jn ≪ −⇀σ in or −⇀σ j = −⇀σ i. In the first case, let p = 0 and we are
done. If −⇀σ j = −⇀σ i, then −⇀σ j+1n ≪ −⇀σ i+1n or −⇀σ i+1 = −⇀σ j+1. In the first case we let p = 1, and in the
second we repeat our argument again and again. We do in fact find a p < min(s, t), for suppose
otherwise. If s < t (t < s), then −⇀σ i+s−1 = −⇀σ j+s−1 (−⇀σ i+t−1 = −⇀σ j+t−1) implies that the rank
of σ j (σ j+t ) is greater than r. And if s = t, then −⇀σ i+s−1 = −⇀σ j+t−1 implies the existence of a
common j th and ( j + t)th critical pair, contradicting the remarks above. 
For each r ≤ q define an ordering ≪r on the finite r-subroutines inductively as follows.
q-Subroutines are always of length 1, and we say 〈−⇀σ i〉 ≪0 〈−⇀σ j〉 if −⇀σ in ≪ −⇀σ jn. For all r < q,
13 I have reversed Scanlon’s terminology here because my labelling seems to be more natural if one hopes to extend
this method to stronger systems.
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each r-subroutine is the concatenation of a unique sequence of r + 1-subroutines: let ≪r be the
lexicographic ordering based on≪r+1. The next lemma is purely combinatorial.
3.5 Lemma Let 〈i, i + s〉, 〈 j, j + t〉 be two r-subroutines such that for some p < min(s, t),
−⇀
σ
j+p
n ≪ −⇀σ i+pn and −⇀σ j+l = −⇀σ i+l for all l < p. Then 〈 j, j + t〉 ≪r 〈i, i + s〉.
Proof: By induction on r. If r = q there is nothing to prove. Suppose the lemma holds for r + 1,
and let 〈i, i + s〉, 〈 j, j + t〉 satisfy the hypotheses. Choose the greatest k ≤ p such that σi+k is
of rank ≤ r + 1. (Such a k exists because σi has rank r.) Then σ j+k has the same rank. By the
inductive hypothesis, the r + 1-subroutine beginning with σ j+k is less than (in the order ≪r+1)
the one beginning with σi+k . Since for all l < k, −⇀σ i+l and −⇀σ j+l are equal and have equal ranks,
we may conclude that 〈 j, j + t〉 ≪r 〈i, i + s〉. 
By induction on r < q we see that each r-subroutine is a concatenation of a≪r+1-descending
sequence of finite r + 1-subroutines, and so each r-subroutine is finite. In particular, the (unique)
0-subroutine is finite, i.e. our algorithm terminates.
For any formula ϕ (perhapswith parameters) the above algorithm is easilymodified to produce
a σ which also fulfils ϕ if ϕ is true. If ϕ has definable satisfaction functions, we merely add
these to our language. If ϕ does not have (globally) definable satisfaction functions, we may still
define some finite approximations as we go along. More precisely, to each partial computation,
〈−⇀σ 0, −⇀σ 1, . . . , −⇀σ k〉 we assign an index as follows. For each r ≤ q let ∞r be a new constant
symbol and extend the ordering ≪r to the ordering ≪+r which has ∞r as its maximal element.
Let the index of 〈−⇀σ 0, . . . , −⇀σ k〉 be 〈a0, a1, . . . , ar 〉, where r is the rank of σk for all s ≤ r,
as =
{
〈 j, l〉, where l ≤ k and j is the greatest j < k for which this is an s-subroutine, if this exists,
∞s, otherwise.
Order these indices lexicographically, that is, 〈a0, . . . , as〉 < 〈b0, . . . , bt 〉 iff either there exists
r < min(s, t) such that ap = bp for all p < r and ar ≪+r br or s < t and ar = br for all r ≤ s.
Now consider the set
{ α : α is the index of some partial computation 〈σ0, . . . , σk〉 which is s.t. each σk fulfils TrΣl } .
By Foundation(4ε) choose a minimal α in this set and some partial computation 〈σ0, . . . , σk〉
which is a witness for this α. Then σk is in the halting state, for suppose not. As Foundation(4ε)
implies Induction, we may choose a further finite approximation to the satisfaction functions for
Tr Σl and then using these perform the next step of our algorithm. This produces a σk+1 which
also fulfils Tr Σl. But 〈σ0, . . . , σk+1〉 has index less than α, a contradiction.
In particular, we can ensure that σ fulfils the axioms of S, and similarly we can have
(Tr x ⊀ y)σ . This completes the proof of 3.1. 
Next we fulfil a promise made in Chapter II on page 21.
3.6 Corollary S ⊢ ∀ϕ (∀m ∃τ ( |τ |–= m ∧ ϕτ) ⊃ ∀n, Γ ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ ϕσ ∧ (Γ ∨ ¬Γ)σ) ), and
PRA proves the ∗fulfilment version.
Proof: We shall sketch an informal proof. Let ϕ, Γ, and n be given, and suppose that Skolem
function symbols for the existential quantifiers of ϕ are added to the language. Consider the
proof of 3.1 when 4 is the empty relation and Γ =H. Then it is easy to calculate an upper bound
on the length of any ≪i-descending sequence. Hence we can calculate an upper bound b on the
number of iterations of our algorithm requires to find a sequence n-fulfilling Γ ∨¬Γ and which is
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closed under the functions of the language—and the bound is independent of how these functions
are interpreted. Now choose m = (b + 1)(n + 1), choose a τ which m-fulfils ϕ, and interpret
the Skolem functions for the existential quantifiers of ϕ in accordance with the winning strategy
for the game associated with ϕτ. We have chosen m large enough so that we may carry out our
computation without encountering any undefined values of these Skolem functions. 
If S + Foundation(4) = PA, our proof gives the sharp bounds of Minc [71].
3.7 Corollary For any natural ordering ≺ of order type 2ω2
k+1, the consistency of S + Σk+1-
Induction is provable in Foundation(2ω2
k+1) with Foundation(2ω
2
k+1) restricted to primitive recursive
predicates, where 2α0 = α, 2
α
k+1 = 2
2α
k .
Sketch of Proof: Note that PA− implies
Σk-Induction ≡ Πk-Induction ≡ Σk-Foundation(ω) . (3)
Also note that that ω2 is essentially just the lexicographic ordering of pairs of integers and so for
any “natural” ordering of order type ω2 we have
Πk-Foundation(ω2) ⊃ Σk+1-Foundation(ω) . (4)
Inspection of the ordinals in the proof of 3.1 yields that
PR-Foundation
(
2(ω
2
+1)ω
k
) ⊢ ∀n∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ (Πk-Foundation(ω2))σ ∧ (Tr∆0)σ ) ,
where we obtain “Tr∆0σ” by considering ∆0 matrices rather than quantifier-free ones, and adding
the appropriate Skolem functions to the language. This in turn implies, by 2.6 and the formalized
versions of (3) and (4),
PR-Foundation
(
2(ω
2
+1)ω
k
) ⊢ RFNΣ1(PA− + Σk+1-Induction) .
It remains to note:
(ω2 + 1)ω ≤ (ω3)ω = ωω = 2ω2 . 
Our next corollary is the “no-counter-example” interpretation due to Kreisel. Consider for
example the sentence ϕ = ∃x ∀y ∃u ∀v ψxyuv, where ψ is ∆0. Third-order logic easily yields:
ϕ ≡ ¬∀x ∃y ∀u ∃v¬ψ
≡ ¬∃ f , g ∀x, u¬ψ(x, f x, u, gxu)
≡ ∀ f , g ∃x, uψ(x, f x, u, gxu)
≡ ∃H,K ∀ f , g ψ(H f g, f (H f g),K f g, g(H f g)(K f g)) .
If ϕ is true in N, we may choose 〈H,G〉 to be recursive: let 〈H f g,K f g〉 be the least pair 〈x, u〉
such that ψ(x, f x, u, gxu).
3.8 Corollary If PA ⊢ ϕ, we may choose 〈H,K〉 above to be <ε0-recursive.
Sketch of proof: We shall not define the notion of <ε0-recursiveness, but merely indicate how to
obtain H and K . Suppose PA−+Σk-Induction ⊢ ϕ. By the proofs of 3.1 and 2.5, by 2ω2k -recursion
we may find, uniformly in f and g, a sequence σ which 5-fulfils ϕ and which is closed under f
and g. Let 〈H f g,K f g〉 be the least pair 〈x, u〉 from σ1 × σ3 such that ϕ(x, f x, u, gxu). 
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We shall end this chapter with an application which will be useful in the next. First we give
a general corollary. Let S consist of a finite number of Σ3 sentences.
3.9 Corollary (i) Let k ≥ 1 and suppose for some Σk+2 formula χ(x)
S ⊢ ∃!x χ(x) ∧ “x is a binary relation” .
Denote this relation by ≺. Then the schema of Foundation(≺) is a Πk+2-conservative extension
of ∇k -Foundation(≺) over S, where
∇k = closure of Σk under Boolean operations and bounded quantification.
(ii) More generally we have the following. Consider the schema of so-called Bar-Induction:
Γ-BIx : wf(x) ⊃ ψx
Γ-BI : ∀x (wf(x) ⊃ ψx)
where ψx ranges over Γ˘-Foundation(x). Let θxm be Πk+2 with k ≥ 1. Then for any instance ϕx
of BIx , there is a instance ϕ0x of ∇k-BIx such that
S ⊢ ∀m (Pr
S
(p∀x (ϕx ⊃ θx Ûm)q) ⊃ ∀x (ϕ0x ⊃ θx Ûm)
)
.
Sketch of Proof: Note that (ii) implies (i), so let us consider (ii). Choose an instance ϕ0x of
∇k-BIx so that
S ⊢ ∀x (ϕ0x ⊃ ϕ1(2(x+1)ωk ) )
where k ∈ ω and ϕ1y ∈ Πk-BIy are such that
S ⊢ ∀x (ϕ1(2(x+1)ωk ) ⊃ ∀y (¬θy ⊃ ∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ x ∈ σ0 ∧ (¬θy)σ ∧ (ϕx)σ)) ) . 
In Chapter VI page 68 we shall, however, prove a result (essentially due to Friedman [76])
which in most applications is stronger, as follows. Let countable bar-induction be the schema:
cBI : ∀x (“x countable” ∧wf(x) ⊃ ψx) , where ψx ranges over Foundation(x).
Fact : Let k > 1 and let θxm be Πk+2. Then for any instance ϕx of cBIx , there is an instance ϕ0x
of Πk-cBI such that
S + ∆0-cBI ⊢ ∀m (PrS+ω-rule(p∀x (ϕx ⊃ θx Ûm)q) ⊃ ∀x (ϕ0x ⊃ θxm)) . 
We shall also mention, for the purposes of comparison, the following well-known result.
Fact : If k > 1 and θm is Πk+2 then
S + Σk-DC ⊢ ∀m (PrS+BI+ω-rule(pθ Ûmq) ⊃ θm) . 
The application we have in mind uses, however, only the weakest of these conservation
results: 3.9.i with ≺ the standard ordering on ω. (Indeed, this is probably the most useful, for
when one is formalizing an informal proof, it is usually clear what instances of strong axioms are
used, but the instances of Induction are often not so obvious.) It is fairly straightforward to check
that the usual proofs of the Kondo-Addison Uniformization Theorem may be formalized to give:
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for each Π11 formula θXY there exists a Π
1
1 formula ψXY such that
Π
1
1-CA ⊢ ∀X
(
∃Y θXY ⊃ ∃!Y (θXY ∧ ψXY )
)
.
We note that the right-hand-side is Π14 and that the schema of Π
1
1-CA is (equivalent in Π
1
1-CA
↾ to
a schema which is) Π13 . Since Π
1
2-CA
↾ implies ∇12-Induction, we have that
Π
1
2-CA↾ ⊢ “Π11-Uniformization”
and so by the usual arguments,
Π
1
2-CA↾ ⊢ Σ12-AC↾ .
A similar application is as follows. If k ≥ 3, then for any Σk formula θXY ,
Π
1
k−1-CA ⊢ ∀X,W
(
V = L(W) ⊃ (∃Y θXY ⊃ ∃Y (θXY ∧ ∀Z (θX Z ⊃ Y 4 Z))) ) .
where 4 is a Π12 formula with parameter W representing Addison’s well-ordering of the reals
constructible from W . (The Σ1
k
-BI needed for this proof is derivable from Π1
k
-CA.) Now the
right-hand-side is Π1
k+2 and Π
1
k−1-CA↾ is (essentially) Π
1
k+1, and so by 3.9 we have that this is
provable in Π1
k
-CA↾ and so:
Π
1
k-CA↾ + ∃W .V = L(W) ⊢ Σ12-AC↾ .
Our final application is a conservation result for arithmetic; let S = PA−ex, as on page 12. Add
a new constant c to the language of arithmetic, and consider the schema Induction(c) of induction
up to c. From the proof of 3.1 we see that for each k, n ∈ ω and each finite subset H of S +
Induction(c) there exists l ∈ ω such that
S + Induction(2c
l
) ⊢ ∀m ∃σ ( |σ |– = n ∧ m ∈ σ0 ∧ Hσ ∧ Tr Σkσ) .
Hence we may obtain results of the following form, where conservative extension is as defined
on page 37.
3.10 Corollary With respect to the language of arithmetic plus c, Induction(c) is:
i. Π2-conservative over S
ii. Π3-conservative over S + ∆1-Induction(c)
iii. Πk+2-conservative over S + Σk−1-Collection + Σk-Induction(2cl ) l ∈ω , and is
iv. Πk+2-conservative over S + Σk+2-Induction(2cl ) l ∈ω . 
IV Some Conservation Results
This chapter consists, in part, of an exposition of Friedman’s [70] method of obtaining conserva-
tion results of the form e.g. Σ1
k+1-AC
↾ is Π1
l
-conservative over Π1
k
-AC↾, for various k and l, and
Σ
1
k+1-AC is Π
1
l
-conservative over { (Π1
l
-CA)α : α < ε0 } (i.e., axioms asserting that the Π1l -jump
may be iterated α times for all α < ε0). The former type of result—the so-called restricted
case—is not, however, explicitly stated in Friedman [70]. This is probably because at that time
nobody was interested in this case, for it seems to me improbable that one could discover the
unrestricted versions without being aware of the restricted. Let us briefly, then, indicate the work
done by others.
Barwise and Schlipf [75] gave a model theoretic proof for the Σ11-AC↾ case, which was con-
siderably simplified by Feferman [76] and, independently, Stavi. Feferman [76] also considered
Σ
1
2-AC
↾. These latter proofs are, in essence, the same as those given below. Proof-theoretic
proofs have been given by Tait ([68] & [70]) for Σ11-AC and Σ
1
2-AC, and by Feferman [77] and
Feferman and Sieg [80] for both Σ1
k
-AC↾ and Σ1
k
-AC for all k.
The other part of this chapter deals with uniform versions of the above: for example
∀n (Π11-AC)n↾ ⊢ RFNΠ13 (Σ12-AC↾ )
and ∀α < ε0 (Π11-AC)α↾ ⊢ RFNΠ13 (Σ12-AC) ,
where e.g. ∀α < ε0 (Π11-AC)α↾ consists of the axiom asserting that for all α < ε0 and for all X ,
there exists a hyperjump hierarchy of length α relativized to X (plus other simple axioms).
Let me briefly discuss the papers of Feferman [77] and Feferman and Sieg [80]. The methods
in these papers—namely, the normalization of infinite terms followed by a Gödel-style functional
interpretation, and cut-elimination arguments, respectively—are stronger than those used here
in that they give conservation results for certain extensions of the theory of types, Z∞ + QF-AC,
whereas mine do not. But if one is only interested in, say, second-order conservation results, then
these proof-theoretic arguments are, to my mind, much more complicated than the corresponding
model-theoretic arguments. It seems likely, however that the uniform versions may also be
obtained from Feferman and Sieg [80], and in this case the two methods would be of about the
same complexity.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. After some preliminary definitions, we shall consider
the restricted case, then give some applications, followed by the unrestricted case. It is hoped
that the presentation here of Friedman’s construction in a more general setting (thus making it
necessary to state explicitly the principles used) helps rather than hinders the reader.
Given a class of sentences Λ and sets of sentences A, B, and C, say that A is aΛ-conservative
extension of B over C if A + C extends B + C but for all θ in Λ, if A + C ⊢ θ then B + C ⊢ θ.
Let S be, as usual, a theory suitable for elementary set theory as on page 11. For convenience,
we shall assume that the axioms ofS areΣ3. InChapter Iwe assumed, alsomostly for convenience,
that S proves the existence of a Σ1 satisfaction predicate for ∆0 formulae. There is, however, an
interesting application of Theorem 4.2 (Application (vii) below) in which this is not the case, and
so we note that this assumption is not necessary for this theorem. Consider the schema Bounding
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given on page 12. It is easy to show:
4.1 Fact In the presence of S + ∆0-Separation, the following are equivalent:
Πk-Bounding
Σk+1-Bounding
Σk+1-Collection + Σk+1-Separation. 
Let S1 be the set of formulae of the form
∃
−⇀x ∀a ∃b∀−⇀y ∈ a ∃−⇀z ∈ b θ ,
where ∃−⇀x ∀−⇀y ∃−⇀z θ is an axiom of S. Obviously,
S + Σ1-Collection ⊢ S1 ;
indeed, in many natural examples, S ⊢ S1.
4.2 Theorem Σ1-Collection is Π2-conservative over S1, and for all k ≥ 1, Σk+1-Collection is a
Πk+2-conservative extension of Σk-Bounding over S.
We shall give two proofs which are essentially the same but the second is more readily
formalized. After a corollary of this second proof, we shall give a long list of applications.
Proof: Fix k ≥ 0. Let A = 〈A, . . . 〉 be a model of S1 and, if k ≥ 1, Σk-Bounding, and suppose
that S is coded in A and that A is recursively saturated. It suffices to show that for any c ∈ A
there exists a k-elementary substructure B = 〈B, . . . 〉 of A containing c which is a model of
S + Σk+1-Collection.
Fix c ∈ A. For each n ∈ ω there exists in A a sequence σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σ |σ |–〉 such that:
i. |σ |– ≥ n;
ii. c ∈ σ0, and the (interpretations of) the constants of the language are contained in σ0;
iii. σi ∈ σi+1, σi ⊆ σi+1, and x ∈ y ∈ σi ⊃ x ∈ σi+1, for all i < |σ |–;
iv. if ∃−⇀x ∀−⇀y ∃−⇀z θ is among the first n axioms of S, then there exists −⇀x ∈ σ1 such that for all
i < |σ |–,
∀
−⇀
y ∈ σi ∃−⇀z ∈ σi+1θ ; and
v. if k ≥ 1 and if ∃−⇀y θ(−⇀x , −⇀y ) is among the first n Σk formulae, then for all i < |σ |–,
∀
−⇀x ∈ σi (∃−⇀y θ ⊃ ∃−⇀y ∈ σi+1θ) .
By recursive saturation, there exists σ satisfying (i) to (v) for all n∈ω. Let B = ∪i∈ωσi. It is clear
that B  S and that B ≺k A. (If k = 0, then (iii) ensures that B is a transitive substructure, and
so ∆0 formulae are absolute.) A simple application of underspill will show that Σk+1-Collection
holds in B, as follows.
Suppose B  ∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y θ where θ is Πk . Since B is a transitive substructure, the set a has
no more elements in A than in B and so for any nonstandard i ≤ |σ |–,
A  ∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y ∈ σi θ .
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By underspill, this must hold for some standard i. Since σi ∈B for all standard i, we may conclude
B  ∃b∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y ∈ b θ ,
and this completes the first proof of theorem 4.2.
Our second proof is, for each fixed value of the parameter n purely internal. Fix n ∈ ω, and
suppose σ satisfies (i) to (v). We claim that σ fulfils the first n axioms of S, that σ satisfies
∀i < |σ |– ∀−⇀x ∈ σi
(
θ
−⇀
x ⊃ (θ −⇀x )σi
)
for θ among the first few Σk formulae (where here few depends on n, on the Gödel numbering,
etc.), and that σ fulfils the first few sentences of the form
∀a,
−⇀
z ∃
−⇀
x ∈ a ∀−⇀y ∃b (θ −⇀x −⇀y −⇀z ⊃ ∀−⇀x ′∈ a ∃−⇀y ′∈ b θ −⇀x ′ −⇀y ′ −⇀z ) (1)
where θ is Πk .
We need only check the latter part of this claim. First observe that for any Πk formula
θ
−⇀x −⇀y −⇀z whose Gödel number is sufficiently small with regard to n, we have for all i, j, l, with
i ≤ j, l < |σ |–, and for all −⇀x , −⇀y , −⇀z ∈ σi,
θσj ≡ θσl ≡ ¬(¬θ)σj (2)
because each of these holds if and only if θ does. To show thatσ fulfils (1), we use the terminology
of game theory. Suppose Player I has chosen i < |σ |– and a, −⇀z ∈ σi. Let
j0 =
{
min j < |σ |– s.t. ∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y ∈ σj θ −⇀x −⇀y −⇀z , if this exists,
|σ |–, otherwise.
Let Player II choose −⇀x ∈ a such that if j0 , 0, then
¬∃−⇀y ∈ σj0−1 θ −⇀x −⇀y −⇀z .
Now Player II has essentially won, for if Player I chooses j < j0 and
−⇀
y ∈ σi, then
¬(¬θ −⇀x −⇀y −⇀z )σj
is false, and if Player I chooses j ≥ j0, then II picks b to be σj0 . This proves the claim. The
theorem now follows from 2.6. 
It is clear that for finite S the second proof may be formalized to obtain by 2.6:
4.3 Corollary S1+Σ1-Induction ⊢ RFNΠ2(S+Σ1-Collection), and for k ≥ 1, S+Σk+1-Induction+
Σk-Bounding ⊢ RFNΠk+2(S + Σk+1-Collection). 
Further observing that we do not need to work with models of Σk-Bounding but only with
arbitrarily large “finite approximations” of such models, we have, for example:
PRA ⊢ ∀k ∀θ ∈ Σk+2 (∀n ∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ (S + Σk-Bounding + θ)∗σ ) ⊃
∀n ∃σ
( |σ |–= n ∧ (S + Σk+1-Collection + θ)∗σ ) ) ,
which immediately translates into:
PRA ⊢ ∀k ∀θ ∈ Πk+2 (PrS+Σk+1 -Collection(θ) ⊃ PrS+Σk -Bounding (θ)) .
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Similarly, we may obtain e.g. for k ≥ 1,
S ⊢ ∀l ≥ k (RFNΠk+2(S + Σl-Bounding) ⊃ RFNΠk+2(S + Σl+1-Collection)) .
Next we shall consider some applications of 4.2, beginning first with set theory. The following
are immediate from our results.
Application (i) Let KP↾ be KP with Infinity but with the Foundation schema replaced by the
Foundation axiom. Then KP↾ is a Π2-conservative extension of KP↾ \ ∆0-Collection. Hence KP↾
is a very weak set theory indeed: Lω+ω is a model of its Π2 consequences. 
Application (ii) For k ≥ 1, Σk+1-Replacement is aΠk+2-conservative extension ofΣk -Replacement
+ Σk-Separation over KP↾. For any non-projectable γ > ω, Lγ is a model of the Π3 consequences
of Σ2-Collection + KP↾ (because γ is the limit of γ-stable ordinals). 
Application (iii) Σ1-Induction + KP↾ \ ∆0-Collection ⊢ RFNΠ2(KP↾), and for k ≥ 1,
KP↾ + Σk+1-Induction + Σk-Collection + Σk-Separation
⊢ RFNΠk+2(KP↾ + ∆k+1-Induction + Σk+1-Collection + ∆k+1-Separation) . 
Next let us briefly consider two-sorted theories with x, y, . . . intended to range over sets and
X,Y, . . . over classes. We obtain, for example, that:
Application (iv) GB \ {Power,Choice} plus the schema Σ11-wAC
weak-Σ11-AC : ∀x ∃Y θ(x,Y ) ⊃ ∃Z ∀x ∃y θ(x, (Z)y) , θ in Σ11 ,
is conservative over ZF−: for Σ11-wAC is Π
1
2-conservative over GB \ {Power,Choice}, and any
model of ZF− can obviously be extended to a model of GB \ {Power,Choice}. (A weaker but
similar result was obtained by Moschovakis, c.1971.) 
Solovay has shown that any countable model A of ZFC may be extended to a model (A,4)
of ZFC in the language with an extra binary predicate which also satisfies
∀x (4 ∩ x2 is a well-ordering) .
Feferman [76] observed that this yields:
Application (v) (Schlipf [78]) GB plus the schema
Σ
1
1-AC : ∀x ∃Y θ(x,Y ) ⊃ ∃Z ∀x θ(x, (Z)x) , θ in Σ11 ,
is conservative over ZFC. 
Now let us consider analysis; our language is that for 〈ω,Pω;+,×, 0, 1, ∈〉. Here S consists of
the axiom of Induction, ∆00-CA, (where ∆
0
0 is the closure of the atomic formulae under ∧, ∨,¬,∃n<
m,∀n < m), and simple axioms for addition and multiplication. As usual, S plus a schema such as
Γ-AC : ∀n ∃Y θ(n,Y ) ⊃ ∃Y ∀n θ(n, (Y )n) , θ ∈ Γ ,
will be denoted Γ-AC↾, while Γ-AC will denote Γ-AC↾ plus the full schema of Induction. Then
4.2 gives:
Application (vi) (Feferman and Sieg [80]) Σ11-wAC↾ is Π
1
2-conservative over ∆
0
0-CA
↾, over PR-
AC↾, and also over Π01-AC↾. Thus: 
Application (vii) (ibid.) Σ11-wAC↾ is conservative over PRA, and
Application (viii) (Friedman [76], Barwise and Schilpf [75]) Σ11-AC↾ is conservative over PA.
IV Some Conservation Results 41
Natural instances of Bounding are just various basis theorems. For example, the Kleene and
the Kondo-Addison Basis Theorems immediately give (upon checking that the proofs go through
in the appropriate theory or by using 4.1 and the discussion at the end of the last chapter) that:
Application (ix) (essentially Friedman [70], as are (x)-(xii) below) Σ12-AC↾ is a Π
1
3-conservative
extension of Π11-CA↾, and 
Application (x) (ibid.) Σ13-AC↾ is a Π
1
4-conservative extension of Π
1
2-CA↾. 
For further basis theorems it seems that further assumptions are needed. For example, using the
relativized version of Addison’s well-ordering of the constructible reals, and that his proof may
be formalized in the appropriate theory, we have:
Application (xi) (ibid.) For k ≥ 3, Σ1
k+1-AC↾ is a Π
1
k+2-conservative extension of Π
1
k
-CA↾ over
∃X .V = L(X). 
Since ∃X .V = L(X) is Π14-conservative over Π1k-CA↾ for k ≥ 3 (and this is easy to check), (xi)
gives:
Application (xii) (ibid.) For k ≥ 3, Σ1
k+1-AC↾ is a Π
1
4-conservative extension of Π
1
4-CA↾. 
Uniform versions of (viii), (ix) and (x) are:
Application (xiii) For k = 0, 1, or 2
Π
1
k-CA↾ + Σk+1-Induction ⊢ RFNΠk+2(Σk+1-AC↾) , (where here Π10 = Π01)
and uniform versions may also be concocted for the general case. 
Next let us consider arithmetic. Here S consists of PA−ex, as given on page 12; all theories
below are assumed to contain S. As is well-known, many schemata which are very different in
set theory become equivalent in arithmetic. In particular,
Fact In PA−ex for k ≥ 1,
Σk-Induction ≡ Πk-Induction ≡ Σk-Separation ≡ Σk-Bounding
Σk-Induction ⊃ Σk-Collection (3)
These results, due to Ch. Parsons ([70] and [72]) (and independently rediscovered by many
others), are all straightforward to prove, except for
Σk-Induction ⊃ Σk-Separation
for which we shall now give a proof using an elegant trick of H. Friedman’s [79]. Suppose we
have already shown (3). It is easy to check that Σk-Collection implies that any formula of the form
∀x < yθ, with θ in Σk is equivalent to a Σk formula. Using this, it is easy to see that Σk-Induction
implies any class of the form
{ x < b : ϕx } ,
with ϕ in Σk , has a maximum element. So given any element a and any Σk formula θ, the class
{ x < a : θx } is realized by the maximum element of
{ x < 2a : ∀y ∈ x θy } , Q.E .F . 
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Now these equivalences immediately give for all k ≥ 0,
Application (xiv) (Paris & Kirby, Friedman) Σk+1-Collection is a Πk+2-conservative extension
of Σk-Induction, and 
Application (xv) (cf. Parsons [71], [72]) Σk+1-Induction ⊢ RFNΠk+2(Σk+1-Collection). 
Finally let us note, as Friedman [70] remarks at the end of his paper, that the first proof of
4.2 may be used to yield interesting results concerning certain infinitary theories. We replace the
notion of recursive saturation by A-saturation for the appropriate admissible set A, and obtain,
for example:
Application (xvi) In ω-logic, Σ1
k+1-AC is a Π
1
l
-conservative extension of (Π1
k
-CA)<ωCK1 , where
l = 2, 3, or 4 according to whether k = 0, 1, or is ≥ 2. (This notion of iterated Π1
k
-CA is
described below; we mention this result here only to compare it with Application (xxi).) 
Theorem 4.2 may be generalized to the so-called unrestricted case as follows. We shall
assume that S contains ∆0-Separation. Suppose that for some sufficiently absolute formula
ψ(x, y), S proves ∃!Ω, ≺ (ψ(Ω, ≺)) and that ≺ is a strict linear well-ordering of its domain Ω.
We shall usually refer to (Ω,≺) by Ω, leaving the ordering implicit. As in Chapter III, we may
define in S and in a natural fashion from Ω, the linear orderings (Ω)ω , 2(Ω+1)ω
k
, and ε(Ω). In
dealing with these orderings, it will be convenient to use the same terminology and notations
which one uses for von Neumann ordinals with α, β, . . . ranging over ε(Ω). For σ = 〈σβ〉β<α ,
let σ<β = ∪γ<β σγ. Say good(σ) if
∀β ∈ |σ | (∪ σ<β ∪ σ<β ∪ {σ<β} ∪ {σ↾ β}) ⊆ σβ ;
this is the analogue of clause (iii) in the proof of 4.2. For any definable α ≤ ε(Ω), consider the
schemata:
Boundingα : ∀b∃σ
( |σ | = α ∧ b ∈ σ0 ∧ good(σ) ∧ ∀β < |σ |– ∀−⇀x ∈ σβ (∃−⇀y θ ⊃ ∃−⇀y ∈ σβ+1θ))
DCα : ∀
−⇀x ∃−⇀y θ ⊃∀b∃σ ( |σ | = α ∧ b ∈ σ0 ∧ good(σ) ∧ ∀β < |σ |– ∀−⇀x ∈ σβ ∃−⇀y ∈ σβ+1 θ)
Sα : ∀b∃σ
( |σ | = α ∧ b ∈ σ0 ∧ good(σ) ∧∧
∃
−⇀x ∀−⇀y ∃−⇀z θ ∈ S∩n ∃
−⇀x ∈ σ1 ∀β ≤ |σ |– ∀−⇀y ∈ σβ ∃−⇀z ∈ σβ+1 θ
)
Let Bounding<ε(Ω) = ∪n ∈ω Bounding(2(Ω+1)ωn ), and similarly for the other schemata.
Note that by taking the θ−⇀x −⇀y in DCα be
∃
−⇀
z θ
−⇀
x
−⇀
z ⊃ θ −⇀x −⇀y ,
we have immediately:
Σ1-DCα ⊢ Sα , and
Σk+1-DCα ⊢ Σk-Boundingα , for k ≥ 1 .
Before stating our next theorem, we shall indicate, as briefly as possible, some derivations of
Σk+1-DCα from more familiar principles. For example, if WO is the axiom asserting that every
set can be well-ordered, then
S +WO + (card(α) = β) + Σk+1-DCβ + Σk+2-Foundation(α) ⊢ Σk+1-DCα .
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Alternatively, define a Σk+1-Uniform Collection schema to be one which has the form:
∀a, −⇀z
(
∀
−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y θ −⇀x −⇀y −⇀z ⊃ ∃!b (ψθ ab−⇀z ∧ ∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y ∈ b θ −⇀x −⇀y −⇀z )
)
where θ 7→ ψθ is a map from Πk formulae to Σk+1 formula. (For example, in set theory we
may choose b to be the least Vα (or perhaps the least Lα) such that ∀
−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y ∈ b θ −⇀x −⇀y −⇀z , and in
analysis there are the Uniformization results.) Then we have:
S + Σk+1-Uniform Collection + Σk+1-Foundation(α) ⊢ Σk+1-DCα .
Finally, note that in analysis the standard notion of Σ1
k
-DC is equivalent to our notion Σ1
k
-DCω ,
which somewhat justifies our notation. For suppose Σ1
k
-DC. This implies the schema:
Σ
1
k-GDC : ∀n, X ∃Y θnXY ⊃ ∀U ∃V
(
U = (V )0 ∧ ∀n θn(V )n(V )n+1
)
.
Suppose ∀X ∃Y θ, where θ is Π1
k−1, and we wish to show
∀A∃σ ( |σ |– = ω ∧ A = σ0 ∧ good(σ) ∧ ∀n ∀X ∈ σn ∃Y ∈ σn+1θ) . (4)
Let ϕnXY be:
if n = 0, then Y = X;
if n = 3(k + 1) for some k ∈ ω, then Y = (X)k ;
if n = 3(〈k, l〉 + 1) + 1 for some k, l ∈ ω, then Y = ((X)k)l;
if n = 3(k + 1) + 2 for some k ∈ ω, then θ(X)kY ,
and let ψUV be (U = V0) ∧ ∀nϕnVnVn+1. Then ∀n ∀X ∃YψnXY , and so by Σ1k-GDC, ∀U ∃Vψ.
Now by Σ1
k
-DC, ∀A∃σ (σ0 = A ∧ ∀nψσnσn+1). This implies (4).
These observations will be used when we give applications of:
4.4 Theorem Suppose S includes ∆0-Separation. Then Σ1-DC<ε(Ω) + Foundation(Ω) is a
Π2-conservative extension of S<ε(Ω), and for k ≥ 1, Σk+1-DC<ε(Ω) + Foundation(Ω) is a Πk+2-
conservative extension of Σk-Bounding<ε(Ω) over S.
Proof: As before, we shall give two proofs. The first is mostly model theoretic, but at one point
it uses 3.1, namely that
S + Foundation(ε(Ω)) ⊢ RFN(Foundation(Ω)) ;
whereas the second proof is purely internal, but it involves details of the Hilbert-Ackermann-
Scanlon method for proving 3.1. The first proof is essentially that of Friedman [70], and it seems
to require the further assumption that S proves Ω is infinite. The proof is in four stages.
For the first, note that Foundation(Ω) is Πk+2-conservative over S + Σk-Bounding<ε(Ω) (or,
if k = 0, S<ε(Ω)). Indeed, because S proves ∆0-Foundation, it is clear that any Σk+2 sentence
consistent with S + Σk-Boundingγω is consistent with S + Σk-Boundingγ + Foundation(Ω) (and
similarly for Sγω), and that 2(Ω+1)
ω
k
ω < 2(Ω+1)
ω
k+1 for large enough k.
For the second stage, add new constant symbols α, l to the language, and consider the theory:
Tα = l ∈ ω + (l > n)n∈ω + α = 2(Ω+1)
ω
l
+ Σk-Boundingα (or, if k = 0, Sα).
It is clear that Tα is conservative over S = Σk-Bounding<ε(Ω) + Foundation(Ω).
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For the third stage, by 3.1 we have
Tα + Foundation(α) ⊢ RFN(“Tα + Σl-Foundation(Ω)”)
and so our proof of the Essential Unboundedness Theorem 2.7 gives that there must be some
instance ϕ of Foundation(α) such that ¬ϕ is Πk+2-conservative over the extensional theory
represented by “Tα + Σl-Foundation(Ω)”, i.e., Tα + Foundation(Ω). (Indeed, a more careful
inspection yields that we may take ϕ to be an instance of Σk+1-Foundation(α), but we shall not
need this fact.)
For the last stage, the theorem now follows immediately from:
4.5 Lemma For any instance ϕ of Foundation(α), any Σk+2 sentence of L consistent with
Tα + Foundation(Ω) + ¬ϕ is consistent with S + Σk+1-DC<ε(Ω) + Foundation(Ω).
Proof: Let A be any model of Tα + Foundation(Ω) + ¬ϕ. Fix m ∈ ω sufficiently large so
that Σm+1-Foundation(α) is false, and choose 2γ ≤ α so that Σm-Foundation(2γ) holds but not
Σm+1-Foundation(2γ). This we can do by choosing the least (nonstandard) n for which
Σm+1-Foundation(2(Ω+1)
ω
n )
is false, and setting γ = 2(Ω+1)
ω
n−1 ; then Σm-Foundation(2γ) is implied by Σm+1-Foundation(γ).
Now we may choose a Πm+1 formula Px (possibly with parameters) such that the class
I = { δ < α : Pδ }
is a proper initial segment of α for which the following overspill property holds:
if θx is Σm, possibly with parameters, and if θδ
holds for all δ ∈ I then θδ holds for some δ ∈ α \ I. (5)
Now let a be an arbitrary element of A and let σ witness Σk-Boundingα (or, if k = 0, Sα)
with a ∈ σ0. Let B = ∪i∈ωσi and let B = A↾B. It is clear that B is a k-elementary transitive
substructure of A and, as it is definable in A, Foundation(Ω) must hold in it. If m ≥ k + 2, it
is easy to see that Σk+1-Collection also holds in B using the overspill property (5) just as in the
proof of 4.2. However, we must show that Σk+1-DC<ε(Ω) holds in B.
Suppose B  ∀−⇀x ∃−⇀y θ, where θ is Πk , and let b ∈ B. It suffices to show that
A  ∃δ ∈ I ∃! f ∈ σδ HO ( f , β, δ) (6)
for suitable β, where
HO ( f , β, δ) = “ f : β 7→ δ is increasing” ∧ b ∈ σf 0 ∧
∀γ < β
(
∀
−⇀x ∈ σfγ ∃−⇀y ∈ σf (γ+1) θ ∧ ¬∃ξ (γ < ξ < f (γ + 1) ∧ ∀−⇀x ∈ σfγ ∃−⇀y ∈ σξ θ)
)
.
This implies B  Σk+1-DCβ, as follows. Choose δ ∈ I and f ∈ σδ to witness (6); then as S
includes ∆0-Separation and as 〈σξ〉ξ<δ ∈ σδ , we have that 〈σf ξ 〉ξ<β ∈ σδ+1 ⊆ B. Now as HO is
absolute between A and B, this is our required witness to Σk+1-DCβ.
To prove (6) we use induction on β. Wemay suppose that β is a limit ordinal, for the successor
case is the same as for Σk+1-Collection. If (6) is false, then by the induction hypothesis,
α \ I = { δ : A  ∀γ < β ∃ f ∈ σγ HO ( f , β, δ) } .
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This gives us a ∆0 definition of I, for if λ is a limit ordinal, for all δ < λ and
−⇀x , −⇀y ∈ σδ,
θ
−⇀x −⇀y ≡ (θ −⇀x −⇀y )〈σδ+1,...,σδ+k 〉 . But this contradicts (5).
This concludes our first proof of 4.4. 
Our second proof of 4.4 is purely internal, that is, it involves no external model-theoretic
considerations. We shall suppose that k ≥ 1; the k = 0 case is similar and easier. Consider the
following:
4.6 Lemma Suppose S contains the axiom of Infinity. Let l ∈ωwith l ≥ 1,and let β0 = ω2
(Ω+1)ω
l
+1.
Then
S+Σk-Boundingβ0+1 ⊢ ∀n, x ∃σ
( |σ |–=n∧x∈σ0∧Σl-Foundation(Ω)σ∧Σk+1-Collectionσ∧Tr Σkσ ) .
Comment before proof: If S includes the negation of Infinity, then the above ordinal is too
large for Σk-Boundingβ0+1 to make sense. We have, however the following extension of 3.10.
Add a new constant c to the language of arithmetic.
4.7 Lemma In arithmetic, for each n, l ∈ ω there exists m ∈ ω, such that:
S+Σk-Bounding2cm
⊢ ∀x ∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧x∈σ0∧Σl-Induction(c)σ∧Σk+1-Collectionσ∧Tr Σkσ ) . 
The proof of 4.7 is similar to that of 4.6, and is omitted. After sketching an informal proof of 4.6,
we shall briefly describe how one could modify the proof to show the existence of a sequence
which fulfils Σk+1-DCβ for suitable β rather than Σk+1-Collection. From this amended version,
theorem 4.4 follows immediately. For the applications which we have in mind, however, 4.6
suffices.
Proof of 4.6: Recall from Chapter III that for any finite subset Γ of Foundation(Ω), any n ∈ ω,
and any finite sets C,G of constant and function symbols, there is an algorithm AΓ,n(C,G) which,
upon inputting any (interpretation of C as) elements C and any (interpretation of the function
symbols G as) functions G (of the appropriate arity), produces a sequence σ which n-fulfils Γ,
has C ⊆ σ0, and is closed under G. Further recall that each state of A (i.e. each iterate of the
single loop of which A consists) depends upon only finite bits of G. More specifically, the 0th
(initial) state depends only upon the values of terms built up from G and C (and the constants and
functions of the language) whose height is less than n, and in general, to calculate the ith state
requires, at most, knowledge of the values of the terms whose height is less than n(i + 1).
Also recall that with each state of A is associated an ordinal such that
α0 > α1 > α2 > . . .
where αi is the ordinal of the ith state. These αi in general depend upon G, but we may obtain an
upper bound for α0 depending only on Γ and n:
α0 < 2
(Ω+1)m
l
, for some m
if Γ is included in Σl-Foundation(Ω).
Switching topics slightly, letψ be any sentence and suppose some sequence τ = 〈τ0, . . . , τ |τ |–〉
fulfils ψ. Let G be a set of satisfaction function symbols for ψ. Then, as in 3.6, for any finite C
there exists a finite interpretation of G (also denoted by G) by partial functions such that:
i. all terms of depth ≤ |τ |– built up from C and G have a value;
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ii. if g ∈ G, i < |τ |–, and −⇀x ∈ τi ∩ domain(g), then g−⇀x ∈ τi+1; and
iii. G is, in so far as it is defined, a set of satisfaction functions for ψ.
We just choose the interpretation for G via a winning strategy for the game associated with ψσ.
Also, if τ satisfies
∀i < |τ |– ∀−⇀x ∈ τi
(
ϕ
−⇀x ⊃ (ϕ−⇀x )τi
)
, (i.e. (Tr ϕ−⇀x )τ) ,
we could make a similar remark for the satisfaction functions for ϕ.
Now after the above preliminaries, let us proceed with the sketch of the proof of the lemma.
Fix any universal instance
∀a, −⇀z (∀x ∈ a ∃yθ ⊃ ∃b∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ b θ)
of Σk+1-Collection with θ in Πk , and let
ψ = ∀a, −⇀z ∃x ∈ a ∀y ∃b (θ ⊃ ∀x′ ∈ a ∃y′ ∈ b θx′y′) .
Fix a finite subset Γ of Σl-Foundation(Ω) and let ϕx be any complete Πk formula. Fix n and x.
We shall show
∃σ ( |σ |–= n ∧ x ∈ σ0 ∧ ψσ ∧ Γσ ∧ Tr ϕσ) .
Let τ be a witness to Σk-Boundingβ0 , with x ∈ τ0. Let C = {x} and let G consist of satisfaction
function symbols for ψ and ϕ. Observe that for each finite subset M of β0, the sequence 〈τγ〉γ∈M
fulfils ψ. (And if the reader first proves this as an exercise, the remainder of the proof should be
clear.) Furthermore, the remark (2) on page 39 also holds, and so there exists some interpretation
of G so that (i), (ii) and (iii) above hold for 〈τγ〉γ∈M and ψ and ϕx. The problem is to choose
M and G so that, with this choice, the computation A = AΓ,n(C,G) may be carried out, thus
producing the required sequence. But we cannot make an a priori choice of M and G as we did
in 3.6; instead we shall choose them according to the algorithm C incorporating A and another
subroutine B, which we shall now describe.
Let TBC (to be considered) be a subclass of the ordinals less than β0, and suppose initially
that all are TBC. Also initially set M = {0} and let all the functions in G have empty domains.
Set α = 2(Ω+1)
m
l
; β will always be the ordinal of the order type of TBC.
Our algorithm C is this: repeat subroutine B n times, and then perform one step of A. Set α
equal to the ordinal associated with the present state of A. If A is not in its terminal state, repeat
B n times again, and so on.
The subroutine B is as follows. Suppose we are given M = {γ0 < · · ·<γj}, G, TBC (= TBCold),
and α. Now there exists a (unique) sequence
µ0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ µ j
of finite sets such that for all i < j, µi ⊆ τγi , and µi is included in the domains of all the functions
G, and µi+1 = ∪g∈G∪L g′′µi. We extend the domains of the functions of G to include µ j and
we reduce TBCold to TBCnew, as follows. If g ∈ G is some satisfaction function for θ or ϕ, and
−⇀
y ∈ µ j , it is clear that we can choose the appropriate g−⇀y ∈ τδ j+1, and TBC remains unaffected by
this. The interesting cases are the satisfaction functions for the quantifiers “∃x ∈ a” and “∃b” in
ψ. By the exercise just mentioned on page 46, it should be clear that we can define g
∃x∈a and
TBCnew so that:
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i. βnew, the order type ofTBCnew, is sufficiently large (we shall explicitly state this requirement
below), and if
γ+ = least ordinal in TBCnew ∪ {β0} greater than γ ,
we have:
ii. ∀a, −⇀z ∈ µ j ∀γ
(
γj ≤ γ < β0 ⊃ ∀y ∈ τγ
(
θ(g
∃x∈a (a, −⇀z ), y, −⇀z ) ⊃ ∀x′ ∈ a ∃y′ ∈ τ<γ+ θ x′y′ −⇀z
) )
.
Now we can choose g
∃b
so that for all a, −⇀z in µ j , if
γ = least γ s.t. γj ≤ γ < β0 ∧ ∃y ∈ τγ θ(g∃x∈a (a, −⇀z ), y, −⇀z )
then g
∃b
(a, −⇀z , y) = τ<γ+ for all y ∈ τβ0 . Add γ+j to M .
In requirement (i), we wish to have β sufficiently large so that immediately after each n-fold
iteration of B, we have
β ≥ ωα .
That it is possible to satisfy this requirement follows from the easy combinatorial Lemma 4.8
given below. In satisfying it, we ensure that we will always have enough TBC ordinals to continue
extending the domains of the partial functions interpreting G until such time as the algorithm A
halts.
This completes the description of the subroutine B.
4.8 Lemma Let δ ≥ ωα+1 and let N ∈ ω. Consider the following game. Set δ0 = δ. On the
(i + 1)st move, Player I chooses a partition
δi = η + ν
and Player II chooses µ < η. Set δi+1 = µ + ν. Player II wins if δN ≥ ωα. We claim that Player
II has a winning strategy.
Proof: Let Player II play as follows: if ωα j < η < ωα( j + 1) for j ∈ ω, let µ = ωα j, and if
η ≥ ωα+1, set µ = ωαN . It is easy to check that this works. 
This concludes our sketch of the proof of Lemma 4.6. We hope our description has been
clear enough for the interested reader to fill in the missing details.
Theorem 4.4 for k ≥ 1 follows from:
4.9 Lemma For l ≥ 1 and for suitable β, we have
S+Σk-Bounding(β2
(Ω+1)ω
l ) ⊢ ∀n, x ∃σ ( |σ |–=n∧x∈σ0∧Σl-Foundation(Ω)σ∧Σk+1-DCβσ∧Tr Σkσ).
The proof of 4.9 is similar to that of 4.6, but as we shall not make use of this result, we shall omit
all of it except for the statement of the analogous (equally easy) combinatorial lemma.
4.10 Lemma Let δ ≥ β(α+1)ω and let N ∈ ω. Let δ0 = δ and consider the game where on the
(i + 1)st move Player I presents a partition
δi =
∑
γ<β ηγ + ν
and Player II chooses δi+1 = ηγ + ν for some γ < β. Player II wins if δN ≥ βαω . We claim that
II has a winning strategy. 
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As before, we may use the effective proofs to obtain uniform versions:
4.11 Corollary If S includes ∆0-Separation,
∀α < ε(Ω)Sα ⊢ RFNΠ2 (S + Σ1-DC<ε(Ω) + Foundation(Ω)) ,
and for k ≥ 1,
S + ∀α < ε(Ω)Σk-Boundingα ⊢ RFNΠk+2 (S + Σk+1-DC<ε(Ω) + Foundation(Ω)) . 
Note that in this terminology, we can restate the content of Corollary 4.3 as:
∀n Sn ⊢ RFNΠ2(S + Σ1-Collection) ,
and for k ≥ 1,
S + ∀n Σk-Boundingn ⊢ RFNΠk+2(S + Σk+1-Collection) .
Let us now briefly consider some applications of 4.4. Our notation is as before.
Application (xvii) (Jäger [78]) In set theory we have, for example, that KP↾ + Induction is a
Π2-conservative extension of KP↾ \ ∆0-Collection + { ∀x ∃y y = Lα(x) : α < ε0 }; hence Lε0 is a
model of the Π2 consequences of KP↾ + Induction. 
Application (xviii) Also if α is the αth nonprojectible, and if β < α is Σ1-definable, then Lα is
a model of the Π3 consequences of KP↾ + Foundation(β) + Σ2-Collection. 
In analysis we have, for example:
Application (xix) (Friedman [70]) For k = 0, 1, or 2, Σk+1-AC is a Π1k+2-conservative extension
of (Π1
k
-CA)<ε0↾; 
Application (xx) For k = 0, 1, or 2, ∀α < ε0 (Π1k-CA)α↾ ⊢ RFNΠk+2(Σk+1-AC) ; and 
Application (xxi) For k = 0, 1, or 2, Σk+1-AC plus the schema of
BI≺
where ≺ ranges over primitive recursive orderings or well-orderings is Πk+2-conservative over
the schema
wf(≺) ⊃ (Π1k-CA)≺↾ ,
where ≺ has the same range. 
Application (xxii) In arithmetic, extend the usual language L to L(c) by adding a new constant
c. Then from 4.7 we have that for all k ≥ 0, Σk+1-Collection + Induction(c) is aΠk+2-conservative
(w.r.t. the language L(c)) extension of Σk-Induction. 
The proofs of 4.4 also give the following result (which, however, does not follow from our
present statement of 4.4):
Application (xxiii) Σ11-wAC is Π
1
2-conservative over PR-CA↾ + the induction schema restricted
to first order formulae with second order parameters + the schema
∀X ∃H “H is the Wainer hierarchy relativized to X up to α” , α < ε0 . 
V Some Model-theoretic Applications: Non-ω-models
This and the following chapter contain some model-theoretic applications of the notion of fulfil-
ment. In this chapter we shall consider only non-ω-models. Let us say at the outset that much of
this chapter was inspired by the work of J. Paris and L. Kirby.
Our first theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of certain initial
segments which model a given coded theory, and indicators for the same. By an iteration of this,
we are able to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an initial segment which
models a given complete theory in Corollary 5.5. We next consider a result of Kirby, McAloon,
and Murawski [79]: they noticed that for any countable model M of PRA and for any theory T
in the language of analysis extending Π01-CA which is coded in M there exists an indicator for
the initial segments I of M which are such that 〈I,RI (M)〉 is a model of T. (These terms are
defined below.) We shall extend this result by weakening the condition on T: namely, in 5.8 we
only require that T extend ∆00-CA↾, WKL (weak König’s lemma) plus (something weaker than)
Σ
0
1-Induction. Our last result 5.11 gives a description of the order type of the set of elementary
initial segments of a recursively saturated (r.s.) model of PA, and it extends results which were
known to hold for countable r.s. models (or, more generally, resplendent models).
By use of the arithmetized Completeness Theorem of Hilbert and Bernays, we can obtain the
following well-known result.
5.1 Result LetM be a nonstandard model of PA− + ∆2-Induction, and let T be any theory coded
inM extending PA. There exists a r.s. end-extension ofMwhich is a model of T iff the Σ1 theory
of M is consistent with T. 
By the use of fulfilment we may easily obtain the dual of 5.1, that is, with “end-extension”
replaced by “initial segment” and “Σ1” by “Π1”. Our first theorem is an elaboration upon this
idea.
But first we must consider the question: what is an initial segment? For models of arithmetic
the answer is clear, and for set theory we have the notion of transitive substructure. For analysis,
however, there is no obvious choice. If we use the notion determined by the membership relation
(as defined on page 11) and have ω as a constant of our language, then the notion of an initial
segment which is a model of QF-AC↾ is the same as that of an ω-absolute substructure which is
a model of QF-AC↾, which is indeed a very natural one. Or we could base the notion of initial
segment on some quite different ordering, such as x is constructible before y, or x has hyper-(or
Turing or Wadge) -degree less than that of y. We shall, however, always assume that the notion
of initial segment is the one based on the membership relation, that is, B is an initial segment of a
structureA, denoted by B ⊆end A, if for all x, y ∈ A, x ∈ y ∈ B implies x ∈ B (where here, of course,
the relation x ∈ y is to be interpreted in A). While this assumption is partially for simplicity, it is
also because of doubts about the model-theoretic importance of these other notions. At the same
time, we would like to emphasize that our constructions are for the most part perfectly general,
and work for any appropriate interpretation of “bounded quantifier”.
Let A be a model of S as on page 11, let B ⊆ A and let b ∈ A. Say B ⊆ b if for all a ∈ B,
A  a ∈ b. A formula θ xyz, possibly with parameters from A, is an indicator for a collection S
of initial segments of A if for all a, b ∈ A, there exists I ∈ S such that a ∈ I ⊆ b iff for all n ∈ ω,
A  θnab. Two sets, S and S’, are symbiotic if for all a, b ∈ A, there exists I ∈ S with a ∈ I ⊆ b
iff there exists I ′ ∈ S ′ with a ∈ I ′ ⊆ b. Say ω codes an initial segment I if there exists a sequence
σ of nonstandard length such that I = ∪i∈ωσi. S is cofinal in A iff for all a ∈ A, there exists
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I ∈ S with a ∈ I.
The next lemma is well-known (perhaps due to Gaifman or Puritz), and we omit the proof.
Given structures A, C, with A ⊆ C, there exists a unique set B that A ⊆cof B ⊆end C. IfA  Σ1-
Collection and A 40 C we have that B = C↾B is a structure. Moreover, if A  ∆0-Separation:
5.2 Lemma i. If A 4k C and Σk+1-Collection holds in A, then B 4k C.
ii. If A 40 B and Σk+1-Collection holds in A, then A 4k+1 B. 
5.3 Theorem Let k ∈ ω, let A be a non-ω-model of S, let T be any theory coded in A, and let
S = { I 4end
k
A : I  T }.
i. Suppose T extends S and Collection and that Σk+1-overspill holds in A. Then
• S has an indicator, and
• S is symbiotic with { I ∈ S : I r.s. and ω codes I }.
• S \ {A} is nonempty iff the Πk+1 theory of A is consistent with T, and
• S is cofinal in A iff the Σk+2 theory of A is consistent with T.
ii. Suppose A is Σ(k+1)-recursively saturated and is locally countable. Then
• S is symbiotic with { I ∈ S : I r.s. }.
• S is nonempty iff the Π(k+1) theory of A is consistent with T, and
• S equals {A} or is cofinal in A iff the Σ(k+2) theory of A is consistent with T.
• If Σk+1-Collection either holds in A or is included in T, S has an indicator, and if we
also have either QF-Foundation or QF-Separation in A or T, then S , {A}.
Before the proof, let us first make several remarks.
The notion of indicator in arithmetic is due to J. Paris and L. Kirby; see Kirby [77]. The
existence of the indicators for arithmetic indicated above is also due to them: they use a game-
theoretic argument.
It will be clear from our proof that if the power-set axiom holds in A, we only need Πk-
overspill and Π(k)-recursive saturation in order to show the existence of the indicators and the
symbiosis.
For information concerning the order types of these sets of initial segments, see theorem 5.11
below.
Part (i) (without the condition ofω coding I andwithT also assumed to contain∆0 -Separation)
actually follows from (ii) by taking countable elementary submodels of A and using 5.2 and a
result of Smoryński and Stavi [79], namely that cofinal elementary extensions of r.s. models
of S + Separation are recursively saturated, However, as there are short elegant proofs using
i-fulfilment, we shall prove (i) directly.
It is easy to check that if σ ∈ A, if iσ holds and if σ fulfils the universal closure of θ∨¬θ,
then it also fulfils the universal closure of
∃x ∈ z θ ⊃ ∃ ∈ z (θ ∧ ∀y ∈ x ¬θ(y/x)) .
This places a restriction (at least in the arithmetical case) on the ease with which wemay construct
r.s. initial segments in which Collection does not hold—for example, our method requires the
countability condition.
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Finally, let us remark that in a pre-print (but not in the published) version of Paris and
Kirby [78], a result is (essentially) proved which is almost the dual of ours; let M be a countable
model of PA−ex as given on page 12, let T be any r.e. theory extending PA; then there exists a
k-elementary end-extension of M which is a model of T iffM is a model of Σk+1-Collection, the
Πk+1 theory of T, and T-provable-Πk+1-overspill, that is, if ϕx is Πk+1 and for all n ∈ω, T proves
ϕn, then ϕm holds in M for some nonstandard m.
Proof of 5.3: Let us first quickly check the assertions of (i) in the order given.
Let a, b ∈ A and suppose a ∈ I ⊆ b for some I ∈ S . Then for each n ∈ ω,
∃σ
( |σ |–= n ∧ a ∈ σ0 ∧ −⇀σ ⊆ b ∧ iσ ∧ Tσ ∧ Tr Σkσ ) (1)
is true in A, where “T” here is represented by any code for T. Conversely, if (1) holds for each
n ∈ ω then, using overspill, there is an I in S with a ∈ I ⊆ b: just let I = ∪i∈ωσi where σ
witnesses (1) for some nonstandard n. As σ also fulfils the universal closure of θ∨¬θ for all
formulae θ, it provides a global satisfaction predicate for I inA, and so I is recursively saturated.
If S is nonempty (respectively, cofinal), then it is clear that A is a model of the Σk+1 (Πk+2)
theory of T. Conversely, if A is a model of the Σk+1 theory of T, then (1), with references to a
and b deleted, holds for each n ∈ ω. So, using overspill, S is not empty. If A is a model of the
Πk+1 theory of T, then (1), prefixed by a universal quantification of a and with b deleted, holds
for each n ∈ ω. Hence S is cofinal in A. This establishes (i).
Now consider 5.3.ii. Given n ∈ ω and two closed, increasing sequences σ, τ, say σ 4n τ if
|σ |= |τ |, for all i < |σ |,σi ⊆ τi, and for all i < |σ |–, all pϕ−⇀v q < n, and all −⇀v ∈σi, (ϕ−⇀v )σi ⊃ (ϕ−⇀v )τi .
Fix a, b ∈ A. Choose some code t for T: we shall suppose that T contains the universal closure of
θ∨¬θ for all formulae θ. For each n∈ω, define a Σ(k+1) predicate extendiblen(σ), with parameters
a, b, and t, as follows. Let extendible0(σ) be 0 = 0, and let extendiblen+1(σ) hold iff
|σ |–>n∧a∈σ0∧−⇀σ ⊆ b∧tσ∧Tr Σkσ∧∀i< |σ |– ∀x∈σi ∀y∈x ∃τ
(
y∈τ0∧σ 4n τ∧extendiblen(τ)
)
.
Let n-extendible be the corresponding informal property: with this notion we are trying to capture
some of the properties of a sequence defined (externally) via satisfaction functions.
If there exists I in S such that a ∈ I ⊆ b, then it is clear that for each n ∈ ω there exists an
n-extendible sequence in A. By Σ(k+1)-recursive saturation, we may choose a sequence σ in A
which is n-extendible for all n ∈ω. Let σ0 =σ. Let y ∈ A be such that there exist i ∈ω and x ∈σi
with y ∈ x. Then for each n ∈ ω there exists τ such that
y ∈ τ0 ∧ σ 4n τ ∧ extendiblen(τ) .
By Σ(k+1)-recursive saturation, choose τ such that this holds for all n∈ω; let σ1=τ. Continuing in
some such manner, define a sequence 〈σi〉i∈ω . Let Bi = ∪j∈ω (σi)j . The Bi’s form an ascending
elementary chain of k-elementary substructures of A which are recursively saturated models of
T, with Bi ⊆ b for all i ∈ ω. Let I = ∪i∈ωBi. Then I is also a k-elementary substructure of
A which is a r.s. model of T, with I ⊆ b. If we make the successive choices of x and y in a
sufficiently orderly manner and use the local countability of A, we may ensure that I is also an
initial segment. Thus S is symbiotic with its r.s. members.
Suppose that theΣ(k+1) theory ofT holds inA. Redefine extendiblen by deleting the references
to a and b. In any model of T, for each n ∈ ω, there exists a sequence which is n-extendible. Just
as in our proof of the Completeness Theorem on page 11, this underlined statement may be
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expressed as a Σ(k+1) sentence without the coding of either sequences or formulae and without
the use of the Σk satisfaction predicate, and, so expressed, it is provable in T. Hence it must hold
inA, and so for each n ∈ω, ∃σ extendiblen(σ) holds inA. By Σ(k+1)-recursive saturation and the
above construction, we may conclude that S is nonempty. The cofinal case is argued similarly.
If Σk+1-Collection holds in eitherA or T, we may express the notion of n-extendible uniformly
in n to obtain an indicator. Also in this case, we can find b ∈ A such that B ⊆ b for the B
constructed above. If we have QF-Foundation, then b< b, and if we have QF-Separation, consider
c = { x ∈ b : x < x }. Obviously c < b. The next result shows that, in general, Σk+1-Collection is
both a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure S , {A}. 
5.4 Lemma Let k ∈ ω and let A be a countable model of S + Σk+1-overspill. The following are
equivalent.
i. For all formulae ϕ−⇀a with parameters −⇀a ∈ A, there exists b ∈ A and B ⊆ b such that −⇀a ∈ B,
B ≺end
k
A, and ϕ−⇀a is absolute between A and B.
ii. Σk+1-Collection holds in A.
Proof: Suppose (ii). Replace “T” with “ϕ−⇀a ” in the above definition of n-extendible. By Σk+1-
Collection we may bound the quantifiers “∃τ”, and then (i) follows by the above construction.
Suppose (i), and suppose ∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y θ holds inA, where θ ∈ Σk+1. Choose b ∈ A, B ⊆ b such
that B ≺end
k
A and B  ∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y θ. Then A  ∀−⇀x ∈ a ∃−⇀y ∈ b θ. Thus (ii). 
5.5 Corollary LetA be a model of S and Σk+1-overspill, and let T be a complete theory extending
S plus Collection plus Separation. The following are equivalent.
i. There exists a k-elementary initial segment of A which is a nonstandard model of T.
ii. A is a model of T ∩ Σk+1, and for all n ∈ ω, T ∩ Σn is coded in A.
Before the proof, let us make a number of remarks.
This result is (in the arithmetical case) the dual of a result of Wilkie [77]. (The proof below
is modelled on Lessan’s [78] proof of this dual.) Together these results answer a question in the
introduction of Friedman [73]: are the standard systems of the nonstandard models of PA which
contain all arithmetic sets the same as those of models of the theory of N?
Let us consider more closely the arithmetical case when T extends PA: we shall quickly
sketch two alternative proofs of 5.5. First, by 5.3.i, we can construct a chain of nonstandard
initial segments
A ≻k B0 ≻k+1 B1 ≻k+2 B2 ≻k+3 · · · (2)
where Bk is a model of T ∩ Σn+k+2 ∪ PA. Let I = ∩i∈ωBi. As T has definable satisfaction
functions, it is easy to check that I ≺k A and that I is a model of T. It is also easy to ensure that
I is nonstandard.
For the second proof, let B be the minimal model for T, or, if T = Th(N), let B be a
conservative extension of N (that is, its standard system consists of exactly the arithmetical sets;
see Phillips [74] or 5.9 below). A subset of ω is coded in B iff it is recursive in T ∩ Σn for some
n ∈ ω. Thus the set of reals of B is included in that of A, and so we may, by Friedman [73],
construct a k-elementary embedding of B into A. Then the initial segment of A determined by
the image of B is by 5.2 a k-elementary substructure of A and is a model of T.
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Third proof of 5.5: The left to right implication is easy, for S + Collection ⊢ Induction, which
provides the overspill required to code the true Σn sentences. For the converse, by 5.2 we may
suppose A is countable. Let 〈ci〉i∈ω be an infinite sequence of new constants. Let 〈ϕi〉i∈ω be
a listing of all sentences of L ∪ 〈ci〉i∈ω of the form ∃xθ, and suppose is ϕi is in Σi+k and only
contains the constants 〈cj〉j≤i . We shall define a descending chain of initial segments as in (2)
above, and an interpretation of 〈ci〉i∈ω as follows. (We shall denote the interpretation of ci also
by ci.) Choose B0 ≺k A to be any r.s. initial segment which is a model of T ∩ Πk+3, and let
c0 be any nonstandard integer of B0. Suppose we have defined Bi, a r.s. model of T ∩ Πi+k+3,
and have interpreted 〈cj〉j≤i in Bi. If ϕi = ∃xθ holds in Bi, let ci+1 be interpreted by a witness
for ϕi; otherwise, let ci+1 be the first element of some fixed listing of A which is a member of
Bi \ {c0, . . . , ci}. Now choose Bi+1 to be any (k + i)-elementary r.s. initial segment of Bi which
includes {c0, . . . , ci+1} and is a model of T ∩ Πi+k+4.
Let I = ∩i∈ωBi = { ci : i ∈ ω }. By construction, I is a nonstandard model of T. 
5.5.ii Corollary Let A be a countable model of S plus Σ(k+1)-recursive saturation, and let T be
a complete theory extending S. Then the following are equivalent.
i. There exists a k-elementary initial segment B of A which is a model of T and which is
Σ(n)-recursively saturated for all n ∈ ω.
ii. A is a model of T ∩ Σ(k+1), and for all n ∈ ω, T ∩ Σ(n) is coded in A.
If A is also a model of Σk+1-Collection, we may ensure that B , A.
Proof: The proof is as above but, as the intersection of recursively saturated initial segments
may not be recursively saturated, we must in our construction also add witnesses to ensure
Σ(n)-recursive saturation. 
We can extend 5.3 as follows. Let T be a theory in any language in which the language of
arithmetic may be interpreted. LetM be a nonstandard model of PRA and suppose T is coded in
M. Since (an axiomatization of) the arithmetical consequences of T, arith(T), will also be coded
in M, we may use 5.3 to consider, say,
S = { I 4endk A : I  arith(T) } .
There is however another, perhaps more elegant approach using 12∗fulfilment, and this also allows
us to consider
{ I ∈ S : I is expandable to a model of T } .
In the countable case and for many theories T (e.g. any theory extending ∆11-CA↾), this coincides
with { I ∈ S : I r.s }, so we do not have any advantage over 5.3.ii. But we may improve 4.3.i to
the following, also obtained independently by Kirby, McAloon, and Murawski [79] for theories
extending Π01-CA↾.
5.6 Theorem Let k ∈ ω and let M be a model of PRA plus Σ0
k+1-overspill. Let T be any theory
coded in M extending S and also extending the schema:
Arith-Collection : ∀m < n∃pθ ⊃ ∃q ∀m < n∃p < q θ .
Let S = { I 4end
k
A : I  arith(T) }. Then S has an indicator, and is symbiotic with
{ I ∈ S : I r.s., ω codes I, and I is expandable to a model of T } .
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S \ {M} is nonempty iff the Π0
k+1 theory of M is consistent with T, and S is cofinal in M iff the
Σ
0
k+2 theory of M is consistent with T. 
The proof of 5.6 is clear using the notion of 12∗fulfilment, and we omit it, only pausing to remark
that the schema of Induction implies that of Arith-Collection.
We shall consider twomoremodel-theoretic “tricks”. Thefirst is closely related to 12∗fulfilment
and 5.6. Let PA∈ be the version of Peano arithmetic formulated in the language with a single
binary relation ∈. Let T be any consistent, recursive theory in the language {∈} which proves
that there exists no ∈-loops, For example, Tmight be ZFC or some theory of analysis over HF. A
well-known folklore result, easily proved, using the compactness theorem, is that any model of T
may be embedded in a model of PA∈. Using fulfilment, we easily obtain the dual result:
5.7 Theorem Any nonstandard model A of PA∈ has a substructure B which is a recursively
saturated model of T. Moreover, if we assume that T is strong enough to perform some coding,
that T includes Arith-Collection, and that A is a model of the theory of T, then we may choose B
so that HFB (i.e. { x ∈ B : x ∈B HFB }) is an initial segment of A. And the usual hierarchical and
cofinal variants also hold.
Proof: We simply note that any finite poset with no loops is isomorphic to a subset of 〈HF, ∈〉. 
For our our second “trick”, let T be a theory in any finite language in which we may interpret
arithmetic, and let be a nonstandard model of PRA which codes T. In T, add a constant Pω for
the definable type consisting of subsets of ω. We have been considering models A of T “coded”
in M in which ωA (i.e. { x ∈ A : x ∈A ωA }) is an initial segment of M. In such a case we have
{ { x ∈ ωA : x ∈A X } : X ∈A PωA } ⊆ R(ωA,M) , (3)
where this latter set is the collection of those subsets of ωA which are coded in M. Kirby,
McAloon, and Murawski [79] noticed if T is a second-order theory extending Π01-CA↾ and if M
is countable, then the collection of initial segments I of M which are expandable to a model A
of T is symbiotic with its subset consisting of those I = ωA for which the relation (3) is in fact
equality. We may extend this result as follows.14
5.8 Theorem Let k ≥ 1, and suppose A is a model of
• ∆00-CA
↾, ∆00-Arith-Collection (where these two schemata are allowed to have second-order
parameters),
• an axiom asserting that the k th Turing jump of the empty set exists, and
• WKL (an axiom asserting that every infinite binary tree has an infinite branch).
• Further suppose that Π01-overspill holds in A, and that
• PωA is countable.
Then for each c ∈ ωA there exists a structure B
• isomorphic to A such that
• ωB is a (k − 1)-elementary initial segment of ωA,
• PωB = R(ωA, ωB), and
• the isomorphism fixes c.
14 Footnote added 2019: This next result and its two lemmas have nothing to do with fulfillability.
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If in addition we have that Σ11-overspill holds inA and that ∃X .X = ∅(k) holds inA for all k ∈ ω,
then we may require that ωB ≺ ωA.
Before the proof, we need a definition and two lemmas. First note that without loss of
generality we can assume that A is a structure for the language of analysis, say A = 〈M,X 〉. A
pseudo-standard formula ofM is one of the form ϕ(a, b, . . . , u, v, . . . ) where ϕ(x, y, . . . , u, v, . . . )
is a formula and a, b, . . . are elements of M. If we add new constants { da : a ∈ M } to
our metalanguage, with each pseudo-standard formula ϕ(a, b, . . . ) we may associate a formula
ϕ(da, db, . . . ). For any T ⊆ M , let p.s.(T) be the collection of those ϕ(da, db, . . . ) for which
ϕ(a, b, . . . ) is a pseudo-standard formula whose code is in T.
The first of the two lemmas, which does not require that M be nonstandard, is a common
generalization of Scott [62] and Friedman [73] and the generalizations of theMacDowell-Specker
Theorem [61] by Phillips [74] and Gaifman [76]. A slightly less general version was first observed
by Kirby, McAloon, and Murawski [79]; their proof is an ultrapower construction which requires
that A be a model of Π11-CA↾.
5.9 Lemma Let 〈M,X 〉 be a countable model of PA−ex, ∆00-Induction, ∆00-Arith-Collection, and
WKL.
i. Let T∈X be such that in 〈M,X 〉 T is a consistent set of sentences of arithmetic. Then
there exists an end-extension N of M which is a model of p.s.(T) in the natural sense with
da being interpreted by a for all a ∈ M , and is such that R(N ,M) = X . If M = N or if
〈M,X 〉 is a model of Π01-overspill, we may choose N to be recursively saturated.
ii. Let T ⊆ M be such that p.s.(T) is a complete theory in the language of arithmetic and for
all k ∈ω, (T∩Σ0
k
) ∈X andM  Con(T∩Σ0
k
). Then there exists an end-extension N which
is a model of p.s.(T) and is such that R(M,N ) = X .
Proof: For (i) we simply have to check that the usual Henkin construction works for M , N.
Since T proves each true quantifier-free pseudo-standard sentence of M, we can suppose that
these are included in T. Let 〈ci〉i∈ω be a list of new constants, and let L(c0, . . . , ci) be the
language of arithmetic augmented with the constants c0, . . . , ci. We shall define an increasing
sequence 〈Tn〉n∈ω , where for each n ∈ω, Tn ∈X is a theory of L(c0, . . . , ci) for some i ∈ω which
is consistent inM. Let T0 = T∪ { c0 > a : a ∈ M }. This is consistent, because given any proof of
a contradiction from T0 we can replace c0 by a for some large a ∈ M , obtaining a contradiction
from T. Define Tn inductively as follows.
Suppose n = 4m + 1 and suppose our language has only ∃, ∨ and ¬ as logical symbols. Let
ϕ be the mth member of some enumeration of the formulae of ∪i∈ωL(c0, . . . , ci). Let Tn+1 be
Tn + ¬ϕ, if this is consistent; otherwise, if ϕ = ∃xθx let Tn+1 be Tn + ϕ + θc for some c not yet
considered, and for ϕ in other forms simply let Tn+1 = Tn + ϕ.
Suppose n=4m+2. Let X be the first element of some enumeration of X not yet considered,
and let c be some constant not yet considered. Let Tn+1 = Tn ∪ { a ∈ c : a ∈ X } ∪ { a < c : a < X }.
Suppose n = 4m + 3. Since we are already using “∈” to denote membership between M
and X , we shall let ∈ˆ denote the membership relation between integers, as defined on page 11.
Choose X ∈ X so that
Tn+1 = Tn ∪ { a ∈ˆ cm : a ∈ X } ∪ { a <ˆ cm : a < X }
is consistent. We can do so, for consider the tree of binary sequences
{ b∈M : there is no proof of 0=1 with code< |b|– from Tn+{ a ∈ˆ cm : ba=1 }+{ a <ˆ cm : ba= 0 } } .
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This is in X , and it is infinite in 〈M,X 〉, because otherwise by ∆00-Arith-Collection we could piece
together proofs to obtain a contradiction from Tn. By WKL, we can choose an infinite branch in
X to obtain X .
Suppose n = 4m + 4. It is at this stage that we ensure that the end-extension is r.s. We can
suppose M , N, for otherwise we simply use the standard argument. Let θx be the mth ∆00
formula, and suppose that for some i ∈ ω the set { x ∈ ω : θx } consists of the codes of formulae
of the form ϕxc0 . . . ci. Suppose for each p ∈ ω, ∃x
∧
{ ϕx : θ pϕq ∧ pϕq < p } is consistent in
M with Tn. Then by Π01-overspill, this is consistent for some nonstandard p ∈ M . Let c be some
constant not yet considered, and let Tn+1 = Tn ∪ { ϕc : θ pϕq ∧ pϕq < p }.
This completes our construction. The remainder of the proof is standard and is left to the
reader.
The proof of (ii) is obtained by a simple modification of the above, essentially due to D. Jensen
and A. Ehrenfeucht [76] and, independently, Guaspari [79]. But since we shall not require (ii),
the proof is omitted. 
The next lemma is an immediate corollary of the embedding techniques of Friedman [73],
Wilkie [7x], and Wilmers [77].
5.10 Lemma Let M and N be countable.
i. Suppose M and N are models of PA−ex + Σk+1-overspill with the same standard systems
and with ThΣk+1(N ) ⊆ ThΣk+1(M). Also suppose N  Σk+1-Collection. Then N is
isomorphic to a k-elementary initial segment of M.
ii. IfN andM are elementarily equivalent, recursively saturated models of PA with the same
standard system, then N is isomorphic to a proper elementary initial segment of M. 
Proof of 5.8: By ∃X . X = ∅(k), we have that the set of true Π0
k
sentences of M is an element
of X . By Application (xv) on page 42 of Chapter IV, Σ0
k
-Induction implies the consistency
of these true Π0
k
sentences plus Σk-Collection, and so by 5.9 we may choose a recursively
saturated k-elementary end-extension N of M which is a model of Σk-Collection and is such
that R(M,N ) = X . Now for any c ∈ M , ThΣk (N , c) = ThΣk (M, c) and so by 5.10 there is an
embedding of N into a proper initial segment of M fixing c.
For 5.8.ii, we note that there is a recursive predicate P(x, k, X) such that { x : P(x, k, ∅(k)) }
is the set of true Π0
k
sentences. So if M is a model of PA and if Σ11-overspill and ∃X . X = ∅(k)
for all k ∈ ω hold in 〈M,X 〉, then there is some nonstandard k ∈ M for which
∃X
(
X = ∅(k) ∧ Con({ x : P(x, k, X) }))
holds. Now by 5.9, wemay choose a r.s. elementary end-extensionN ofM such thatR(M, N ) =
X , and then by 5.10, embed N in M.
This completes the proof of 5.8. 
Our final theorem considers the order types of various classes of elementary initial segments
of r.s. models of PA.
5.11 Theorem Let M be a recursively saturated model of PA, and let
A ={ I 4end M : I not r.s. }
B ={ I 4end M : I r.s. and ω codes I }
C ={ I 4end M : I r.s. }
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Then:
i. For all I 4end M, I ∈ A iff there exists a ∈ I such that the elements of M definable from a
are cofinal in I.
ii. There exists an order-preserving map from M into A (ordered by inclusion), and so by (i),
the cardinality of A is equal to that of M .
iii. For all I ∈ A, I = ∩{ J ∈ B : I ( J }, and so A is densely ordered.
iv. C = {∪X : ∅ , X ⊆ A, X has no greatest element }.
v. There exists an order-preserving map from M into B, and so the cardinality of B equals
that of M .
vi. For all I ∈ B, I = ∩{ J ∈ B : I ( J } = ∪{ J ∈ B : J ( I }, and so B is densely ordered.
vii. C = {∪X : ∅ , X ⊆ B }, and so by (vi), if M is countable then C \ {M} has the order-type
of the real numbers.
Let us first make some remarks. Many of these results are well-known for countable M:
see, for example, Barwise [75] or Schlipf [78]. Part (i) is essentially due to W. Marek and
H. Kotlarski; see Kotlarski [78]. For the case when M is countable, much of (ii) to (vii) has also
been independently obtained by Kotlarski [78] and Murawski [78].
We remark that Paris and Kirby [78] show that if M ≺end N with M  S, then Collection
holds in M and N , and so it is necessary for us to consider models of PA in this result. It will
be obvious, however, that an analogue of 5.11 could be given for rank extensions of r.s. models
of ZF or for L-extensions of r.s. models of ZF− + V = L. The set-theoretic case has in addition
another natural class of initial segments symbiotic with those above: those internal sets B ∈ A for
which B ≺ A.
Proof of 5.11: We shall only consider i-fulfilment in this proof, as given on page 9. Let True(σ)
be the schema
∀i < |σ |– ∀−⇀x ≤ σi
(
ϕ
−⇀x ⊃ (ϕ−⇀x )σi
)
,
where ϕ has the free variables indicated.
We shall first prove (vii). Suppose I ∈C. For each a ∈ I choose a σ ∈ I to realize the recursive
type
{a < σ0} ∪ { |σ |– > n : n ∈ ω } ∪ True(σ) ,
and let Ja = ∪i∈ωσi. Then Ja ∈ B and I = ∪a∈I Ja. Conversely, it is clear that recursive
saturation is preserved under unions of elementary chains.
This also gives the second part of (vi). For the first, let I ∈ B and let s be a sequence coded in
M such that I = ∪i∈ω si. Let a ∈ M \ I; by recursive saturation choose t ∈ M to be an increasing
sequence such that |t |– is nonstandard, t |t |– ≤ |s |–, st |t |– < a, and so that True(〈sti 〉i≤ |t |–) holds;
and, let Ja = ∪i∈ω sti . Then I = ∩a∈M\I Ja, and (vi) is proved,
For each a ∈ M , let Ia be the initial segment determined by those elements definable from
a. Then Ia ≺ M by Lemma 5.2, and Ia is not recursively saturated, for the type { ∃yθay ⊃
∃y < x θay : θzy any formula } is not realized in Ia . A and B are easily seen to be symbiotic,
because for any X ⊆ A with no greatest element there exists Y ⊆ B such that∪X = ∪Y , and so
∪X is r.s. Thus each member of A has the form Ia , and so (i) holds.
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Let I = Ia , let b ∈ M \ I, and let c satisfy
∃y θxy ⊃ ∃y < b θxy and
∃y θay ⊃ ∃y < x θay
for all formulae θxy. Then I ( Ic < b, and as b was arbitrary, this proves (iii). (iv) is easy: if
J ∈ C, J = ∪a∈J Ia where Ia is as above.
Only (ii) and (v) remain to be proved. Imagine, for a moment, that there exists an M-infinite
sequence σ = 〈σi〉i∈M satisfying True(σ). (If M is resplendent then such a sequence exists: we
can let σ be a cofinal set of indiscernibles for which 〈M, σ〉 is a model of full induction; see
Schlipf [78].) Then we could define our required maps easily. Define M → A by letting i 7→ Iσi .
This is monotone, for if θxy is any formula,
∃y θσiy iff ∃y < σi+1 (θσiy)σi iff ∃y < σi+1 θσiy .
Define the map M → B by i 7→ ∪j∈ωσki+j , where k is some fixed nonstandard element of M .
This is clearly monotone.
I do not know whether such a sequence exists in general, but we shall construct a suitable
alternative. Let Γ(σ, x) = { |σ |– = x} ∪ {x < σ0} ∪ True(σ). Let α, β, γ range over the (real)
ordinals, and let α be the cofinality of M , that is, α is the least cardinal such that there exists
a cofinal subset of M of cardinality α. Choose a sequence of internal sequences 〈σβ〉β<α as
follows. Let σ0 satisfy Γ(σ0, 1), let σβ+1 satisfy Γ(σβ+1, σβ), and if γ < α is a limit ordinal,
choose x ∈ M greater than σβ for all β < γ, and let σγ satisfy Γ(σγ, x). Define an increasing
sequence of functions 〈 fβ〉β<α , each mapping an initial segment of M into M , as follows. Let f0
be empty; let
fβ+1(x) =

fβ(x) , if x ∈ domain( fβ) ,
(σβ+1)x , if x ≤ |σβ+1 |– and x < domain( fβ) ,
undefined, otherwise;
and if γ is a limit ordinal, let fγ = ∪β<γ fβ. Now define maps M → A and M → B as before,
but replacing by σ by fα.
This completes the proof of 5.11. 
VI More Model-theoretic Applications: ω-models
We shall study in this chapter ω-models of various theories, (including theories in the infinitary
language L∞ω) which extend our base theory S given on page 11. To give an illustration of our
techniques, to compare them with other known techniques, and to help the reader understand the
more general results given later, we shall first consider the example of ω-models of the language
of second-order arithmetic, that is, analysis.
Let BI, Bar-Induction, be the schema:
BI : ∀X
(
wf(≺
X
) ⊃
(
∀n
((∀m ≺
X
n θm) ⊃ θn) ⊃ ∀nθn) )
where ≺
X
= { (m, n) : 〈m,n〉 ∈ X }. Let us consider a theory T in the language of analysis
extending S + Σ11-BI which has an ω-model. To keep things simple, suppose T is r.e., although
for the following results it suffices to let T be Π11.
Gandy, Kreisel, and Tait [60] showed:
6.1 Theorem T does not have a minimum model. 
Here we are considering ω-models ordered by inclusion. Briefly, they showed that the intersec-
tion, of all models of T consists of the hyper-arithmetic sets, HYP, and as Σ11-BI is false in HYP,
T does not have a minimum model.
Friedman [73] proves that:
6.2 Theorem If T extends the full schema of AC, T does not have a minimal model.
Simpson [73] asks whether weaker conditions on T suffice for this result. Indeed, we shall show:
6.3 Theorem T does not have a minimal model.
We shall first give a very quick sketch of Friedman’s result 6.2 (since the existing versions in
print are unnecessarily complicated) and then briefly explain the modification which allows us
to remove AC.
First note that as ∃X
(
“{ (X)n : n ∈ ω }  T”
)
is true in any β-model, we can restrict our
attention to non-β-models. Fix some non-β-model A of T (i.e. A ⊆ Pω and 〈ω,A, . . . 〉  T)15
and choose some non-well-founded linear ordering ≺ ∈A for which A  wf(≺). Let α be the
ordinal of the well-founded part of ≺.
First, to give Friedman’s proof, suppose A is a model of AC. We consider τ ∈ A such that τ
is (the code of) a tree of finite sequences σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σ |σ |–〉 of sets for which
i. σi  (T ∩ i), for all i ≤ |σ |–, and
ii. σi 4i σi+1, for all i < |σ |–,
where in general in this chapter X = { (X)n : n ∈ ω }, and 4i means Σ1i -elementary substructure.
Claim 1 For all β < α there exists such a τ ∈A of rank β.
Theorem 6.2 follows from this claim. For as T includes Σ11-BI, we may apply overspill to obtain
a tree τ of nonstandard rank. τ has (in the real world) an infinite branch 〈σ0, σ1, σ2, . . . 〉. Let
15 Footnote added 2019: That is, for ω-models of analysis, the same notation is used for both the model and its Pω
component.
59
60 VI More Model-theoretic Applications: ω-models
B = ∪i∈ωσi. Then it is clear that B ⊆ A and B  T. That A , B follows by Cantor’s diagonal
argument.
The proof of the claim is by induction on β, and to be able to carry out the inductive step, we
need to prove a bit more. Say a finite sequence σ is good if (i) and (ii) hold, and
iii. σi 4i A, for all i ≤ |σ |–.
Claim 2 For each β < α and each good sequence σ ∈ A there exists such a tree τ ∈ A of rank
β + |σ |– which is such that each sequence in τ extends σ.
Proof of Claim 2: By induction on β. Suppose the claim holds for β and that we wish to show
that it holds for β + 1. This is easy but requires the essential use of AC. Suppose σ ∈ A is good,
say σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σn〉. By AC, we can find a set A ∈ A such that A 4n A and σn ⊆ A. The
sequence
〈σ0, . . . , σn, A〉
is also good, and so we may apply the inductive hypothesis to it to obtain the appropriate τ for σ.
At limit β, we in addition need to piece together the τ of appropriate ranks using Σ11-AC. This
is straightforward.
This concludes our sketch of the proof of the claim and of 6.2. 
Turning next to the proof of 6.3, let A be a non-β-model of T, and let ≺ be as before. We
now consider trees τ ∈A of finite sequences σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σ |σ |–〉 such that:
i′. σi is finite for all i ≤ |σ |–, and
ii′. 〈σi, σi+1, . . . , σ |σ |–〉 fulfils the ith axiom of T for all i < |σ |–.
(More precisely, condition (i′) of course means this. σ is a subset of ω; σi is the set σi = { m :
〈m, i〉 ∈ σ }; and σi codes the collection { Xj : j ∈ ω } where Xj = { x : 〈x, j〉 ∈ σi }. We require
in (i′) that Xj = ∅ for all but finitely many j.)
As before, it suffices to show that Claim 1 holds. For if it does, then by overspill there exists
such a τ ∈ A of nonstandard rank. Choose (externally) an infinite branch 〈σ0, σ1, . . . 〉 of τ, and
let B = ∪i∈ωσi. Then B ⊆ A; B is a model of T by Lemma 1.1; and A , B as before.
To show that the new version of Claim 1 holds, we need, once again, to prove a bit more.
Say a sequence σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σ |σ |–〉 is good if (i′) and (ii′) hold, and
iii′. for all i < |σ |–, there exist satisfaction functions f , g, . . . , h for the ith axiom of T such that
for all j with i ≤ j < |σ |–,
σj+1 ⊇ f ′′σj ∪ g′′σj ∪ · · · ∪ h′′σj .
Then Claim 2 also holds for this new version of goodness, and the proof is as before. But now,
given a good sequence 〈σ0, . . . , σ |σ |–〉, we do not need any strong axioms to extend it to another
good sequence
〈σ0, . . . , σ |σ |–, A〉 ,
for it is sufficient (and, by the definition (i′), necessary) to take A to be a finite collection of sets.
Finally, we note the well-known result that Σ11-BI implies Σ
1
1-AC. Thus we have strong enough
axioms to carry out the inductive step at limit ordinals.
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This concludes the sketch of the proof of Claim 2, and of 6.3. 
Next we shall give a more general development of the ideas contained in the above proof,
starting with an extension of the definition of fulfilment to the languageL∞ω. It will be convenient
to suppose thatL∞ω is defined so that all formulae have only finitely many free variables. We shall
consider sequences σ = 〈(Ai, Bi)〉i∈I of ordered pairs, where each Ai is, as before, a subset of the
domain of individuals, and each Bi is a subset of L∞ω . Often we shall write σ = 〈(σ0i , σ1i )〉i∈I .
For reasons which will become clear, we will henceforth suppose that Ai and Bi are finite for all
i ∈ I. We will also suppose that 〈Ai〉i∈I and 〈Bi〉i∈I are increasing chains, with the former closed
under the functions of L. To the previous definition of fulfilment on page 7, add the clauses:(∧
Φ
)σ
i
= ∀ j ≥ i
∧
{ ϕσj : ϕ ∈ Φ ∩ Bj } , j a new variable,(∨
Φ
)σ
i
=
∨
{ ϕσi : ϕ ∈ Φ ∩ Bi+1 } .(
¬
∧
Φ
)σ
i
=
(∨
{ ¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ Φ }
)σ
i
, and(
¬
∨
Φ
)σ
i
=
(∧
{ ¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ Φ }
)σ
i
.
This choice of definition is rather arbitrary, and other choices are possible. This is because
each conjunction or disjunction can be regarded as having a domain unique to itself, whereas all
the quantifiers ∃ and ∀ have a common domain. (In this chapter, the words “conjunction” and
“disjunction” refer to both the finitary and infinitary kinds.)
The analogue of Lemma 1.1 from page 9 holds; we shall combine parts (i) and (ii) of 1.1, as
this is all we shall require. Recall that σ↾ (n + 1) = 〈σi〉i≤n.
6.4 Lemma Let σ = 〈(Ai, Bi)〉i∈ω and let ϕ be a sentence of L∞ω. Suppose that∪i Bi includes
all subformulae of ϕ, that A = ∪i Ai, and that σ↾ (n + 1) fulfils ϕ for all n ∈ ω. Then ϕ is true in
A.
Proof: We shall sketch a game-theoretic argument. We can suppose that ϕ is in negation-normal-
form. The set of subformulae of ϕ may be considered as a tree using the subformula relation.
Two players, ∀ and ∃, play the following game (called the ϕ-game), in the process choosing a
branch 〈ϕ = ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕΩ〉 of this tree and an increasing sequence s0 ⊆ s1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ sΩ, with
each sj a valuation in A of the free variables of ϕ j . ∃ wins iff ϕΩ(sΩ) is true in A. Suppose ϕ j
and sj have been chosen, and consider the ( j + 1)st stage:
(a) If ϕ j is atomic or the negation of an atomic formula, let Ω = j, and the game halts.
(b) If ϕ j = Qxθ, let ϕ j+1 = θ and let sj+1 = sj ∪ {(x, a)}, where a ∈ A is chosen by Q.
(c) If ϕ j = θ ∨ ψ (or θ ∧ ψ), let sj+1 = sj and let ϕ j+1 be θ or ψ, as chosen by ∃ (or ∀,
respectively).
(d) If ϕ j =
∨
Φ (or
∧
Φ), let sj+1 = sj and let ϕ j+1 ∈ Φ be chosen by ∃ (or ∀, respectively).
Then ϕ is true inA iff ∃ has a winning strategy for the ϕ-game. We shall show that ∃ in fact has
a winning strategy such that for any play according to this strategy,
if for any j ≤ Ω, if ∀ has made all of their choices up to the
( j+1)st stage from Ai∪Bi, then (ϕ jsj)σ↾(n+1)i holds of all n > i.
(1)
We shall simultaneously define this strategy and verify (1), using induction on j. If j = 0, (1) is
just the premise of the lemma. Consider the ( j + 1)st stage. If it is ∀’s move, then any choice by
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them will preserve (1). Suppose it is ∃’s move, that ϕ j = ∃xϕ j+1x, say, and that ∀ has made all
of their choices from Ai ∪ Bi. Then by the inductive hypothesis (ϕ j sj)σ↾(n+1)i holds for all n > i.
As Ai+1 is finite, there exists an x ∈ Ai+1 such that (ϕ j+1(x, sj))σ↾(n+1)i holds for infinitely many
(and hence all) n > i; let ∃ choose such an x. Cases (c) and (d) are similar. 
In this chapter, the base theory Swill be assumed to include Σ1-Collection and ∆0-Separation.
The reader is reminded of the simple notions and conventions regarding non-standard models
given on page 3. We shall be considering non-β-modelsA = 〈A, . . . 〉 of S. In each such structure
we shall (usually implicitly) fix some linear ordering ≺ ∈ A which is well-founded internally but
not externally, and let α, β, . . . range over its domain. α is a standard ordinal of A if it is in
the well-founded part of this linear ordering. The standard ordinal of A is the order-type of its
standard ordinals; because A  Σ1-Replacement, this is independent of the choice of ≺. As
usual, it will be convenient to use the notations and conventions associated with von Neumann
ordinals.
We shall consider trees τ of finite sequences σ. Say a tree τ fulfils a sentence ϕ of L∞ω if σ
fulfils ϕ for each σ ∈ τ. Given α in the domain of ≺, say τ is of rank α if there is a map rk in A
from τ to α + 1 = { β : β 4 α } satisfying
rk(σ) = sup{ rk(σ ′) + 1 : σ ′ ∈ τ and σ ′ extends σ } .
with rk(root of τ) = α; we shall write rk(τ) = α.
The next result is the analogue of Lemma 1.2 on page 13.
6.5 Lemma Let ϕ be a sentence of L∞ω and let A be a model of S with ϕ ∈ A and ϕ true in A.
Then for each standard ordinal α ofA there exists a tree inA of rank α which fulfils ϕ, and if we
have sufficient Bar-Induction, the construction can be formalized.
Proof: In Lemma 1.2, we considered finite pieces of satisfaction functions for ϕ. The infinitary
analogue of satisfaction functions is a winning strategy for the ϕ-game, and we shall consider
finite pieces of the same.
A (winning) strategy for ∃ is a partial function S from (A ∪ sub(ϕ))<ω into A ∪ sub(ϕ) such
that ∃ plays (and wins, respectively) the ϕ-game by choosing at each turn S−⇀a , where −⇀a is the
listing of ∀’s choices up to that point. If S is a strategy for ∃, let S0 be Swith its domain restricted
to arguments −⇀a for which ∃ actually needs the value S−⇀a in the course of some play; S0 is a
minimal strategy. Say σ = 〈(Ai, Bi)〉i≤ |σ |– is closed under a strategy S for ∃ if
S
′′
0 (Ai ∪ Bi)<ω ⊆ Ai+1 ∪ Bi+1
for all i < |σ |–.
Claim 1 Given finite sets A0, B0, a function F : ω → L∞ω, and a strategy S for ∃, there exists
σ = 〈(Ai, Bi)〉i<ω which is closed under S and the functions of L, and satisfies Fi ∈ Bi+1 for all
i < ω.
This claim is not quite obvious, because S0 may contain arbitrarily large n-tuples in its domain.
Suppose Ai and Bi are finite. Let C be the smallest set of formulae including Bi and containing ψ
and ψ′ if it contains ∃xψ, ∀xψ, ψ ∨ψ′, or ψ ∧ψ′. By König’s lemma, C is finite, and the lengths
of the sequences −⇀a from Ai ∪ Bi which must considered may be bounded by the cardinality of C.
This establishes the claim.
Let σ = 〈(Ai, Bi)〉i≤n. The σ-game (for ϕ) is like the ϕ-game, except that ∀’s choices are
restricted to An−1 ∪ Bn−1, and at each turn of ∃, if ∀ has made all of their previous choices from
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Ai ∪ Bi, then ∃ must choose from Ai+1 ∪ Bi+1; and if either ∀ or ∃ cannot make a choice, the
game is drawn. A strategy for ∃ for the σ-game is good if for each play according to this strategy,
ϕisi is true for all i ≤ Ω, where ϕi, si, and Ω are as in 6.4 on page 61. The following is an easy
consequence of these definitions.
Claim 2 If S is a winning strategy for ∃ for the ϕ-game and if σ is closed under S, then S is
a good strategy for the σ-game. Conversely, any good, minimal strategy for a σ-game may be
extended to a winning strategy S for ∃ for the ϕ-game which is such that σ is closed under S.
(We may now see the reasons for the above definitions; the notion of a winning strategy for ∃
for the ϕ-game cannot be expressed directly in our language, while the notion of a good strategy
for ∃ for the σ-game can be so expressed by the use of partial truth definitions because such
strategies are essentially finite; this will be required when we give an internal version of 6.5.)
Given a sequence σ and a tree τ, let σ⌣τ be the tree { σ⌣σ ′ : σ ′ ∈ τ }, where the latter ⌣ is
sequence concatenation.
Claim 3 For all σ for which there exists a good strategy for ∃ for the σ-game of ϕ, and for all
standard ordinals α of A, there exists a tree τ of rank α such that σ⌣τ fulfils ϕ.
The lemma follows immediately from this claim. We use induction on α. If α = 0, take τ to
be empty. Suppose the claim holds for all α < β. Let σ satisfy the premise. By Claim 2,
there exists σ ′ = σ⌣〈(A′, B′)〉 for which there exists a good strategy for the σ ′-game. By
the inductive hypothesis, for all α < β there exists a τ of rank α such that σ ′⌣τ fulfils ϕ. By
Σ1-Strong Replacement, there exists a set K such that for all τ′ ∈ K , σ⌣τ′ fulfils ϕ, and for all
α < β there exists τ′ ∈ K of rank ≥ α. (If β is a successor, K may be taken to be a singleton.) Then
τ = 〈(A′, B′)〉⌣∪ K is the required tree. 
Weshall want to consider an extension of the formula hierarchy into the transfinite. The details
here do not matter; all we require of, say, Σα is that it be closed under finitary conjunction, finitary
disjunction, and existential quantification (and, if α=0, infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions),
and that there exists a suitable universal formula, e.g. a formula ϕα(e, x) ∈ Lα+ ∩ Σα (where
α+ = the next admissible) such that in any model A of S, for all Σα formulae ψx in A,
A  ∀x
(
ψx ≡ ϕα(pψq, x)
)
. For any subclass Γ of L∞ω, let ΓB = Γ ∩ B. Let Σ(B)(α) be the closure
of ΣBα under conjunction, disjunction, existential and bounded universal quantification. We note
that in the presence of the schema of
Σα-(Strong) Replacement : ∀x ∈ a ∃y θ ⊃ ∃ f ∀x ∈ a ( f x , ∅ ∧ ∀y ∈ f x θ) , θ ∈ Σα ,
every formula of the form ∀x < y θ with θ ∈ Σα is equivalent to a Σα formula.
As a corollary of the above proof, we have the following extension.
6.5(ii) Corollary LetA be a model of S, and let T and B be coded inA, with T a set of sentences
of L∞ω and B a transitive set satisfying some weak closure condition (e.g. LB is a fragment of
L∞ω). Let F ∈ A be, in A, a map from ω into L∞ω, and suppose its range includes ΣBα and all
subformulae of T. For an ordinal β of A, say
τ β-fulfils T + Tr ΣBα (with respect to F)
if τ ∈ A is a tree of rank ≥ β, and for all σ ∈ τ, all i < |σ |–,
i. Fi ∈ σ1
i
ii. for all ϕ ∈ σ1
i
∩ T, ϕσ
i
, and
iii. for all ϕ−⇀x ∈ σ1
i
∩ Σα ∩ B, all −⇀x ∈ σ0i , ϕ−⇀x ⊃ (ϕ−⇀x )σi .
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Say τ β-fulfils . . . if it does so w.r.t. some such F.
Then if A is a model of T + ΣB
α+1-Collection, then for each standard ordinal β of A, there
exists a tree τ in A which β-fulfils T + TrΣBα . 
Our next theorem is the generalization of 6.3 and the analogue of 5.3 from page 50.
6.6 Theorem Let A be a model of S; let LB be a fragment of L∞ω coded in A by a code which
is countable in A, and let T be a theory of LB coded in A. Let α be a standard ordinal of A and
suppose that ΣB
α+1-overspill holds in A. Consider the set
S = { B 4end
Σ
B
α
A : B  T }
(a) Suppose that α is finite, that T is included in the closure of the set of finitary formula
under conjunction, disjunction, and existential quantification, and that T extends S plus the
first-order schema of Collection. Then
• S has an indicator.
• S \ {A} is non-empty iff A is a model of the Σ(HF)(α+1) theory of T, and
• S is cofinal in A iff A is a model of the Π(HF)(α+2) theory of T.
(b) Suppose A is locally countable and either that A is a model of ΣB
α+1-Strong-Replacement
or that T extends S + ΣB
α+1-Strong-Replacement. Then
• S has an indicator.
• S \ {A} is non-empty iff A is a model of the Σ(B)(α+1) theory of T, and
• S is cofinal in A iff A is a model of the Π(B)(α+2) theory of T.
• If B is a resolvable admissible set with height equal to the ordinal of A, then S is
symbiotic with
{ B ∈ S : B B-saturated } ,
that is, those B which realize a B-r.e. type (which may have parameters from B) if
every B-finite subset of the type is realized.
Proof: We shall only consider the condition for S \ {A} being nonempty, and the symbiosis. The
remainder of the theorem will then be clear from our constructions.
The necessity of the condition is clear, so let us first consider its sufficiency in (a) when
0 , α. We need one preliminary definition: for each (real) set a, define the ∆0 formula θa(x) by
θa(x) = ∀y ∈ x
∨
b∈a θb(y) ∧
∧
b∈a∃y ∈ x θb(y) .
The formal sentence ∃xθa(x) will often be paraphrased by a exists.
Let T be as given in (a). Then by 6.5.ii for each standard ordinal β of A, T proves
(1) if T exists and is hereditarily countable and if β exists,
(2) then there exists τ which β-fulfils T + TrΣα.
(If α=0, this cannot be expressed as a Σ1 sentence, and so we shall postpone this case until later.)
IfA is a model of the Σ(HF)(α+1) consequences of T, we have that (2) holds inA for all standard β. By
overspill we may find a witness τ of nonstandard rank. Choose any infinite branch σ = 〈σi〉i∈ω
of τ, and let C = A↾∪i∈ω σ0i . C is a ΣHFα -elementary substructure of A which is a model of T.
Let B be the initial segment of A determined by C. Then B is as required, for Lemma 6.4 also
shows that each axiom of T is absolute between B and C. Finally A , B as follows. We have
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A  ∀n ∃!〈b0, . . . , bn〉
(
b0 = ∪σ∈τσ0|σ |– ∧ ∀i < n (bi+1 = ∪bi) ) .
The relation x = ∪y is ∆0 and so by Σ1-Collection we have that b = ∪n∈ω bn is an element of
A. Let c = { x ∈ b : x < x }. Then c < b, and as B ⊆ b, we have c < B. This proves (a) for α , 0.
Before we proceed with (b), let us consider the easier problem of finding a ΣBα-elementary
substructure of A which is a model of T when ΣB
α+1-Replacement holds in A and T is arbitrary.
(We are not assuming T has any coding ability.) We shall show that this exists if (and only if)
A is a model of those sentences contained in the closure of ΣB
α+1, under conjunction, disjunction
and existential quantification which are implied by T. Let β be a standard ordinal ofA and define
the following sets in A:
Bβ = { x ∈ B : rk(x) < β } , Tβ = T ∩ Bβ .
Let G ∈ A be a surjection from ω onto LBβ . For each n ∈ ω and each standard ordinal γ of A,
define the formula (where the middle terms refer to i,ii in the definition of β-fulfil on page 63)
Fγ,n(σ0, . . . , σn−1) =
(∧
i∈nGi∈σ
1
i
)
∧T〈σ0,...,σn−1 〉
β
∧(Tr Σα) 〈σ0,...,σn−1 〉∧∃σn∧δ<γFδ,n+1(σ0, . . . , σn)
where this is assumed to be defined without any coding as in our proof of the Completeness
Theorem on page 11 and of 5.3.ii on page 51. Then for all γ, n, T proves
∃σ0, . . . , σn−1 Fγ,n(σ0, . . . , σn−1)
since we can see (nonconstructively) that this is true in any model of T. Now suppose
Fγ,n(σ0, . . . , σn−1) holds in A for some σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σn−1〉 ∈ A. We claim that there exists
in A a tree τ of rank γ such that σ⌣τ fulfils Tβ + TrΣBβα (with respect to G). We use induction
on γ. By the inductive hypothesis, there exists σn ∈ A so that for all δ < γ there exists τδ of rank
≥ δ so that σ⌣〈σn〉⌣τδ fulfils Tβ + Tr ΣBβα (w.r.t. G). By ΣBα+1-Replacement, we may form a
collection K of such τδ’s. Then τ = 〈σn〉⌣∪ K is as required. Hence if A is a model of the
part of the theory of T specified above, by setting γ = β and applying overspill and 6.4, we may
obtain a proper substructure of A which is a model of T.
We may use this construction for (a) for the case α = 0, by taking the appropriate initial
segment.
Next consider the case where T extends S + ΣB
α+1-Replacement whereA is a locally countable
model of the Σ(B)(α+1) theory of T, and we wish to find a Σ
B
α-elementary initial segment ofA which
is a model of T. We need a definition analogous to that given in the non-ω-model case, one which
captures some of the properties of trees defined non-constructively via satisfaction functions.
These further properties must be local in that they are preserved under the union of trees.
Consider the following. Let β be a standard ordinal ofA. Fix some surjection G : ω → LBβ . For
two sequences, σ, σ ′, with |σ |– = |σ ′|– = n, say σ 4 σ ′ if for all i < n, σ0
i
⊆ σ ′0
i
and if Gi has
free variables −⇀x , then for all −⇀x ∈σi, (Gi)(−⇀x )σi ≡ (Gi)(−⇀x )σ
′
i
. For any ordinal γ say extendibleβ,γ (τ)
(w.r.t. G) if τ fulfils Tβ + TrΣ
Bβ
α , and for all δ < γ, σ ∈ τ, x ∈ σ0|σ |–, y ∈ x,
• there exists a tree τ′ of sequences each extending, or a subsequence of, σ, and
• there exists a tree isomorphism f from τ↾σ = { s ∈ τ : s ⊇ σ ∨ s ⊆ σ } to τ′ such that for
all s ∈ τ, s 4 f s,16 and
16 It is sufficient to suppose fσ = σ rather than s 4 f s for all s ∈ τ; this latter requirement is needed, however, to
construct a B-saturated initial segment.
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• for all s ∈ τ′, if |s |– > |σ |– then y ∈ s0|σ |, and finally
• extendibleβ,δ (τ′) holds.
Suppose T includes ΣB
α+1-Replacement. Then by the proof of 6.5, it is easy to see by induction
on γ that in any model of T containing β, γ, Tβ, and Bβ, for any “good” sequence σ there is a
tree τ of rank γ such that σ⌣τ is a (β, γ)-extendible tree, and so in particular,
if β, Tβ, and Bβ exist, there is a (β, β)-extendible tree of rank β . (3)
If α , 0, (3) may be expressed in T by a Σ(B)(α+1) sentence. So if A is a model of the Σ
(B)
(α+1)
consequences of T, then by overspill there exists such a tree τ of nonstandard rank. We now
construct our initial segment. Let τ=τ0, and chooseσ0∈τ0 of nonstandard rank. Pick x∈(σ0)0|σ0 |–
and y ∈ x. Then there is a tree τ1 satisfying the four points in the definition of extendible which is
(γ, γ)-extendible of some nonstandard γ. Choose σ1 ∈ τ1 of nonstandard rank and x ∈ (σ1)0|σ1 |–
and y ∈ x. Continuing in this way we have an increasing sequence of finite sequences
σ0 ⊆ σ1 ⊆ σ2 ⊆ . . . .
Let σ = 〈σi〉 be the limit. Then σ fulfils T + Tr ΣBα, and so B = A ↾∪i∈ω σ0i is a ΣBα-elementary
substructure of A which is a model of T. By judicious choices of the x’s and y’s, and using the
local countability of A, we may ensure that B is an initial segment. Finally, because T includes
Σ
B
α+1-Collection, we can specify that all the τ’s are contained in some b∈ A, and in this way ensure
that B , A.
If α = 0, or if T does not necessarily include ΣB
α+1-Replacement but A is a model of Σ
B
α+1-
Replacement, then we can combine the above two constructions. That is, we can express (3)
directly without coding, and so expressed, it is provable in T. So if A is a model of the Σ(B)(α+1)-
consequences of T, then (3) holds in A, and moreover we may express (3) uniformly in A using
Σ
B
α+1-Replacement in A and codes of T and B. Now use overspill and construct the initial
segment as before.
Next let us consider the following problem. Suppose A is a model of T + ΣB
α+1-Replacement
+ ΣB
α+1-overspill which codes T and a resolvable countable admissible set B, and that we wish
to find a proper ΣBα-elementary substructure of A which is a B-saturated model of T. We may
suppose that T contains ∀−⇀x (θ ∨ ¬θ) for all θ −⇀x ∈ LB. Let R : ord(B) → B be a resolution of B.
Let τ ∈ A be any tree which fulfils T + Tr ΣBα of nonstandard rank and let C = ∪σ∈τσ0|σ |–. Fix
some (external) listing of all pairs 〈Φ, −⇀a 〉, where Φ = Φ(x, −⇀a ) is a B-recursive subset of LB with
only the free variables listed and −⇀a ∈ C. Choose an infinite branch of τ in the following manner.
Suppose we have chosen σ ∈ τ nonstandard rank. Let 〈Φ, −⇀a 〉 be the first pair in our listing which
we have not yet considered such that −⇀a ∈ σ0|σ |–. Suppose
for all standard β, there exists i ∈ ω and an extension σ ′ ∈ τ of σ of
rank >β such that for all extensions σ ′′∈τ of σ ′,
(
∃x
∧
(Φ∩Rβ)
)σ′′
i
.
(4)
Then by overspill, we may choose i ∈ ω and a σ ′ of nonstandard rank, and let this σ ′ be in the
branch. If not (4), then choose σ ′ ∈ τ to be any extension of σ of nonstandard rank.
Let 〈σi〉i∈ω be any infinite branch obtained in this way, and let B = ∪i∈ωσ0i . Then B is
B-saturated, for let Φ(x, −⇀a ) be any B-recursive type. If (4) held when we came to consider the
pair 〈Φ, −⇀x 〉, then Φ is clearly realizable in B. Suppose (4) did not hold, and at that point we had
already chosen σ = 〈σi〉i≤n. Then there exists a standard β such that for all i ∈ ω, all extensions
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σ ′ ∈τ of σ of rank >β, there is an extension σ ′′ of σ ′ that ¬θσ′′
i
holds, where θ = ∃x
∧
(Φ∩Rβ).
Choose i so that the sentence ∀−⇀a (θ ∨ ¬θ) is the ith element of our implicit listing of T. Then
(¬θ)σ′′
i
, and so (¬θ)σ′
i
. Thus for all extensions σ ′ ∈ τ of nonstandard rank, (¬θ)σ′
i
, and so θ is
false in B, that is, Φ is not B-finitely realizable.
To obtain a B-saturated initial segment, we in addition ensure that the tree τ be (β, β)-
extendible for some nonstandard β, and then in choosing an infinite branch, we alternate the two
constructions given above.
IfT does not necessarily extendS +ΣB
α+1-Replacement butA is amodel ofΣ
B
α+1-Replacement,
we combine all three of the above techniques to obtain the required result.
This completes our proof of 6.6. 
As a corollary we have:
6.7 Corollary Let T be any r.e. extension of ZF−. For any k ∈ ω, each nonstandard model of T
has a proper k-elementary initial segment which is a model of T. 
A weaker version of 6.7 (requiring the power-set axiom) appeared in the unpublished Fried-
man [7y] (but 6.7 was obtained independently).
Another corollary concerns ω-models of analysis.
6.8 Corollary Let A be an ω-model of Σ11-AC. Then the following are equivalent. (Also, see
addendum on page 78.)
i. Let T = { ϕx : ϕ ∈ T } be a Π11 collection of formulae of analysis, where the Π11 definition
may have parameters from A. Let Z ∈ A and suppose A  ϕZ for all ϕ ∈ T. Then there
exists B ∈A and B ⊆ { (B)n : n ∈ ω } such that Z ∈ B and B  ϕZ for all ϕ∈T.
ii. The set W = { X ∈A : ≺X well-founded } is not Σ11/A.
Proof: Suppose (ii). If A is a β-model,then (i) holds, so suppose A is not a β-model. Then
there is some pseudo-well-ordering ≺ in A, and, moreover, we have ≺-overspill holding on this
ordering, for otherwise we would have that W is Σ11/A.
Let T = { ϕ : ∀ f ∃n θ ( f n, pϕq) } be any Π11 set of sentences true in A (where we are
suppressing the parameter Z and the parameters in θ). Let ≺ϕ be the Kleene-Brouwer ordering
on the non-past-secured sequences of of { s : θ (s, pϕq) }. Now by 6.5, for each ‘ordinal’ α in the
standard part of ≺ϕ , we have
∃τ
(
rk(τ) ≥ α ∧ ∀ϕ (rk(≺ϕ) < α ⊃ τ fulfils ϕ)
)
.
By overspill, this holds for some non-standard α, and we may obtain the required B from any
infinite branch of any witness τ.
Now suppose (i) but not (ii). Then A cannot be a β-model. Fix some pseudo-well-ordering
≺ ∈ A and suppose
the well-founded part of ≺ = { n : A  ψnZ }
for some Σ11 formula ψ with parameter Z ∈A. Now
T = { ψnx : n ∈ well-founded part of ≺ }
is a Π11 set with parameter ≺ ∈ A, and T(Z) is true inA. So by (i) there exists X ∈A such that for
all ψnx ∈ T, (ψnZ)X . But then the well-founded part of ≺ is ∆11 in A, and as ∆11-CA holds in A,
this contradicts that ≺ is a well-ordering in A. 
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We were careful enough in our proof of 6.5 so that it may be readily formalized to yield:
6.9 Corollary For all k > 1, and for each ϕ ∈ Σk+2,
S + Πk-BI ⊢ ∀ ≺ (wf(≺) ⊃ ∀x (ϕx ⊃ ∃τ (rk(τ) = rk(≺) ∧ τ fulfils ϕx)) ).
For k = 1, we require, say, Π2-BI or Σ1-DC. (In analysis we note that Π11-BI↾ ≡ Σ11-DC↾ by S.D.
Friedman [79].) 
Consider the schema
ω-RFN : ∀X ⊆ ω
(
ϕX ⊃ ∃ ω-model of ϕX containing X
)
.
Our next result is due to H. Friedman [75]. His argument, using the completeness of the cut-free
sequent calculus for ω-logic, is probably simpler than ours. We note the next result immediately
gives the Fact on page 35.
6.10 Corollary S ⊢ Σk+2-ωRFN ≡ Πk-cBI, for all k ≥ 1.
Proof; We shall first show the right to left implication. Consider the version of 6.9 for 12∗fulfilment,
namely for ϕ ∈ Σk+2
S + Πk-cBI ⊢ ∀ ≺ ⊆ ω2 (ϕ ⊃ ∃τ (rk(τ) = rk(≺) ∧ ∀σ ∈ τ ϕ 12 ∗σ ) ). (5)
By Π01-CA↾ we can consider the set:
Y = { σ ∈ ω : σ codes a finite sequence which 12∗fulfils ϕ } .
Y is not well-founded, for otherwise by (5) we may find a tree τ ⊆ Y of rank greater than that
of Y . Since Y ⊆ ω, we may choose an infinite branch internally; the union of this branch is the
required ω-model. This argument relativizes to an arbitrary X ⊆ ω by adding a constant X and
axioms { n ∈ X : n ∈ X } and so we have Σk+2-ωRFN.
For the converse, note that for Πk-cBI it suffices to consider orderings on ω. Let ≺= { (m, n) :
(m, n) ∈≺ } be such an ordering, and suppose
∃ parameters
(
∀n
((∀m ≺ n ϕm) ⊃ ϕn) ∧ ¬∀n ϕn) (6)
where ϕ is in Πk . Then by Σk+2-ωRFN there is an ω-model of (6), and so wf(≺) is false. 
With regard to 6.6, in certain circumstances we need only look at first-order sentences. Call
an admissible ordinal α self-definable if for no β < α, Lβ ≺1 Lα.
6.11 Corollary Let S be a model of S + Σ1-overspill of standard ordinal α, and suppose α
is self-definable. Let T ∈ Lα be any theory of LLα extending S. Then there exists a proper
0-elementary substructure of A which includes α and is a model of T iff A is a model of those
first-order Σ1 sentences θ for which T α θ, i.e., those θ which are true in all models of T with
standard ordinal ≥ α. 
This follows easily from the following well-known result of Kripke and Platek:
α is self-definable iff for each a ∈ Lα, there exists a Σ1 formula θx
such that for any structure B end-extending Lα, B  ∃!x θx ∧ θa.
For a proof, see V.7.8 of Barwise [75]. For readers who, like myself, know very little generalized
recursion theory, I shall give a brief indication of the extent of the self-definable ordinals. The
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least admissible ordinal which is not self-definable is greater than the first recursively inaccessible,
the first recursively Mahlo, the first recursively hyper-Mahlo, etc.; see Cenzer [74]. The largest
self-definable ordinal is the least stable ordinal, that is, the least α such that Lα ≺1 L.
As our final result, we shall consider the analogue of 2.8 on page 25. Let T be a consistent
first-order r.e. theory extending S + Infinity, and let
(Γ1, Γ2)ω = { pϕq ∈ Γ1 : ϕ is Γ2-conservative over T with the ω-rule } .
Say T is Π11-sound if for all Π
1
1 sentences ϕ, if T ⊢ω ϕ, then ϕ is true.
The following result is not, as 2.8 was, the best possible, and further work remains to be
done. (But see page 78.)
6.12 Theorem Let k ∈ ω and let T be a consistent r.e. extension of S.
i. If T extends Σk+1-Collection, a sentence ϕ is Σk+1-conservative (Πk+2-conservative, re-
spectively) over T with the ω-rule iff all LωCK1 -saturated models of T have (for any element
x) a k-elementary substructure (containing x) which is a model of T + ¬ϕ.
ii. If k ≥ 0 and T extends Σk+1-Collection, then
(Πk+1, Σk+1)ω (if k ≥ 1), and (Σk+2, Πk+2)ω
are Π01 in Kleene’s O, and are complete for this class of sets.
iii. If either T is not Π11-sound and includes Σ
1
1-BI or if T is strong enough to prove that every
Π
1
1 formula is equivalent to a Σ1 formula, then
(Π1, Σ1)ω and (Π1, ∆1(T))ω
are also complete for this class.
Proof: The proof of (i) is clear if we can show that for any sentence θ consistent with T in ω-logic
there exists a LωCK1 -saturated model of T + θ. But this is a well-known result, closely related to
the Gandy Basis Theorem, and is due to Ressayre [77] (and perhaps others).
For (ii), we first need a result concerning semi-representability.
6.13 Lemma Fix some recursive set W , and suppose that for all e ∈ ω,
≺e = { 〈x, y〉 : 〈x, y, e〉 ∈ W }
is a linear ordering and that { ≺e: e ∈ ω } contains all primitive recursive well-orderings.
i. There is a Σ11 formula ψx such that
≺n is well-founded iff T ⊢ω ψn .
ii. If T is Π11-sound, we may choose ψ above to be Π
1
1 .
iii. If T is not Π11-sound and if T extends Σ
1
1-BI, we may choose ψ ∈ ∆
1
1(T).
iv. The set
{ e : ∀n (wf(≺n) ⊃ wf(≺(e,n)) ) }
is Π01 in O, and is complete for this class of sets, and hence so is
{ ψ : ∀n (wf(≺n) ⊃ (T ⊢ω ψn) ) }
where ψ ranges over Σ11 formulae, or over ∆1(T) formulae if T is not Π11-sound and extends
Σ
1
1-BI.
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Proof of 6.13: (i) Choose ψ so that T proves for all n ∈ ω,
ψn ≡ ∃τ
(
rk(τ) =≺n ∧∀σ ∈ τ
(
T
1
2 ∗σ ∧ (¬ψn) 12 ∗σ ) ) .
Then ≺n well-founded implies T ⊢ω ¬ψn ⊃ ψn, which implies T ⊢ω ψn. And T ⊢ω ψn implies
≺n well-founded.
(ii) If T is Π11-sound, we merely consider the Π
1
1 predicate
“T ⊢ω ψn ”
where ψ is as above. Alternatively, consider the predicate “T ⊢ω wf(≺n) ”.
(iii) Let ≺ be some recursive non-well-ordering which T proves is a well-ordering. Now Σ11-BI
implies that there is a hyperarithmetic hierarchy H along ≺. Let ψ be such that T proves for all
n ∈ ω,
ψn ≡ ∃H (H is a hyperarithmetic hierarchy along ≺ and ∃i∈ω ∃τ∈Hi (rk(τ) =≺n ∧∀σ∈τ (T 12 ∗σ∧(¬ψn) 12 ∗σ)) ) .
We claim that T ⊢ω ψn iff ≺n is a well-ordering. The only novel point here is to see that if T +
ψn is consistent in ω-logic, then for any ordinal α < ωCK1 , there exists a tree τ ∈ HYP of rank α
which 12∗fulfils T + ψn; this is clear from the proof of 6.5.
(iv) Finally, (iv) is obtained immediately from the above by looking at the definition of the dual
class, the collection of sets r.e. in O.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.13. 
Continuation of proof 6.12: Fix k ≥ 0, Let ψx be Σ1, and consider the fixed point
T ⊢ω Φ ≡ ∀n
(
∃τ
(
rk(τ) =≺n ∧∀σ ∈ τ (Tσ ∧ TrΣkσ ∧ Φσ) ⊃ ψn
) )
(7)
or, alternatively, the fixed point
T ⊢ω Φ ≡ ¬∀n
(
∀m
(
“≺m embeddable into ≺n” ⊃ ψm
)
⊃ ∃τ
(
rk(τ) =≺n ∧∀σ∈τ (Tσ∧Tr Σkσ∧Φσ)
) )
.
Consider:
(a) ∀n ∈ ω
(
wf(≺n) ⊃ (T ⊢ω ψn))
(b) Φ is Σk+1-conservative over T + ω-rule
(c) Φ is Σ11-conservative over T + ω-rule
(d) Φ is ∆11(T)-conservative over T + ω-rule
We claim that (a), (b) and (c) are equivalent.
First suppose (a), and let A be any model of T. We shall show that there is a k-elementary
substructure of A which is a model of T + Φ. If A  Φ, we are done. If not, choose some
witnesses n, τ ∈ A for ¬Φ. Now ≺n is necessarily non-well-founded, and so τ has (in the real
world) an infinite branch, from which we may obtain the required structure. Hence (b).
The implication (b)⊃ (c) is trivial, and (c)⊃ (a) follows from 6.5.ii. By the lemma, this gives
the first part of (ii). For the second, we merely alter (7) to ensure that there exists τ containing
any arbitrary element.
For (iii), we simply choose ψ to be ∆1(T) in (7). Then we have that (a), (b), and (d) are
equivalent.
This completes the proof of 6.12. 
VII The Paris-Harrington Statement
Since the original definition of fulfilment was motivated by the Paris-Harrington statement, PHS,
we thought that it would be appropriate to conclude this thesis with an exposition of this. For
newcomers, we mention that PHS (defined below) is a natural combinatorial sentence which is
true but not provable in PA: in fact, the instance
∀e ∃n n−→∗ (e + 1)e3
is not provable in PA, even with the set of true Π1 sentences as additional axioms. Furthermore,
if we let
σ(e, c) = µn . n−→∗ (e + 1)ec
then for each function f provably recursive in PA there exists an e such that
f (x) < σ(e, x)
for all x (although for each e the function λx .σ(e, x) is provably recursive), and
f (x) < σ(e, 3)
for all large x.
Let k, e, c be (non-negative) integers and let X be a (finite) set of integers. Say the partition
relation
X−→∗ (k)ec
holds if |X | ≥ e and for each function f : [X]e → c, where [X]e is the set of increasing e-tuples
from X and where c = {0, 1, . . . , c − 1}, there exists a large subset Y of X of cardinality at least
k which is homogeneous for f , where Y is large if |Y | ≥ minY and where Y is homogeneous for
f if f is constant on [Y ]e. This is a primitive recursive relation (in fact elementary), and so it is
expressible by a formula in the language of arithmetic which is ∆1 in PRA. The Paris-Harrington
statement is
PHS: ∀k, e, c ∃n n−→∗ (k)ec .
The plan of this chapter is as follows. First the PHS is shown to be true, and then various
independence results are established, with the PHS being shown to be equivalent to the Σ1
Reflection Principle for PA. (Only this latter fact makes any use of the notion of fulfilment.)
Then we consider the rate of growth of the function σ.
The exposition given below is an amalgam from many sources, but all the main ideas are due
to J. Paris and L. Harrington. The work of L. Kirby, G. Mills and J. Paris [79] and of J. Ketonen
and R. Solovay [79] has provided sharp results, namely that
PA−ex + Σe+1-Collection ⊢ ∀k ∃n [k, n]−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c (1)
for each integer c, and that
true Π1 sentences + Σe+1-Collection 0 ∀c ∃n n−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c . (2)
The proofs below give (2) but not (1). On the other hand, they are much simpler than those of
the above-mentioned works, replacing complex model-theoretic and combinatorial arguments by
naïve ones.
7.1 Theorem PHS is true.
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Proof: Suppose not, and let k, e, c be chosen to violate the theorem. Call f good if f : [n]e → c
for some n and f has no large homogeneous subset of cardinality ≥ k. Let
T = { g : g : [n]e → c for some n and g ⊆ f for some good f } .
ThenT ordered by inclusion is a finitely branching tree, and by our initial assumption, it is infinite.
By König’s Lemma, it has an infinite branch B. Let F = ∪B. Then F : [ω]e → c, and by the
infinite version of Ramsey’s Theorem, there exists an infinite Y ⊆ ω which is homogeneous for
F. Let X ⊆ Y be a finite large set of cardinality ≥ k. Then F↾X ⊆ f for some good function f .
But then X is homogeneous for f , which contradicts the goodness of f . 
In fact, one can show that for each e, where PA−ex is as given on 12,
PA−ex + Σ2e+4-Collection ⊢ ∀k, c ∃n [k, n]−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c . (3)
For in the above proof, we can choose the branch B so that the graph of F is definable: ∆3 in
fact. By a direct analysis of a suitable proof of the infinite Ramsey’s Theorem (see Jockusch [72],
page 275), it can be seen in PA that F has an infinite definable (it can be shown to be ∆2e+2)
homogeneous subset. The contradiction follows as above. Thus for each e the function λx . σ(e, x)
is provably recursive in PA.
The above argument will not work if e is a free variable, for Jockusch [72] proves, for instance,
that for each e ≥ 2, there exists a recursive partition of [ω]e into two classes with no infinite ∆e
homogeneous set.
7.2 Lemma For all e ≥ 1
PA−ex + Σe-Collection 0 ∀c ∃n n−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c .
Proof: (We shall in fact prove more.) Let M be a nonstandard model of PA−ex. Suppose that for
some nonstandard c ∈ M ,
∃n n−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c .
Fix n to be the least witness. Let 2b+2 be any nonstandard power of 2 less than c, and let 〈ϕi〉
be any natural listing of all ∆0 formulae whose free variables are among v0, v1, . . . , ve. Define
F : [n]e+1 → c by
F(−⇀v ) =
{
2v0 + 1 , if v0 < 2b,∑
i<b 2
i+1Fi(−⇀v ) , otherwise,
where −⇀v is (the code of) an e + 1-tuple from n, and
Fi(−⇀v ) =
{
1 , if Sat∆0(pϕiq, −⇀v ) ,
0 , otherwise,
where Sat∆0 is the usual satisfaction predicate for ∆0 formulae.
Since F can be defined internally, there exists in M a large subset {c0 < c1 < . . . } of n of
cardinality greater than e+1which is homogeneous for F. Since F(c0, . . . , ce) = F(c1, . . . , ce+1),
it must be the case that c0 ≥2b . Thus the set is of nonstandard cardinality, and so wemay consider
the initial segment I = ∪i∈ω ci. If we can show that I is a model of PA−ex + Σe-Collection, we
are done, for the partition relation is then absolute between I and M , and obviously n < I. We
proceed as follows. For a t-tuple
−⇀
i = 〈i0, . . . , it−1〉, let c−⇀i = 〈ci0 , . . . , cit−1〉.
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(i) First note that for any ∆0 formula ϕ
−⇀
v with t ≤ e + 1 free variables and for any two increasing
t-tuples 0 ≤ −⇀i , −⇀j ≤ c0 + t − e − 2, ϕc−⇀i ≡ ϕc−⇀j holds in M. If t , 0, this is because F(c−⇀i ⌣−⇀z ) =
F(c−⇀
j ⌣
−⇀z ) for −⇀z = 〈cc0+t−e−1, cc0+t−e, . . . , cc0−1〉 (where −⇀z = 〈〉 when t = e + 1).
(ii) I is closed under addition and multiplication, as follows. c0 + i ≤ ci for all i ≤ c0 − e, and so
2co − e ≤ cc0−e. As c0 > 2e, we have 32c0 < cc0−e, and hence by (i), 32c0 < c1. So (32 )ic0 < ci for
all i ≤ c0 − e and so (32 )c0/2c0 < cc0−e. Thus (c0)2 < cc0−e, and by (i) again, (ci)2 < ci+1.
Define the class ∇k of formula inductively as follows. Let ∇0 = ∆0, and let ∇k+1 be the
closure of ∇k ∪ { ∃−⇀x θ : θ ∈ ∇k } ∪ { ∀−⇀x θ : θ ∈ ∇k } under conjunction and disjunction. (NB:
we do not close under bounded quantification.) For each ∇k formula ϕ(−⇀x ), define a ∆0 formula
ϕ∆(−⇀x , y0, . . . , yk−1) inductively as follows. If ϕ is ∆0, let ϕ∆ = ϕ; let (ϕ ∨ θ)∆ = ϕ∆ ∨ θ∆, and
similarly for conjunction; and let (Q−⇀v ϕ(−⇀x , −⇀v ))∆ = Q−⇀v < y0 ϕ∆(−⇀x , −⇀v , y1, . . . , yk) for ϕ ∈ ∇k and
for Q ∃ or ∀.
Let
−−⇀
dk be the k-tuple 〈cc0−e−k, . . . , cc0−e−1〉.
(iii) We claim that if ϕ−⇀x∈∇k with k<e, then for each l, each increasing k-tuple −⇀i with l<−⇀i <c0−e,
and for all parameters −⇀x < cl,
ϕ∆(−⇀x , c−⇀
i
) ≡ ϕ∆(−⇀x , −−⇀dk ) .
The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The only non-trivial case is when ϕ−⇀x =
Q
−⇀
y ψ(−⇀x , −⇀y ) with ψ ∈ ∇k−1. Suppose the claim is false: for some l and k-tuple l < −⇀i < c0 − e,
∃
−⇀x < cl
(
ϕ∆(−⇀x , c−⇀
i
) . ϕ∆(−⇀x , −−⇀dk )
)
,
that is, ∃−⇀x < cl
(
Q
−⇀
y < ci0 ψ
∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , c−⇀
j
) . Q−⇀y < cd′ ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )
)
,
where
−⇀
i = 〈i0〉⌣−⇀j and d ′ = c0 − e − k. The inductive hypothesis gives that for all −⇀x , −⇀y < ci0 ,
ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , c−⇀
j
) ≡ ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )
so if Q = ∃, ∃−⇀x < cl
(¬∃−⇀y < ci0 ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 ) ∧ ∃−⇀y < cd′ ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )) ,
or if Q = ∀, ∃−⇀x < cl
(
∀
−⇀
y < ci0 ψ
∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 ) ∧ ¬∀−⇀y < cd′ ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )
)
.
Say Q = ∃. Since the number of c’s is 3 + (k − 1) ≤ e + 1, (i) gives
∃
−⇀x < c0
(¬∃−⇀y < c2 ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 ) ∧ ∃−⇀y < c3 ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )) .
Let f (z) = ⌊ s√z − e − k − 2 ⌋ , where s is the length of −⇀x . By (ii), c0 < f (c1), and so we may
change the latest bound on −⇀x from c0 to f (c1). So by (i), for all i with 0 < i < d ′,
∃
−⇀x < f (c0)
(¬∃−⇀y < ci ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 ) ∧ ∃−⇀y < ci+1 ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )) . (∗)
Consider in M a map from { i : 0 < i < d ′ } to { −⇀x : −⇀x < f (c0) }, where for each i we choose a
witness −⇀x to the body of (∗). The size of the codomain is f (c0)s ≤ c0 − e − k − 2 = d ′ − 2, less
than that of the domain. So by the pigeon-hole principle in M, there exist i, j with 0 < i < j < d ′
with the same witness −⇀x . That is,
¬∃−⇀y<ci ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )∧∃−⇀y<ci+1 ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )∧¬∃−⇀y<cj ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 )∧∃−⇀y<cj+1 ψ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−−⇀dk−1 ) .
But the middle two conjuncts are contradictory. The Q = ∃ case is identical, except that the
positions of the negations are changed. This proves the claim.
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(iv) Using (iii), by an easy induction on complexity, we see that for k < e, for any ∇k formula ϕ−⇀x
and any −⇀x ∈ I,
I  ϕ−⇀x iff ϕ∆(−⇀x , −−⇀dk ) . (4)
Also for any ∇e formula ϕ−⇀x and any −⇀x ∈ I,
I  ϕ−⇀x iff ∀ large j ∈ ω ϕ∆(−⇀x , cj, −−−−−⇀de−1 ) . (4′)
(v) That Σe-Collection holds in I now follows by a simple application of underspill: suppose
I  ∀−⇀x < a ∃−⇀y θ−⇀x −⇀y
where a ∈ I and where θ is a Πe−1 formula which may have parameters from I. Then for any
nonstandard i < c0 + 1 − 2e,
∀
−⇀x < a ∃−⇀y < ci θ∆(−⇀x , −⇀y , −−−−⇀de−1 ) .
By underspill, there exists a standard i for which this holds, and by (4) we are done.
(vi) We have completed the proof of the lemma, but we shall also show that parameter-free
∇e-Foundation holds in I, as follows. Let ϕx be ∇e, with no other parameters, and suppose that
I  ∃xϕx, and that we wish to find a least witness. Then
I  ∃xϕx iff ∃i ∃x < ci
(
I  ϕx
)
, i standard
iff ∃i ∃x < ci ∀ large j ϕ
∆(x, cj, −−−−⇀de−1 ), i, j standard, by (4′)
iff ∃x < ci ϕ
∆(x, cj, −−−−−⇀de−1 ), for a standard i and non-standard j (or for⇒, take j = i + 1)
iff ∃x < ci ϕ
∆(x, cj, −−−−⇀de−1 ) for all i, j ∈ M , with 0 ≤ i < j < d ′ = c0 − 2e + 1, by (i)
iff ∃x < c0 ϕ
∆(x, c2, −−−−⇀de−1 ), by (i)
which implies ∃x < c1/4 ϕ∆(x, c2, −−−−⇀de−1 ), by (ii)
iff ∃x < c0/4 ϕ∆(x, ci, −−−−⇀de−1 ), by (i) again, for all i with 0 < i < d ′.
Consider in M the map i 7→ µx < c0/4 . ϕ∆(x, ci, −−−−⇀de−1 ), 0 < i < d ′. Since d ′ − 1 > c0/4, by the
pigeon-hole principle there exist x0 < c0/4 and i, j with 0 < i < j < d ′ such that
ϕ∆(x0, ci, −−−−⇀de−1 ) ∧ ∀y < x0 ¬ϕ∆(y, ci, −−−−⇀de−1 ) ∧ ϕ∆(x0, cj, −−−−⇀de−1 ) ∧ ∀y < x0 ¬ϕ∆(y, cj, −−−−⇀de−1 ) .
And so
∃x < ci/4
(
ϕ∆(x, ci, −−−−⇀de−1 ) ∧∀y < x ¬ϕ∆(y, ci, −−−−⇀de−1 ) ∧ ϕ∆(x, cj, −−−−⇀de−1 ) ∧∀y < x ¬ϕ∆(y, cj, −−−−⇀de−1 )
)
.
By (i), this must hold for all i < j < d ′. Setting i = 0 shows the given map is constant. Thus
ϕ∆(x0, ci, −−−−⇀de−1 ) holds for all i < ω, and so I  ϕ(x0). If I  ϕ(y) for some y < x, then for some
i < c0 (in fact, for all sufficiently large i < ω), ϕ∆(y, ci, −−−−−⇀de−1 ) holds, a contradiction. 
7.3 Lemma For all e ≥ 0,
i. Σe+1-Collection is a Πe+2-conservative extension of Σe-Induction, and
ii. Σe-Induction is a Σe+2-conservative extension of Σe-Collection plus parameter-free ∇e-
Foundation (with ∇e defined on page 73), all over PA−.
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Proof: The first part of the lemma is just Application (xiv) on page 42, so let us consider the
second. Let M be any model of PA− + Σe-Collection and parameter-free ∇e-Foundation, and let
N ⊆ M consist of those elements a of M for which there is a Σe+1 formula ψx such that
M  ∃!x ψx ∧ ψa .
Then N 4e+1 M, as follows. N is clearly closed under addition and multiplication. Suppose
M  ∃xψ, where ψ is Πe. Then by parameter-free ∇e-Foundation,
∃!x ∈ M
(
M  ψx ∧ ∀y < x ¬ψy ) .
By Σe-Collection, this latter formula is equivalent to a Σe+1 formula, and so ψ has a witness in
N . Thus N 4e+1 M.
To complete the lemma, it suffices to show that N is a model of Σe-Foundation. Suppose
N  ∃xϕxa ,
where ϕ is Σe and for notational simplicity we only allow a single parameter a ∈ N . Then
M  ∃x, u, z (ϕxu ∧ ψazu) , (5)
where ψa is a Πe formula such that
M  ∃!u ∃z ψazu ∧ ∃z ψaza .
Now by parameter-free ∇e-Foundation, consider the least triple 〈x0, u0, z0〉 which is a witness
to (5). Because u0 is unique, x0 and z0 are independent of each other, and so x0 is the unique
element satisfying
M  ∃u, z (ϕxu ∧ ψazu ∧ ∀y < x ¬ϕyu) .
Now by Σe-Collection, this is equivalent to a Σe+1 formula, and so x0 ∈ N . Since N 4e+1 M, x0
is the least witness to ϕ in N also. 
From 7.2 with parameter-free ∇e-Foundation and from 7.3 as the PHS is Π2, we immediately
have:
7.4.i Theorem True Π1 sentences + Σe+1-Collection 0 ∀c ∃n n−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c . 
From the proof of 7.2 we see that in PA−ex the sentence ∀c ∃n n−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c implies that for
each m there exists a sequence of length m which fulfils the first m axioms of Σe−1-Induction,
where the most convenient notion of fulfilment to use here is the combination of the second
notion motivated by Skolem functions as given on page 8 with the version of i-fulfilment as given
on page 9. The proofs are readily formalized to yield:
PA−ex + ∀c ∃n n−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c ⊢ RFNΣ1(Σe−1-Induction) ,
and so by the remarks following 4.3, we also have
PA−ex + ∀c ∃n n−→∗ (e + 2)e+1c ⊢ RFNΣ1(Σe-Collection) .
Moreover, the proofs are uniform in e, and so we may obtain
PA−ex + ∀e, c ∃n n−→∗ (e + 1)ec ⊢ RFNΣ1(PA) .
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Furthermore, by formalizing the proof of (3) we have (where the dot notation is defined on page
21)
PA−ex ⊢ ∀e PrPA (p∀c ∃n n−→∗ ( Ûe + 1) Ûecq) ,
and so we have
7.4.ii Corollary PA−ex ⊢ ∀e, c ∃n n−→∗ (e + 1)ec ≡ RFNΣ1(PA). 
We may take a weaker instance of the left-hand-side of the above equivalence as follows.
First we need an lemma of Paris and Harrington [77].
7.5 Lemma A set Y ⊆ X is homogeneous for F : [X]e → c iff every subset of Y of cardinality
e + 1 is homogeneous for F.
Proof: Let −⇀x = 〈x0 , . . . , xe−1〉 be the first e elements of Y . Pick −⇀y = 〈y0, . . . , ye−1〉 from Y so
that F(−⇀x ) , F(−⇀y ) and y0 + y1 + · · · + ye−1 is minimal. If i is the least index such that xi , yi,
then {x0, . . . , xi, yi, . . . , ye−1} is of cardinality e + 1 but not homogeneous. 
Recall the finite version of Ramsey’s Theorem, which is provable in PRA:
∀k, e, c ∃n n → (k)ec .
7.6 Lemma If m ≥ 3, if m+ e+ 7 → (e + 1)ec , and if one of the following holds:
i. N−→∗ (m + 1)m3
ii. N−→∗ (m + 2)m2
iii. (m,N)−→∗ (m + 1)m2 , where (m,N) = { x : m < x < N };
then (m,N)−→∗ (m+ e + 7)ec .
Proof: We can suppose that e, c ≥ 2. Let F : [N]2 → c be given. Let s = m−e−1 and t = 2m+ 6.
Since t 9 (m + 1)m2 (see comment at end of chapter), we can choose g : [t]m → 2 with no
homogeneous set of cardinality m+ 1. Define f : [N]e+1 → 2 by
f (v0, . . . , ve) =
{
1 if {v0, . . . , ve} is homogeneous for F
0 otherwise.
Define G : [N]m → 3 as follows. Let −⇀v = 〈v0, . . . , vm−1〉 < N be given and let i be the least i
such that vi ≥ t, if this exists, and m otherwise. If (i) holds let
G(−⇀v ) =

g(−⇀v ) if i = m
2 if i = 1 or m − 1
parity(i) if 1 < i < m − 1
f (v0 − s, . . . , ve − s) if i = 0.
If (ii) holds, let
G(−⇀v ) =

g(−⇀v ) if i = m
parity(i) if m − e ≤ i < m
parity(i + f (vi − s, . . . , vi+e − s)) if i + e < m.
And if (iii) holds, let
G(−⇀v ) =
{
parity(i + f (vi − s, . . . , vi+e − s)) if i + e < m.
0 or 1 otherwise.
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Let X ⊆ N be homogeneous for G and such that X satisfies the appropriate conditions of (i),
(ii) or (iii). It is straightforward to check that in each case, |X | ≥min X ≥ t, and so we can suppose
X = {c0 < c1 < . . . < cc0−1}. Let Y be the first m+e+7 elements of X , and define H : [Y ]e → c by
H(v0, . . . , ve−1) = F(v0 − s, . . . , ve−1 − s) .
By our hypothesis, we can choose Z ⊆ Y homogeneous of cardinality e + 1. Now the cardinality
of Z ∪ {cm+e+7, . . . , ct−1} is (e + 1) + (t − (m + 7 − e)) = m, and the value of G on this set is 0,
and so G′′[X]m = {0}. Let X ′ = {c0 − s, . . . , cc0−s−1 − s}. Obviously m+ e + 7 ≤ min X ′ ≤ |X ′|.
We claim that X ′ is homogeneous for F. For if {x0 − s, . . . , xe − s} is any subset of X ′ of
cardinality e + 1, then the cardinality of {x0, . . . , xe} ∪ {cc0−s, . . . , cc0−1} is e + 1 + s = m, and
G(x0, . . . , xe, cc0−s, . . . , cc0−1) = 0. By Lemma 7.5, we are done. 
7.7 Theorem (i) If f : ω → ω is provably recursive in PA− + Σe+1-Collection, then
f (x) < σ(e + 1, x)
for all large x, for e ≥ 1.
(ii) If f : ω → ω is provably recursive in PA, then
f (x) < σ(x, 3)
for all large x.
Proof: (i) Suppose f is provably recursive in PA− + Σe+1-Collection. Let M be any proper
elementary extension of N, and fix c nonstandard. Let I be as in Lemma 7.2, but with a constant
for c added to the language. Now by the proof of Lemma 7.3, relativized to c, we have that
f (c) ∈ I whereas σ(e, c) < I. That is,
M  for all large x, f (x) < σ(e + 1, x) .
Now the same must be true in N.
(ii) Let M be any proper elementary extension of N, and fix e nonstandard. By 7.6 there is a
primitive recursive function g such that
σ(g(e, c), 3) > σ(e, c) .
If c is nonstandard, we may construct an initial segment which is a model of PA containing c and
e, and so g(e, c) and f (g(e, c)), but not σ(e, c), and so not σ(g(e, c), 3). The theorem follows as
before. 
By Lemma 7.6, we see that PA does not prove ∀e ∃n n−→∗ (e + 1)e3 , ∀e ∃n n−→∗ (e + 2)e2 , and
∀e ∃n (e, n)−→∗ (e + 1)e2. But we have left unanswered the question of whether or not PA proves.
∀e ∃n n−→∗ (e + 1)e2 .
This question does not appear to be answerable using our simple-minded techniques. There is an
analogous (apparently very difficult) problem concerning the ordinary Ramsey partition relation:
reasonable bounds are not known for the function
λk . µn . n → (k + 1)k2 .
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One can easily show that
(2k + 1)9 (k + 1)k2 (k ≥ 2) .
Isbell [69] has proved that 129 (4)32, and using this we may obtain17
(2k + 6)9 (k + 1)k2 (k ≥ 3) .
These lower bounds appear to me to be very low, but I cannot improve on them. Known upper
bounds are also very poor.
Addendum
Corollary 6.8 on page 67 may be strengthened by requiring thatA be only an ω-model of ∆11-CA.
Using the same technique, we may also greatly improve part (ii) of Theorem 6.12: e.g. for any
ω-consistent r.e. theory T extending ∆11-CA and for any k ≥ 3, the sets
(∃mΠk, Σk)ω and (Σk, Πk)ω
are Π01 in Kleene’s O, and are complete for this class of sets. (Here a sentence is in “∃mΠk” if
it is a Πk formula prefaced by existential numerical quantifiers.)
17 Proof of (2k + 6)9 (k + 1)k2 for k ≥ 3. We can suppose k > 3. Let:
green = { n : n < 12 }, the first twelve numbers
red = { n : 12 ≤ n < k − 3 + 12 }, the next k − 3 numbers
blue = { n : k − 3 + 12 ≤ n < 2(k − 3) + 12 }, and the next k − 3 numbers
Choose f: [12]3 → 2 to witness 129 (4)32. Define F: [2k + 6]k → 2 by
F(X) = parity(D + E)
where D(X) =
{
index of first blue number in natural order, if it exists
k, otherwise
where E(X) =
{
f (Y), if |X ∩ 12| ≥ 3, where Y consists of the three least elements of X
0, otherwise
Suppose F has a homogeneous set Z ⊆ 2k + 6 of cardinality k + 1. Then |Z ∩ 12| ≤ 3. Hence Z must contain both
red and blue numbers. But F(Z \ {any red number}) cannot equal F(Z \ {any blue number}). 
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